Henry Benamon a/k/a Henry Jordarell Benamon v. State of Mississippi

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: April 21, 2026
• Docket: 2024-KA-00501-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-KA-00501-COA

HENRY BENAMON A/K/A HENRY APPELLANT JORDARELL BENAMON

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/28/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MICHELLE DEAN EASTERLING COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: NOXUBEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE DISTRICT ATTORNEY: SCOTT WINSTON COLOM NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/21/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Following a jury trial, Henry Benamon was convicted of first-degree murder and

possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, Benamon argues that the trial court erred by

(1) denying his motion to quash the venire after he briefly appeared in the courtroom prior

to voir dire in handcuffs and shackles and (2) refusing to give a jury instruction on the lesser-

included offense of heat-of-passion manslaughter. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

¶2. Benamon and Lisa Brooks worked together at Peco Foods and were also involved in

a romantic relationship. In April 2021, Benamon moved into Brooks’s home in Macon, Mississippi. Neither Benamon nor Brooks owned a car, so their coworker Michael Barber

typically drove them to and from work.

¶3. On July 15, 2021, Benamon and Brooks argued at work and had to be separated. As

Barber drove them home after work, Brooks repeatedly told Benamon that he had “to get out

[her] house.” Barber dropped off Benamon and Brooks at Brooks’s house and left.

¶4. Around 10 p.m. that evening, Benamon called Barber and asked for a ride. Benamon

said that Brooks had “left her phone” and “gone with somebody,” but he did not “know

where she went.” Barber told Benamon that he was “not coming” and that he would see

Benamon and Brooks when he picked them up in the morning for work.

¶5. Benamon also called his cousin Jamikah and asked for a ride. Benamon told Jamikah

that he had “just shot somebody.” Jamikah told Benamon she was “sure not coming if [he]

just shot somebody” because she “want[ed] to have nothing to do with that.” Benamon “kind

of got frustrated” with Jamikah and “got off the phone.”

¶6. Benamon next called Jimmy Cole and asked for a ride. He told Cole that Brooks had

“put him out.” When Cole arrived at Brooks’s house, Benamon got into Cole’s car and told

Cole to turn off his headlights. Benamon was carrying three or four bags and two cellphones

and asked Cole to drive him to Meridian.

¶7. Around 3:30 a.m., Barber received a text message from Brooks’s phone stating that

she and Benamon were “at the casino” and would be late for work. The next text message

asked Barber to tell their supervisors that they “had to rush to [the] hospital for [Benamon’s]

face.” Barber tried to call Brooks in the morning around 9 a.m. and again around noon, but

2 Brooks did not answer. Around 1:30 p.m., Barber received another text message from

Brooks’s phone stating that she and Benamon were going “out of town.” Barber was

suspicious and tried to call Brooks again, but Brooks still did not answer.

¶8. On July 17, Brooks’s son, Darnell Welch, was concerned because he had not heard

from Brooks, and she and Benamon were not answering their phones. Welch talked to

Barber, who confirmed that Brooks had missed work.

¶9. Later that evening, Welch went to Brooks’s house to check on her, but no one came

to the door. All the doors were locked, so Welch broke a window and entered the home. He

found Brooks’s body wrapped in a comforter on the floor of her bedroom. Prior to Welch’s

arrival, there was no sign of forced entry at the home.

¶10. Welch again tried to call Benamon, but Benamon did not answer. Welch then called

Brooks’s brother-in-law, Andreas Walker, a member of the Macon Police Department

(MPD). Walker went to Brooks’s house and confirmed that she was dead. The MPD and

the Mississippi Bureau of Investigation (MBI) investigated the case. Investigators found a

projectile and a cartridge casing on the floor of Brooks’s bedroom. They found nothing else

out of the ordinary and no other signs of an intruder or altercation in the home.

¶11. After discovering that Brooks’s cell phone was missing, MBI subpoenaed Brooks’s

and Benamon’s cell phone records. MBI determined that both phones traveled from Macon

to Meridian on July 16 but then stopped transmitting signals.

¶12. MBI also subpoenaed Benamon’s Facebook records. From July 15 to 17, Benamon

sent Facebook messages to other users asking for help to leave town. He also stated that he

3 had “f***ed up . . . bad.”1

¶13. On July 29, the United States Marshals Service apprehended Benamon in Pine Apple,

Alabama, and returned him to Mississippi. A Noxubee County grand jury indicted Benamon

for first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon.

