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“NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION”
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RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 2026 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky 2025-SC-0083-MR
HENRY JUNIE CRAWFORD, JR. APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE PATRICIA MORRIS, JUDGE NO. 07-CR-000418
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING
This appeal arises from a resentencing proceeding conducted after the Kentucky Court of Appeals’ determination that Appellant Henry Crawford, Jr.’s (“Crawford”) jury-recommended and court-imposed 200-year sentence exceeded the statutory maximum authorized by KRS 1 532.110(1)(c). 2 The Court of Appeals vacated Crawford’s sentence and, following remand, a new sentencing hearing was held on November 21, 2024.
The trial court sentenced Crawford to 50 years in prison for each offense of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, first-degree burglary, and first-degree
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2 Upon direct appeal, this Court had previously affirmed the 200-year sentence
in Crawford v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-SC-000645-MR, 2012 WL 601248 (Ky. Feb. 23, 2012).
robbery, as enhanced by the PFO charge. The trial court ran the sentences consecutively but capped the sentence at 70 years in prison based on the maximum allowed under KRS 532.110(1)(c). Crawford now appeals from the new sentence. Having reviewed the record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Underlying offenses and original prosecution.
The underlying offenses occurred on October 16, 1990, in Jefferson County. According to the Commonwealth, the victim returned home after dropping off her daughter at daycare and was attacked by an assailant who had concealed himself inside her residence. The assailant struck the victim in the head, held a firearm to her head, bound her hands and legs, blindfolded her, removed her clothing, and forcibly raped and sodomized her. The assailant subsequently rummaged through the home and stole property, including a handgun and a ring. After hearing what was perceived as the kitchen door open and close, she began a long struggle to free herself and was only able to remove the bindings from her legs. Unclothed and bleeding from the head wound, she sought help. Passengers from a passing truck wrapped her in a blanket and helped her into a neighbor’s home until an ambulance transported her to a hospital. At the hospital, sexual-assault evidence was collected.
The offenses remained unsolved for approximately sixteen years. In 2006, Crawford’s DNA profile was entered into the Combined DNA Index
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System (“CODIS”) and matched biological evidence obtained during the victim’s sexual assault examination. The investigation revealed that Crawford had been seen in the neighborhood at the same time the crimes were committed, and DNA testing conducted on the blanket used by the victim immediately after the assault revealed a mixture of the victim’s DNA and Crawford’s DNA.
On January 31, 2007, a Jefferson County grand jury indicted Crawford on first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, first-degree burglary, first-degree robbery, and first-degree persistent felony offender (“PFO I”). Before trial, Crawford successfully moved to have the sentencing statutes in effect in 1990 applied to his cases, including the violent-offender provisions then in effect, because those provisions were more favorable with respect to parole eligibility and calculation of life sentences. The trial court granted the motion.
A jury trial was held in May and June of 2010. The jury convicted Crawford of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, first-degree burglary, first- degree robbery, and PFO I. The jury initially fixed his punishment at twenty years on each substantive offense and recommended consecutive service. Following the PFO phase, the jury enhanced the punishment for each offense to fifty years and again recommended that the sentences run consecutively, resulting in a total recommended sentence of 200 years’ imprisonment. The trial court imposed a sentence consistent with the jury’s recommendation.
B. Direct appeal and post-conviction litigation.
Crawford appealed his convictions and sentence to this Court. Among other issues, he argued that the trial court should have applied the seventy-
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year aggregate sentencing cap contained in KRS 532.110(1)(c). This Court rejected that claim because Crawford had affirmatively elected to proceed under the 1990 sentencing scheme before trial and had not provided the unqualified consent necessary to invoke retroactive application of later sentencing legislation under KRS 446.110. Therefore, this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.
