Henry Holland v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 6, 1996
• Docket: 03-95-00046-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

HOLLAND

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-95-00046-CR

Henry Holland, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF HAYS COUNTY

NO. 39,823, HONORABLE HOWARD S. WARNER, II, JUDGE PRESIDING

Appellant Henry Holland was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04 (West 1994). ⁽¹⁾ The trial court sentenced appellant to a year in jail probated for two years and assessed a $750 fine. In three points of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction. We will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

On February 22, 1992, Bill Hodge observed a blue van with Florida license plates driving southbound on Interstate 35 in San Marcos. As he drove behind the van for ten to fifteen minutes, Hodge noticed the van driving erratically, making multiple lane changes and tailgating another car. The van, the car being tailgated, and Hodge all took the same exit off the interstate. Although he never saw the van's driver, Hodge called the San Marcos Police Department with a description of the van. The San Marcos Police Department then issued a "be on the lookout" for the van around 10:30 p.m.

Within minutes, San Marcos Police Officer Loy Locke noticed a van and a car parked on the access road of the interstate. Two men were outside the vehicles apparently surveying the damage from a minor wreck in which they had been involved. Officer Locke noted that the van matched the description of the van given by the dispatcher and stopped to speak to the men, whom he identified as appellant and Ronnie Starling. According to Locke, there were no other people at the scene. Appellant admitted to being the driver of the van and Starling concurred.

Officers Kathy Anderson and Terry Nichols arrived shortly thereafter. While Nichols administered field sobriety tests and Anderson inventoried the vehicle, Hodge happened by the accident site and spoke with Officer Locke. According to Hodge, the van was the same one he called to complain about.

Nichols testified that appellant failed the standard field sobriety tests and all three officers confirmed that appellant had lost the use of his mental or physical faculties and that he was intoxicated. Anderson also testified that she found a four liter square carton of wine, equipped with a spigot, in the back seat of the van. The carton was positioned in a way that would permit someone in the driver's seat to fill a glass using the spigot. The carton was approximately two-thirds empty. Anderson also found a fruit-jar type of container with alcohol in the front area of the van. Based on the results of the field sobriety tests, appellant's physical demeanor, the earlier complaint made of a vehicle matching the description of appellant's vehicle, and appellant's admission that he was the driver of the van, Officer Nichols arrested appellant for driving while intoxicated.

DISCUSSION

Appellant's points of error overlap substantially and we will address them together. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and contends that the trial court erred when it denied appellant's motion for an instructed verdict. ⁽²⁾ The critical inquiry on review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court does not ask whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

Appellant first contends that there is no evidence in the record stating that he ever drove or operated the vehicle in this case. Officer Locke testified that appellant admitted he was driving the van. The State may not rely solely on the extrajudicial admission by the appellant to establish an element of the crime. See Folk v. State, 797 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, pet. ref'd). Absent any other direct or circumstantial evidence that appellant was the driver, the evidence would be insufficient to support the conviction. Id.

Officer Locke also testified that Starling made statements placing appellant behind the wheel of the van. This hearsay testimony was not objected to and was therefore properly before the jury for consideration. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 802; Fernandez v. State, 805 S.W.2d 451, 455-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Because a jury is permitted to consider such hearsay as evidence, this same evidence is considered in a sufficiency analysis. Brown v. State, 871 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1994, pet. ref'd). This evidence, combined with the absence of other potential drivers at the scene and considered in light of the short amount of time that passed from when Hodge witnessed the erratic movements of the van to when Officer Locke arrived at the accident, adequately corroborates appellant's admission.

Appellant next contends that the State must prove if and when appellant became intoxicated. It was only necessary, however, for the State to prove that appellant was intoxicated at the time he operated his van in a public place. Ford, 571 S.W.2d at 925.

Appellant and Starling were involved in a minor accident resulting in only slight damage to the cars. Officer Locke arrived shortly thereafter, and the two men were outside of their respective vehicles inspecting the damage. Locke and the other seasoned officers determined that appellant was intoxicated because he did not have control of his mental and physical faculties and failed the field sobriety tests. Since appellant was intoxicated when the officers arrived shortly after the accident, it is not an extensive leap for a rational trier of fact to find that appellant was intoxicated minutes before when he was operating the van.

Finally, appellant contends that "[a]lthough the record is replete with references to `the Highway, the Interstate, I-35, IH-35, the access road,' etc, no one ever testified that appellant drove or operated a motor vehicle in a public place or on a public road, an essential element of the crime."

On direct examination of Officer Nichols, however, the following discourse took place:

Q: Okay. On this particular occasion the place where this accident occurred,was that a public place?

A: Yes, sir, it was.

Appellant's argument is thus without merit. We conclude that a rational trier of fact could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was driving his van, that he was intoxicated while doing so, and that he was driving in a public place. Accordingly, appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is overruled.

Given our discussion above, we also overrule appellant's point of error asserting the trial court erred in denying his motion for an instructed verdict. A challenge to the trial court's ruling on a motion for an instructed verdict is actually a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Madden v. State, 799 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Because we have already reviewed the evidence and we believe it to be sufficient to sustain the conviction, we conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jimmy Carroll, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Carroll, Justices Jones and B. A. Smith

Affirmed

Filed: March 6, 1996

Do Not Publish

1.   The offense occurred before September 1, 1994, and is governed by the law in effect at the time the offense was committed. Penal Code, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3697. Because the Code amendments effective September 1, 1994, have no substantive effect on the offenses at issue, the current Code is cited for convenience.

2.   To sustain a conviction for driving while intoxicated, the evidence must show that the appellant drove the vehicle while intoxicated in a public place. Solis v. State, 787 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

is. Brown v. State, 871 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1994, pet. ref'd). This evidence, combined with the absence of other potential drivers at the scene and considered in light of the short amount of time that passed from when Hodge witnessed the erratic movements of the van to when Officer Locke arrived at the accident, adequately corroborates appellant's admission.

Appellant next contends that the State must prove if and when appellant became intoxicated. It was only necessary, however, for the State to prove that appellant was intoxicated at the time he operated his van in a public place. Ford, 571 S.W.2d at 925.

Appellant and Starling were involved in a minor accident resulting in only slight damage to the cars. Officer Locke arrived shortly thereafter, and the two men were outside of their respective vehicles inspecting the damage. Locke and the other seasoned officers determined that appellant was intoxicated because he did not have control of his mental and physical faculties and failed the field sobriety tests. Since appellant was intoxicated when the officers arrived shortly after the accident, it is not an extensive leap for a rational trier of fact to find that appellant was intoxicated minutes before when he was operating the van.

Finally, appellant contends that "[a]lthough the record is replete with references to `the Highway, the Interstate, I-35, IH-35, the access road,' etc, no one ever testified that appellant drove or operated a motor vehicle in a public place or on a public road, an essential element of the crime."

On direct examination of Officer Nichols, however, the following discourse took place:

Q: Okay. On this particular occasion the place where this accident occurred,was that a public place?

Appellant's argument is thus without merit. We conclude that a rational trier of fact could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was driving his van, that he was intoxicated while doing so, and that he was driving in a public place. Accordingly, appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is overruled.