Henry Diaz v. Palmetto General Hospital

191 So. 3d 882, 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 208, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 887, 2016 WL 1704091

• Court: Supreme Court of Florida
• Decided: April 28, 2016
• Docket: SC14-1916
• Status: Published

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This complex workers’ compensation case is before this Court for review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Diaz v. Palmetto General Hospital/Sedgwick CMS, 146 So.3d 1288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), concerning a $13.28 hourly fee award for 120 hours of work deemed to be necessarily and reasonably expended by the claimant’s attorney. The judge of compensation claims found' the $13.28 hourly fee — over twenty-five -times less than the $350 hourly rate found to be a reasonable fee — “patently unreasonable” and stated that the claimant would not have recovered the $8,956.44 in total benefits that were awarded to him without the aid and assistance of counsel. The attorney for the employer/camer, on the other hand, spent 175 hours litigating this case— 55 hours more than the claimant’s attorney — which was found by the- judge of compensation claims-to be “a reasonable amount of time given the nature of the case.”

Forced to calculate the fee for the claimant’s attorney in strict compliance with the conclusive fee schedule , in section 440.34, Florida Statutes, the judge of compensation claims could not deviate from the statutory requirements regardless of how unreasonable the ultimate , fee award. And, constrained by its prior jurisprudence, the First District was compelled to affirm the fee “[biased on” its decision in Castellanos v. Next Door Co./Amerisure Ins. Co., 124 So.3d 392, 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Diaz, 146 So.3d at 1288.

However, this' Court has now held on review of Castellanos that the conclusive statutory fee schedule is unconstitutional as a denial of due process under the Florida and United States Constitutions. Castellanos v. Next Door Co., No. SC13-2082, 192 So.3d 431, 432-33, 2016 WL 1700521, slip op. at 1-2 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2016). Here, the First District certified that its disposition passed upon the same question certified in Castellanos, 124 So.3d at 394, which this Court has now resolved. 1 For the reasons explained in our opinion in Castel-lanos, we therefore quash the First District’s decision in Diaz and remand for further proceedings consistent with Castel-lanos. See also Richardson v. Aramark/Sedgwick CMS, No. SC14-738, 193 So.3d 880-81, 2016 WL 1704132, slip op. at 2-3 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2016); Pfeffer v. Labor Ready Se., Inc., .No. SC14-1325, 191 So.3d 884, 882, 2016 WL 1708823, at *1 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2016).

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. ■ CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., dissent.

1 . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, §§ 3(b)(3), (4), Fla. Const.