¶14. At trial, Barber testified that he had seen Benamon previously carrying a revolver.

Welch testified that Benamon carried a revolver and that his mother did not own a gun.

¶15. Dr. Mark LeVaughn, the State’s chief medical examiner, testified that Brooks

sustained three gunshot wounds, including one to the back of the head that was fired from

“three or four feet.” Dr. LeVaughn determined that Brooks’s cause of death was homicide.

¶16. Philip Bridges, a forensic scientist with the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory, testified

that the projectile found in Brooks’s bedroom and a projectile recovered from Brooks’s body

during her autopsy both had class characteristics consistent with a .38-caliber revolver.

¶17. After the State rested its case-in-chief, Benamon testified. He claimed that two days

before Brooks’s death, she “put a gun to [his] head” because he was talking to another

woman. He admitted that he argued with Brooks on July 15 and that he was “jealous,” but

he said he was not “jealous to the point of where [he] would kill her or put [his] hand on

her.” He testified that when he and Brooks left work with Barber on July 15, he “begged”

Barber to take him to his grandmother’s house “because [he] felt like something was going

to happen that night.” However, Barber drove him and Brooks to Brooks’s house.

1 On July 16, before Brooks’s body was even discovered, Benamon also sent messages to various women on Facebook, complimenting their appearances, asking if they were “single,” and asking for their phone numbers.

4 ¶18. Benamon testified that he and Brooks argued again that night but later “made up.”

Benamon took a shower, and he and Brooks were in her bedroom. Benamon testified that

he thought they were “fixing to have sex.” But just then, a “masked man” opened the door

and appeared to be “reaching” for a gun. Benamon did not recognize the masked man.

Benamon “rushed” the masked man, and they “got to tussling.” To Benamon’s surprise,

Brooks then “grabbed [Benamon] too” as if “she was helping [the masked man].” As they

continued tussling, Benamon, the masked man, and Brooks “all fell on the bed.” Benamon

testified that he “turned over” and saw Brooks “with a gun.” Benamon testified that as he

continued to fight the masked man, he “snatch[ed]” the gun from Brooks, “the gun went off,”

and Brooks “fell over the bed.” When Benamon went to “check on” Brooks, the masked

man fled. Benamon realized that Brooks was dead. He testified that he did not feel safe in

Noxubee County because Brooks’s brother-in-law (Walker) was a police officer, so he left

town immediately. Benamon said that he “threw [the gun] out” later and did not know where

it was. Benamon denied that he ever possessed a .38-caliber revolver prior to July 15.

¶19. Benamon testified that he could not say whether he shot Brooks. He testified, “I’m

not going to say I shot. I’m not going to say I didn’t shoot. Because if we tussling, I can’t

say that I shot . . . or he [(i.e., the masked man)] shot.”

¶20. The jury convicted Benamon of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by

a felon, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of life imprisonment and ten

years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Benamon filed a motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which was denied, and a notice of appeal.

5 ¶21. On appeal, Benamon argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to

quash the venire after he briefly appeared in the courtroom prior to voir dire in handcuffs and

shackles and (2) refusing to give a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of heat-of-

passion manslaughter.

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Quash the Venire

¶22. Prior to voir dire, in the presence of the jury venire, Benamon was brought into the

courtroom in handcuffs and shackles and seated at the defense table. Benamon was wearing

street clothes, not jail attire. Once Benamon was seated, the handcuffs and shackles were no

longer visible to the venire. The district attorney immediately noticed the handcuffs and

shackles, but the judge was not in the courtroom. Rather than ask the sheriff’s department

to remove Benamon from the courtroom or remove the handcuffs and shackles in the jury’s

presence, the district attorney asked the bailiffs to remove the venire from the courtroom.

Benamon’s handcuffs and shackles were then removed outside the jury’s presence. The

district attorney estimated that Benamon was in the jury’s view in handcuffs and shackles for

no more than “thirty seconds,” which defense counsel did not dispute. In addition, the

podium and other features of the courtroom at least partially obscured the venire’s view of

the shackles and handcuffs. It was not clear how many, if any, potential jurors actually

observed the handcuffs or shackles.