Following affirmance on direct appeal, Crawford pursued post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 3 11.42, which was ultimately unsuccessful. Significant to the present appeal, Crawford later filed a pro se motion under CR 4 60.02 challenging the legality of the 200-year sentence, asserting the aggregate sentence violated the sentencing cap established by KRS 532.110. The Jefferson Circuit Court denied relief. Crawford appealed.
C. Court of Appeals decision vacating the sentence.
On January 26, 2024, the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of CR 60.02 relief. Both parties agree that the Court of Appeals concluded Crawford’s aggregate 200-year sentence exceeded the statutory maximum authorized by KRS 532.110(1)(c). While the operative language of the Court of Appeals’ mandate is agreed upon, the parties differ with regard to its effect.
The Court of Appeals held that Crawford’s sentence was void “only as to the excess portion of his sentence” and remanded for correction of the illegal sentence and imposition of a sentence not exceeding the seventy-year statutory
3 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
4 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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maximum. The dispute is whether that decision directs correction to comply with the statutory cap, which was properly implemented by the trial court when it implemented that mandate by imposing a seventy-year aggregate sentence, or whether the Court of Appeals merely established the outer boundary of a lawful sentence and left the trial court free to impose any lesser lawful sentence after considering mitigation and aggravation.
A review of the record reflects defense counsel filed a substantial sentencing memorandum in advance of the hearing. According to Crawford, the memorandum argued that a sentence substantially below seventy years would satisfy the goals of sentencing while recognizing Crawford’s rehabilitative efforts and current circumstances. At the time of resentencing, Crawford was approximately sixty years old and had served roughly fifteen years in prison on the conviction at issue. Crawford had allegedly amassed a significant record of educational, vocational, religious, and rehabilitative accomplishments during incarceration. Submissions included documentation reflecting completion of a GED program, employment evaluations, vocational training, Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous participation, faith-based programming, anger-management programming, life-skills courses, family reunification programs, and numerous certificates recognizing completion of prison-based initiatives.
Crawford also submitted numerous letters of support from family, friends, and community supporters. According to Crawford, those materials included letters from his children, grandchild, siblings, former spouse, and
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individuals associated with prison ministry programs. Crawford additionally submitted a letter in which he maintained his innocence while expressing sympathy for the victim.
D. Issues at the resentencing hearing.
One of the principal issues raised concerns about information presented by the prosecutor at the outset of the hearing. The prosecutor informed the court that Crawford had been indicted in 2018 in Jefferson Circuit Court on allegations involving a separate rape reportedly committed in 1983. The prosecutor further stated that the prosecution had been dismissed in 2020 after the alleged victim died. According to the defense, no documentary evidence, testimony, indictment, court records, or other proof supporting those assertions was submitted. The prosecutor explained that the information would have appeared in an updated presentence investigation (“PSI”) report and indicated she intended to argue it as part of the aggravating circumstances relevant to sentencing.
After expressing that he did not see the relevance of that information to the present sentencing, Crawford, by way of counsel, stated that, if the case existed, he would not object to “reality.” Crawford’s age, lengthy incarceration, participation in treatment, extensive educational and faith-based programming, strong family support network, and absence of disciplinary problems while incarcerated were argued to demonstrate Crawford was a materially different person than the individual sentenced in 2010. Crawford argued a seventy-year sentence would effectively guarantee he would die in prison and give
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insufficient weight to rehabilitation as a sentencing objective. He personally addressed the court, discussed his achievements, asserted that he no longer posed a danger to the community, and expressed a desire to contribute positively to society.
A second issue involves the scope of testimony presented by the victim.
The victim addressed the court during resentencing and urged imposition of the maximum lawful sentence. Crawford contends the victim exceeded the scope of allowable participation in sentencing proceedings by discussing matters beyond the impact of the offenses, including sentencing recommendations, advocacy activities, and references to other alleged victims.
