Henson v. Corizon Health LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMarch 18, 2022
Docket2:19-cv-04396
StatusUnknown

This text of Henson v. Corizon Health LLC (Henson v. Corizon Health LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Henson v. Corizon Health LLC, (D. Ariz. 2022).

Opinion

1 WO SH 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Christopher James Henson, No. CV 19-04396-PHX-MTL (DMF) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Corizon Health LLC, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 Plaintiff Christopher James Henson, who is currently confined in Arizona State 16 Prison Complex (ASPC)-Florence, East Unit, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 17 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 116.) Defendant Shinn moves for summary judgment. (Doc. 18 231.) Although Plaintiff was informed of his right and obligation to respond to Defendant’s 19 Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff did not respond, and the time to do so has 20 expired.1 21 I. Background 22 On screening of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 116) pursuant to 28 23 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated constitutional claims against 24 Defendants Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Director David Shinn (in his 25 official capacity only), Corizon Health, Centurion of Arizona, Nurse Practitioner Dorothy 26 Igwe, Contracting Monitoring Bureau Director David Robertson, Supervisor Vanessa 27

28 1 The Court provided notice to Plaintiff pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), regarding the requirements of a response. (Doc. 233.) 1 Headstream, Dr. Rodney Stewart, Medical Director Thomas Lutz, Facility Health 2 Administrators Adam Perkins and Trina Randall, Nursing Supervisors Elizabeth Pontious 3 and Phyllis Raney, and ADC Office of Publication Review employees Tray Williams and 4 Diane Miller and ordered them to respond to the respective claims against them. (Docs. 5 70, 117.) The Court subsequently dismissed Defendants Williams and Miller pursuant to 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Doc. 162.) The Court also dismissed Defendant 7 Lutz for failure to timely serve. (Doc. 179.) 8 On September 16, 2021, the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants 9 Corizon, Centurion, Igwe, Stewart, Perkins, Robertson, Headstream, Pontious, Randall, 10 and Raney and dismissed them from the action with prejudice. (Doc. 225.) 11 Plaintiff’s sole remaining claim is Count 5 in which he alleges that Defendant Shinn 12 violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to implement proper cleaning and 13 screening policies to protect him and other prisoners from Covid-19. Defendant Shinn now 14 moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim regarding ADC’s Covid-19 protocols. 15 (Doc. 231.) 16 II. Summary Judgment Standard 17 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 18 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 20 movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 21 those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 22 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 23 If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 24 produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 25 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 26 to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 27 contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 28 governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 1 jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 3 Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 4 favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 5 it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 6 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 7 citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 8 At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 9 determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 10 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 11 all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 12 materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 13 III. Exhaustion 14 Defendant Shinn first argues that Plaintiff did not exhaust the available 15 administrative remedy with respect to his claim regarding ADC’s Covid-19 protocols. 16 A. Exhaustion Standard 17 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner must exhaust “available” 18 administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); 19 Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 20 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). The prisoner must complete the administrative review process in 21 accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). 22 Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 23 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the administrative process, Booth v. 24 Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 25 The defendant bears the initial burden to show that there was an available 26 administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust it. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 27 1162, 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014); see Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37 (a defendant must 28 demonstrate that applicable relief remained available in the grievance process). Once that 1 showing is made, the burden shifts to the prisoner, who must either demonstrate that he, in 2 fact, exhausted administrative remedies or “come forward with evidence showing that there 3 is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available 4 administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The 5 ultimate burden, however, rests with the defendant. Id.

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Henson v. Corizon Health LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/henson-v-corizon-health-llc-azd-2022.