¶23. Benamon moved to quash the venire, arguing that the incident had tainted the jury and

that he could not receive a fair trial. The State responded that under applicable precedents,

6 the trial court was not required to quash the venire based on Benamon’s brief appearance in

the courtroom in handcuffs and shackles. After a brief recess, the trial judge stated that she

had reviewed relevant caselaw, including Payton v. State, 897 So. 2d 921, 931-33 (¶¶6-18)

(Miss. 2003), and other cases, and found that Benamon had not sustained any substantial or

irreparable prejudice and could receive a fair trial. The judge also noted that Benamon could

voir dire the jury panel as to what they observed and whether it would affect them.

Therefore, the judge denied Benamon’s motion.

¶24. It is well-settled that “[r]estraints should be used [in the courtroom] only in

exceptional cases where there is evident danger of escape or in order to protect others from

an attack by the prisoner.” Id. at 931 (¶12). “Permitting the jury to see the defendant bound

and shackled improperly encroaches on the defendant’s presumption of innocence.” Id. at

931-32 (¶12). A violation of this right may require the court to quash the venire. Id. at

(¶¶11-12). “However, the failure, through an oversight, to remove handcuffs from a prisoner

for a short time or any technical violation of the rule prohibiting shackling, not prejudicial

to him, is not ground for reversal.” Id. at 932 (¶12).

¶25. The decision whether to quash a venire is “entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial

court” and will not be reversed unless that discretion is abused. Id. at 931 (¶11). “Where the

evidence is conflicting on the question of whether or not the defendant could receive a fair

and impartial trial, this Court will generally defer to the considered opinion of the trial

judge.” Id. (ellipsis omitted).

¶26. In Payton, the defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial because he was brought

7 into the courtroom in the presence of the venire in shackles and chains. Id. at (¶6). The trial

judge had the restraints removed and noted that the venire’s “view” of the defendant “would

have been obstructed by the rail, the lectern, the counsel table, and by the attorneys seated

at the table.” Id. at (¶8). The court also granted additional time for defense counsel to

question the venire regarding the incident, but defense counsel did not ask any questions on

the subject. Id. at (¶10). The Supreme Court emphasized that “without a showing of

prejudice,” the Court had “generally been unwilling to reverse a conviction on these

grounds.” Id. at 932 (¶16). The Court found that the error in Payton was a “non-prejudicial

technical violation” because the defendant “was restrained in the venire’s presence for only

a short time,” and “his restraints were removed, outside the presence of the jury, as soon as

being brought to the court’s attention.” Id. at (¶17). Moreover, the defendant “presented no

evidence [to] indicate[] that the jurors were not fair and impartial.” Id. For these reasons,

the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to quash the

venire, finding that the defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced and failed to rebut

the “presumption that the judgment of the trial court [was] correct.” Id. at 933 (¶18).

¶27. Similarly, in Rush v. State, 301 So. 2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1974), the defendant argued

that he was denied a fair trial when a deputy brought him into the courtroom in handcuffs in

the presence of the venire. The handcuffs were immediately removed at defense counsel’s

request. Id. Finding no prejudice to the defendant, the Supreme Court held that “the failure,

through an oversight, to remove handcuffs from a [defendant] for a short time” was not

grounds for reversing his conviction. Id.

8 ¶28. The facts of this case are substantially similar to Payton and Rush. Benamon was only

briefly shackled in the jury’s presence, the shackles were removed outside the jury’s presence

as soon as the district attorney noticed them, and Benamon presented no evidence that he was

prejudiced or denied a fair trial as a result. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by denying Benamon’s motion to quash the venire.

II. Manslaughter Instruction

¶29. Benamon also argues that the trial court erred by refusing a jury instruction on heat-of-

passion manslaughter. The trial court refused the instruction, finding that there was no basis

in the evidence to support the instruction and that “[t]his is not a heat of passion case.” On

appeal, Benamon argues that his own “testimony unequivocally supported the granting of a

[heat-of-passion] manslaughter instruction” because he testified that he “fought” “with a

masked intruder in his bedroom.”

¶30. We review de novo the refusal of a lesser-included-offense instruction. Downs v.

State, 962 So. 2d 1255, 1258 (¶10) (Miss. 2007). A defendant is entitled to a lesser-included-

offense instruction if there is some evidence from which a reasonable juror could find him

both not guilty of the indicted offense and guilty of the lesser-included offense. Gilmore v.