Following the hearing, Jefferson Circuit Court imposed an aggregate sentence of seventy years’ imprisonment. The sentencing order reflects that the court reviewed the presentence investigation report, considered the circumstances of the offenses, examined Crawford’s history and character, and evaluated the parties’ sentencing positions. The court reimposed fifty-year PFO-enhanced sentences on the underlying convictions and ordered them to run consecutively, subject to the statutory limitation imposed by KRS 532.110(1)(c). As a result, the aggregate sentence was reduced from 200 years to 70 years. Crawford now claims three errors for which he requests relief in the form of a vacatur of the November 21, 2024, resentencing judgment and a remand for a new sentencing hearing before the trial court. The three alleged errors are: (1) the trial court improperly considered unsupported allegations relating to a separate dismissed rape prosecution; (2) the victim’s testimony
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exceeded permissible statutory limits; and (3) the trial court failed to exercise independent sentencing discretion and improperly imposed the maximum lawful sentence without adequate consideration of rehabilitation and mitigation.
II. ANALYSIS
This appeal presents issues concerning preservation, sentencing procedure, the admission and consideration of information at sentencing, and the scope of a trial court’s discretion on resentencing. The parties dispute preservation as to Crawford’s first and second assignments of error. The Commonwealth contends Crawford failed to contemporaneously object to the prosecutor’s reference to the dismissed rape indictment and to portions of the victim’s testimony, limiting review to palpable error under RCr 10.26. Crawford, however, maintains that these issues were preserved by his question as to their relevance or, alternatively, warrant palpable-error review. Crawford’s third claim, that the trial court failed to exercise independent sentencing discretion, was preserved by the resentencing proceedings and is reviewed under the ordinary standards governing sentencing decisions. A trial court’s evidentiary rulings during sentencing, as well as its ultimate sentencing decision, are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
A. Whether the trial court improperly considered an unsubstantiated dismissed rape indictment during resentencing was not palpable error.
The parties dispute whether the issue was preserved. The Commonwealth argues the issue is unpreserved because Crawford failed to
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object when the prosecutor advised the court of the dismissed indictment. Defense counsel stated that he did not believe the information was relevant but would not object if the prosecutor’s representation was accurate. He did not object to the correction of the PSI report nor the testimony about this indictment by the victim. Under Kentucky preservation principles, the claim challenging the admission and consideration of the dismissed indictment is more appropriately reviewed for palpable error under RCr 10.26.
Because this issue was unpreserved, it is reviewed for palpable error.
RCr 10.26 states,
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.
To establish palpable error, Appellant must show “the probability of a different result or error so fundamental as to threaten his entitlement to due process of law.” Huddleston v. Commonwealth, 542 S.W.3d 237, 245 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Brooks v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 219, 225 (Ky. 2007)). “On appellate review, our focus is on whether ‘the defect is so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process.’” Id. (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006)). “For an error to be palpable, it must be easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A palpable error must be so grave in
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nature that if it were uncorrected, it would seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings.” Id.
To the extent the claim challenges the sentence itself, sentencing decisions within statutory limits are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Howard v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 471, 475 (Ky. 2016). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Application Crawford argues that the resentencing proceeding was tainted when the prosecutor informed the court that he had been indicted in 2018 for an alleged rape committed in 1983 in which the prosecution was dismissed after the complainant died before trial. According to Crawford, the allegation was unsupported by testimony, documentary evidence, or any adversarial testing, yet suggested he had committed another violent sexual offense despite never being convicted.
Although sentencing proceedings are not governed by the strict rules of evidence applicable at trial, due process requires that sentencing decisions rest upon reliable information. Doolan v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1978). Here, the allegation concerned conduct substantially similar to the offenses for which Crawford was being resentenced, was presented solely through the prosecutor's representations, never resulted in a conviction, and was not included in an updated PSI report.
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Kentucky law affords sentencing courts broad latitude to consider information concerning the defendant's background, criminal history, and character. See KRS 532.050; KRS 532.055; Caraway v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Ky. 2015). Because this was a judicial resentencing rather than a jury proceeding, the trial court is presumed capable of distinguishing reliable information from unsupported advocacy and assigning appropriate weight to the information presented. Howard, 496 S.W.3d at 475.
