Henschen v. Ohio Dept. of Taxation, 06 Ap 341 (5-24-2007)

2007 Ohio 2528
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 24, 2007
DocketNo. 06 AP 341.
StatusPublished

This text of 2007 Ohio 2528 (Henschen v. Ohio Dept. of Taxation, 06 Ap 341 (5-24-2007)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Henschen v. Ohio Dept. of Taxation, 06 Ap 341 (5-24-2007), 2007 Ohio 2528 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

OPINION
{¶ 1} In 2001, the Ohio Department of Taxation ("ODT") reorganized positions in the organization and several positions were abolished based on a provided rationale of the efficient operation of the ODT. Many of the affected employees filed appeals with the State Personnel Board of Review ("SPBR"). The cases were consolidated and a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") in November 2002. The *Page 2 ALJ issued a report and recommendation finding that ODT's actions constituted bad faith which required a disaffirmance of the abolishments. The ALJ concluded the abolishment of the existing positions of tax commissioner agent supervisor was purposely delayed until the newly created classification of tax auditor manager was filled. Thus, appellees were prevented from exercising their displacement rights. Further, the ALJ found that the rationale provided by ODT for the abolishments was due to reasons of efficiency but, at the hearing, the evidence demonstrated that the basis was for reasons of economy. The ALJ concluded that reasons of increased efficiency and economy are two separate rationales provided by R.C. 124.321(D) and ODT's failure to allege the true rationale for the abolishments also required disaffirmance.

{¶ 2} ODT filed objections to the ALJ's report and recommendation and many of the employees' cases were resolved. The SPBR adopted the findings of the ALJ but rejected her recommendation. The SPBR found that ODT complied with the pertinent procedural and substantive prerequisites and complied with the legal standards for abolishment as set forth inPenrod v. Dept. of Admin. Serv. (SPBR case No. 02-ABL-08-0276), and did not engage in bad faith.1

{¶ 3} The three remaining employees, Rita K. Henschen, Jeffrey L. Point, and David T. Buken, filed appeals to the common pleas court. The common pleas court determined that SPBR's order was not supported by reliable, credible, and probative evidence and was not in accordance with law. *Page 3

{¶ 4} ODT filed a notice of appeal in two cases, No. 06AP-341, involving Henschen and Point, and No. 06AP-342, involving Buken. The cases were consolidated, but the appeals pertaining to Point and Buken have since been dismissed and this appeal only involves Henschen. ODT raised the following assignment of error:

The court of common pleas abused its discretion when it adopted the finding of the ALJ regarding bad faith as to Point and Henschen.

{¶ 5} R.C. 119.12 provides the standard of review for the common pleas court, as follows:

The court may affirm the order of the agency complained of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire record and such additional evidence as the court has admitted, that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. In the absence of such a finding, it may reverse, vacate or modify the order or make such other ruling as is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. * * *

{¶ 6} In Lorain City Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1988),40 Ohio St.3d 257, 260-261, the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the standard of review for an appellate court as follows:

In reviewing an order of an administrative agency, an appellate court's role is more limited than that of a trial court reviewing the same order. It is incumbent on the trial court to examine the evidence. Such is not the charge of the appellate court. The appellate court is to determine only if the trial court has abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion `* * * implies not merely error of judgment, but perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency.' State, ex rel. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., v. Lancaster (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 191, 193 * * *. Absent an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, a court of appeals must affirm the trial court's *Page 4 judgment. See Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82 * * *.

The fact that the court of appeals, or this court, might have arrived at a different conclusion than did the administrative agency is immaterial. Appellate courts must not substitute their judgment for those of an administrative agency or a trial court absent the approved criteria for doing so.

{¶ 7} On questions of law, however, the court of appeals review is plenary. Univ. Hosp., Univ. of Cincinnati College of Medicine v. StateEmp. Relations Bd. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 339, paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶ 8} In Our Place, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm. (1992),63 Ohio St.3d 570, 571, the court defined the evidence required by R.C. 119.12, as follows:

* * * (1) "Reliable" evidence is dependable; that is, it can be confidently trusted. In order to be reliable, there must be a reasonable probability that the evidence is true. (2) "Probative" evidence is evidence that tends to prove the issue in question; it must be relevant in determining the issue. (3) "Substantial" evidence is evidence with some weight; it must have importance and value.

(Footnotes omitted.)

{¶ 9} By their assignment of error, ODT contends that the common pleas court abused its discretion in adopting the finding of the ALJ regarding bad faith.

{¶ 10} The testimony regarding the reorganization of ODT established that Thomas Zaino became the Tax Commissioner in July 1999. Prior to 2001, ODT had a number of district offices throughout the state and each office performed taxpayer services such as taxpayer assistance as well as field and desk audits. In January 2000, the department held a retreat at Deer Creek State Park, with a goal to develop a plan for restructuring the tax department. From this retreat developed the concept that the *Page 5 department would be reorganized, creating a new auditing division, which would be separate from the taxpayer service division. Thus, the audit division would primarily perform field audits and the taxpayer service division would be responsible for the other taxpayer services. The goal was to have the audit division begin functioning July 1, 2001.

{¶ 11} As part of the reorganization, a new Tax Auditor Classification series was to be created and added to the state's classification system. The new series included newly created Tax Auditor Agent Classifications, which were in a bargaining unit, and supervisory positions Tax Audit Manager 1 and Tax Auditor Manager 2, which were positions exempt from the bargaining unit. The Department of Administrative Services ("DAS") created the new tax auditor positions and revised the existing Tax Commissioner Agent positions. These new bargaining unit classifications became effective July 1, 2001. (Tr.

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McAlpin v. Shirey
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501 N.E.2d 648 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1985)
Rohde v. Farmer
262 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1970)
University Hospital v. State Employment Relations Board
587 N.E.2d 835 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1992)
Our Place, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Commission
589 N.E.2d 1303 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
2007 Ohio 2528, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/henschen-v-ohio-dept-of-taxation-06-ap-341-5-24-2007-ohioctapp-2007.