State, 119 So. 3d 278, 286 (¶13) (Miss. 2013). However, “the jury should not be presented

with a lesser-included-offense instruction unless the record provides an evidentiary basis for

the instruction.” Franklin v. State, 136 So. 3d 1021, 1026 (¶11) (Miss. 2014) (quotation

marks omitted). Therefore, “lesser-included-offense instructions should not be granted on

mere speculation.” Id.; Wallace v. State, 369 So. 3d 83, 88 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023).

9 ¶31. A killing is manslaughter if it is committed “without malice, in the heat of passion,

but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, without authority of

law, and not in necessary self-defense.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-35 (Rev. 2020) (emphasis

added). Importantly, “[h]eat-of-passion manslaughter is an intentional homicide that is

reduced from murder to manslaughter because it was committed in the heat of a sudden

passion caused by some sufficient provocation or injury.” Brown v. State, 336 So. 3d 134,

144 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 316 So. 3d 202 (Miss.

2021); see also Cap. City Ins. v. Hurst, 632 F.3d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Under

Mississippi law, heat-of-passion manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder because

it lacks malice, not willfulness.”).

¶32. The Mississippi Supreme Court has defined “heat of passion” as follows:

A state of violent and uncontrollable rage engendered by a blow or certain other provocation given, which will reduce a homicide from a grade of murder to that of manslaughter. Passion or anger suddenly aroused at the time by some immediate and reasonable provocation, by words or acts of one at the time. The term includes an emotional state of mind characterized by anger, rage, hatred, furious resentment or terror.

Jones v. State, 39 So. 3d 860, 866 (¶36) (Miss. 2010) (quoting Mullins v. State, 493 So. 2d

971, 974 (Miss. 1986)). In addition, the Court has stated:

One of the primary elements of a heat-of-passion crime is immediate and reasonable provocation, by words or acts of one at the time. . . . [I]t is essential that the excited and angry condition of the party committing the act which would entitle him to the milder consideration of the law, should be superinduced by some insult, provocation, or injury, which would naturally and instantly produce, in the minds of ordinarily constituted men, the highest degree of exasperation. . . . [T]here must not only be passion and anger to reduce a crime to manslaughter, but there must be such circumstances as would indicate that a normal mind would be roused to the extent that the

10 reason is overthrown and that passion usurps the mind destroying judgment.

Id. at 866-67 (¶36) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The mere fact that [the

defendant] and [the victim] were arguing before the [killing] is insufficient to reduce the

crime to manslaughter.” Avera v. State, 761 So. 2d 900, 903 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

“Words of reproach, criticism or anger do not constitute sufficient provocation to reduce an

intentional and unjustifiable homicide from murder to manslaughter.” Gaddis v. State, 207

Miss. 508, 515-16, 42 So. 2d 724, 726 (1949). “When a deadly weapon is used, as here,

malice is implied. In order to overcome that implication, there must be some evidence in the

record from which the jury could determine that the act was not the result of malice, but a

result of heat of passion.” Frazier v. State, 382 So. 3d 1193, 1202 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App.

2024) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

¶33. In the present case, the trial court did not err by refusing Benamon’s request for a

heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction. The court correctly found that there was no basis

in the evidence for the instruction because there was no evidence that Benamon acted in a

“heat of passion.” Indeed, Benamon himself claimed that he did not even know who shot

Brooks, i.e., whether he or the alleged “masked man” fired the fatal shot. Benamon testified

that the gun just “went off” as he wrestled it from Brooks while also struggling with the

masked man. As stated above, “[h]eat-of-passion manslaughter is an intentional homicide

that is reduced from murder to manslaughter because it was committed in the heat of a

sudden passion.” Brown, 336 So. 3d at 144 (¶28) (emphasis added). But in this case,

Benamon claimed that he may or may not have killed Brooks by accident during a struggle.

11 During the jury instruction conference, defense counsel stated that “the defense [Benamon]

presented” at trial was that “he was fighting for his life,” and either he or the masked man

“accidentally” shot Brooks. The trial court confirmed with defense counsel that Benamon’s

defense was “accident or misfortune,” and, as Benamon requested, the court instructed the

jury on the excuse of accident. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-17 (Rev. 2020). Thus, the jury

was properly instructed on the defense’s theory of the case. The trial court did not err by

refusing to instruct the jury on a species of manslaughter that had no basis in the evidence.

CONCLUSION

¶34. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Benamon’s motion to quash the

venire, nor did it err by refusing a heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction. Therefore, we

affirm Benamon’s conviction and sentence.

¶35. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.