Henry v. Department of Transportation

Supreme Court of Georgia

Henry v. Department of Transportation

339 S.E.2d 715, 255 Ga. 467, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 592

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 25, 1986

Docket42981

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 339 S.E.2d 715 (Henry v. Department of Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Henry v. Department of Transportation, 339 S.E.2d 715, 255 Ga. 467, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 592 (Ga. 1986).

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Opinion

Per curiam.

A trustee in bankruptcy sought to pursue in the superior court, as an asset of the debtor, a damage suit commenced by the debtor, as [468]*468plaintiff, against Cobb County. The trial court entered an order declaring the case dismissed by operation of law under OCGA § 9-2-60 (b), which provides: “Any action or other proceeding filed in any of the courts of this state in which no written order is taken for a period of five years shall automatically stand dismissed with costs to be taxed against the party plaintiff.”

Decided February 25, 1986. Thomas A. Bowman, for appellant. Sams, Glover & Gentry, Richard W. Calhoun, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Roland F. Matson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.

Excluding the period of time between commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings and “60 days after the order for relief,” 11 USCA § 108 (b), the interval between the taking of written orders in superior court was in excess of five years. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found the complaint to be dismissed. See West v. Dept. of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 603 (330 SE2d 803) (1985).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

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Per curiam.

A trustee in bankruptcy sought to pursue in the superior court, as an asset of the debtor, a damage suit commenced by the debtor, as [468]*468plaintiff, against Cobb County. The trial court entered an order declaring the case dismissed by operation of law under OCGA § 9-2-60 (b), which provides: “Any action or other proceeding filed in any of the courts of this state in which no written order is taken for a period of five years shall automatically stand dismissed with costs to be taxed against the party plaintiff.”

Decided February 25, 1986. Thomas A. Bowman, for appellant. Sams, Glover & Gentry, Richard W. Calhoun, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Roland F. Matson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.

Excluding the period of time between commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings and “60 days after the order for relief,” 11 USCA § 108 (b), the interval between the taking of written orders in superior court was in excess of five years. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found the complaint to be dismissed. See West v. Dept. of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 603 (330 SE2d 803) (1985).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

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Bluebook (online)

339 S.E.2d 715, 255 Ga. 467, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 592, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/henry-v-department-of-transportation-ga-1986.

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