The record contains substantial aggravating evidence independent of the challenged allegation. Crawford was originally convicted of violent offenses arising from a home invasion, kidnapping, robbery, rape, and sodomy, and the jury recommended consecutive enhanced sentences totaling 200 years. The Court of Appeals disturbed only the legality of the aggregate sentence—not the underlying convictions or the seriousness of the offenses. The resentencing court also considered the original record, the victim's testimony, the PSI report, and Crawford's extensive mitigation evidence. Nothing in the record affirmatively demonstrates that the dismissed indictment was a determinative factor in the court's sentencing decision.
Likewise, Crawford's challenge to the lack of an updated PSI report fails to warrant reversal in this instance. Crawford identifies no additional information an updated report would have contained that was reasonably likely to affect the sentence imposed. Absent a showing of prejudice, procedural irregularities in sentencing generally do not justify reversal. Aaron v. Commonwealth, 810 S.W.2d 60, 61–62 (Ky. App. 1991). Accordingly, while the
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prosecutor's reference to the dismissed indictment may warrant caution regarding the use of unsupported allegations at sentencing, Crawford has not demonstrated either palpable error or prejudice requiring a new sentencing hearing.
B. Whether the victim’s testimony exceeded the scope authorized for victim participation at sentencing was not palpable error.
This issue was unpreserved and is reviewed for palpable error under RCr 10.26 (see above).
Crawford argues the victim exceeded the proper scope of victim-impact testimony by requesting the maximum sentence, discussing her advocacy work, referring to another alleged victim, and expressing opinions concerning Crawford's rehabilitation and lack of remorse.
Although Kentucky's Victims' Bill of Rights guarantees victims a meaningful opportunity to be heard, sentencing remains the responsibility of the court. The trial court therefore retains authority to ensure victim-impact evidence remains relevant and fundamentally fair.
KRS 421.520 governs victim impact statements and reads:
(2) The impact statement may contain, but need not be limited to, a description of the nature and extent of any physical, psychological, or financial harm suffered by the victim, the victim's need for restitution and whether the victim has applied for or received compensation for financial loss, and the victim's recommendation for an appropriate sentence.
(emphasis added).
KRS 421.520 expressly authorizes a victim to submit a victim-impact statement and to recommend an appropriate sentence. The statute broadly
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defines the permissible content of a victim-impact statement and is not limited solely to describing the physical, emotional, or financial effects of the crime. Moreover, Kentucky courts have recognized broad participation rights for crime victims during sentencing proceedings. See Thacker v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 287 (Ky. 2006); Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 26 (Ky. 2004).
Kentucky's victim-rights statutes guarantee victims the opportunity to be heard at sentencing but do not eliminate the trial court's obligation to ensure sentencing proceedings remain fundamentally fair. Although victim-impact evidence serves an important purpose, the sentencing decision ultimately rests with the court, not the victim.
Additionally, this case involved a judicial resentencing rather than a jury penalty phase. Unlike a jury, a trial judge is presumed capable of separating proper victim-impact evidence from emotional advocacy and of assigning appropriate weight to the statements presented. Howard, 496 S.W.3d at 475. Nothing in the record suggests the trial court believed itself bound by the victim's recommendation or otherwise surrendered its independent sentencing responsibility.
Finally, even assuming portions of the victim's testimony extended beyond the ideal scope of victim-impact evidence, Crawford has not demonstrated prejudice. The court was already familiar with the underlying offenses through the original trial, the appellate proceedings, and the resentencing record. The victim's recommendation for the maximum sentence added little to the aggravating circumstances already before the court.
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C. Whether the trial court failed to exercise independent sentencing discretion.
