Henry v. Jackson

37 Vt. 431
CourtSupreme Court of Vermont
DecidedJanuary 15, 1865
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 37 Vt. 431 (Henry v. Jackson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Henry v. Jackson, 37 Vt. 431 (Vt. 1865).

Opinion

Aldis, J.

The bill seeks to charge the defendants with their shares of the losses sustained in the management of an union store at Westford from June 1st, 1851, to August 20th, 1856.

The defendants insist they ought not to contribute to make up these losses because they have arisen from the negligence of three of the orators — Beach, Henry and Bellows — in the discharge of their duty as directors.

I. The defendants claim that this fact of negligence has been found by the master appointed to take the account. We are clear however that that subject was not referred to him. That is the vital point of defence made in the answers — the leading and material question in issue upon which the court, and not the master, is called upon to decide. The order of reference does not refer it to him [432]*432for consideration. His finding upon this question, whether founded upon the evidence now before us or upon other proofs not before us we cannot tell, must be laid out of the case.

n. To determine this question of negligence we must ascertain-what were the respective rights and duties of the directors of the division and of the agents ; then the losses, from what causes they arose and whether from the negligence of the directors so as to make them chargeable.

The defendants claim that the directors should be held to the strict performance of all the duties prescribed for them in the bylaws ; and that they are responsible for the same measure of diligence that the trustees and directors of private corporations are.

But in regard to this association it is to be observed that their constitution and all their rights and duties under it stand wholly upon agreement and consent — not at all upon law or acts of incorporation. Hence evidence of their custom — of their established and uniform mode of doing business^ — becomes admissible to show consent to or acquiescence in a practice and actual modification or Change of their by-laws.

If these directors were to be held liable for the performance of the duties and the exercise of the powers named in their written articles, I should find it very difficult to say that they had not grossly neglected them, and had not contributed at least to increase the losses by erroneously reporting the condition of- the business to be safe and prosperous, and so prolonging the existence of the association.

But the court does not take this view of their duties, nor consider that the evidence shows such negligence of the real and actual duties imposed upon and expected of them, as should subject them to its losses.

Without attempting any reference in detail to the great volume of evidence and exhibits, we will briefly refer to those more obvious matters appearing in the nature of the organization, its character, object, written articles, real necessities and in the character of the men who composed it and of their uniform mode of doing business, which lead us to conclude that it would not be’ just to charge the three directors with these losses.

[433]*433First. Their business was to buy goods and sell them to the members, and sell the products of the members, so as to save to themselves some of the profits which are usually paid to the merchants. But the members appear, all of them, to have been farmers and mechanics wholly ignorant of this kind of trade. The directors were known to be equally ignorant of the business, and reluctant to enter upon the duties of their office.

Their constitution is quite full and minute in establishing rules fit for a debating society, but wholly silent upon points the most vital to their pecuniary welfare. They propose to establish a country store to sell goods much cheaper than other stores, yet nothing is said as to how a sufficient capital — the first element of success — is to be provided. ' The $10. admission fee, of which $7. might at any time be withdrawn, is too insignificant a contribution to this end to be regarded. This important matter is left open for practical adjustment by the division, to be solved by borrowing money or buying on a credit as best they might. How far want of capital, the necessity of borrowing, perhaps of usurers ; or buying upon credit poor goods at high prices may have contributed to loss it is impossible to tell. The theory of trade upon which the association was founded seems to have excluded, practically, at least to a great extent, a consideration of this point.

It must have been obvious at the outset that they must have an agent or clerk to tend the store and sell the goods, to judge as to whom to trust and to collect debts — to see to the replenishing of the stock and buying goods in market. It could not be expected that directors would do more than advise and oversee in these matters. Yet this vital point is only incidentally alluded to in one of the articles. He who is practically the most important officer of the company — the real manager of the whole business — is not referred to as an officer of the division. Although his duties comprise almost the whole work to be done, nothing is said as to how he shall be employed, or what he shall do, or what record or report he shall make of his doings. This palpable omission in the constitution began to show itself and to call for relief at the beginning of the business. When directors were chosen, upon whom the written articles imposed these duties in part, they hesitated to accept, said they were unskilful [434]*434and inexperienced; and then at the first meeting it was talked up (as the witnesses say) that an agent must be hired to attend to the business, and that there would not be much for the directors to do< This agent should buy and sell goods and make the inventories. From that first meeting agents were hired, and did in fact manage the whole business unless it was to borrow money — made the directors’reports and read them to the meeting. We cannot think but that every member of the association knew full well how all the business was done, and that the written regulations as to the duties of the directors were not expected to be lived up to. Witnesses may be asked whether to their knowledge the members knew that the directors did not perform the duties named in the articles, and may be obliged to say in truth that they cannot say that the members did know of it. But when we consider that these duties if performed would constantly have brought the knowledge that they were so performed to the members, and that from the beginning they were not performed at all for a period of over five years — that the division held monthly meetings at which it was expressly provided that they might require reports from the directors, and none ever were required - — it is impossible for the mind to feel that the members did not know1 that the directors were not expected to come up to the standard of the constitution ; — that in fact all acquiesced in having the business done as it was practically done.

By the by-laws and by the practice of the association the members had the' right to examine the books and papers of the officers,- and in this respect we think had much more extensive rights than have the members of ordinary corporations. So too it is obvious that the division was expected to exercise a much more direct control and constant supervision of business matters, than do the members or stockholders of common joint stock companies.

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Bluebook (online)
37 Vt. 431, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/henry-v-jackson-vt-1865.