Crawford argues that the trial court failed to conduct a genuine resentencing hearing and instead treated the Court of Appeals' remand as requiring imposition of the maximum lawful sentence. He contends the court gave controlling weight to the original jury's recommendation, failed to meaningfully consider his extensive evidence of rehabilitation, and effectively punished him for maintaining his innocence rather than exercising independent sentencing discretion.
Crawford identifies the principal issue presented by this appeal. The Court of Appeals vacated only the illegal portion of Crawford's sentence and remanded for imposition of a lawful sentence not exceeding the seventy-year statutory maximum. The central question is whether the trial court independently determined that a seventy-year sentence remained appropriate or merely believed that result was compelled by the remand order.
The resentencing record supports the independent determination of the sentence’s appropriateness.
A trial court's sentencing decision within the statutory range is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Howard, 496 S.W.3d at 475. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. English, 993 S.W.2d at 945. To the extent Crawford's claim requires interpretation of the Court of Appeals' remand order, that issue presents a question of law reviewed de novo. See Commonwealth v. Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717, 722 (Ky. 2013).
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Resolution of this issue turns on the scope of the Court of Appeals'
remand and the nature of the resentencing proceedings that followed. The Court of Appeals held only that Crawford's aggregate 200-year sentence exceeded the statutory maximum authorized by KRS 532.110(1)(c) and remanded for imposition of a lawful sentence. It did not direct the trial court to impose a seventy-year sentence, nor did it prohibit the court from imposing a lesser lawful sentence. Accordingly, upon remand, the trial court retained discretion to determine an appropriate sentence within the statutory limits.
The record reflects that the court understood the remand in that manner.
Rather than simply entering an amended judgment reducing Crawford's aggregate sentence to seventy years, the court conducted a resentencing hearing, received sentencing memoranda from both parties, considered extensive documentary mitigation evidence, heard argument of counsel, permitted Crawford to allocute, and received the victim's statement before imposing sentence. The aforementioned proceeding is inconsistent with Crawford's assertion that the trial court believed its role was merely ministerial.
Crawford nevertheless argues that the trial court failed to meaningfully consider the mitigation evidence presented at resentencing. The record demonstrates otherwise. Crawford introduced substantial evidence concerning his conduct during incarceration, including educational achievements, vocational training, institutional programming, family support, and evidence of rehabilitation. The circuit court was entitled to consider that evidence. It was
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likewise entitled to weigh those mitigating circumstances against the seriousness of the underlying offenses, the original jury's sentencing recommendation, and the remaining aggravating circumstances reflected in the record. The fact that the court ultimately assigned greater weight to the aggravating evidence does not establish that it failed to consider the mitigation evidence presented.
The court clearly understood sentencing remained a discretionary judicial function rather than a ministerial correction of the judgment. Nor does the imposition of the statutory maximum itself establish an abuse of discretion. A sentencing court may consider substantial mitigating evidence and nevertheless conclude that the seriousness of the offenses warrants the maximum lawful sentence.
Likewise, the record does not establish that the trial court increased Crawford's sentence because he maintained his innocence or declined to participate in sex-offender treatment. Although those matters were discussed during the hearing, the sentencing order reflects that the court considered the offense conduct, Crawford's history and character, the PSI report, the victim's statement, and the mitigation evidence submitted by the defense. Nothing affirmatively demonstrates that the court believed a seventy-year sentence was mandatory or that it failed to exercise independent judgment.
Accordingly, the resentencing record demonstrates that the trial court exercised its sentencing discretion within the lawful statutory range. As such,
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the trial court’s imposed sentence was not “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” English, 993 S.W.2d at 945.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error during Crawford's resentencing proceeding. Because it properly exercised its sentencing discretion and imposed a lawful sentence within the statutory limits, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
Lambert, C.J.; Conley, Goodwine, Keller, Nickell and Thompson, JJ., sitting. All concur. Bisig, J., not sitting.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt Assistant Public Advocate
Roy Alyette Durham, II Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Russell M. Coleman Kentucky Attorney General
Joseph A. Beckett Assistant Attorney General