Henley v. Johnson

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJuly 28, 2021
Docket2:20-cv-01218
StatusUnknown

This text of Henley v. Johnson (Henley v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Henley v. Johnson, (E.D. Wis. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

DIQUAR D. HENLEY,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 20-CV-1218-JPS

STEVEN JOHNSON, ORDER Defendant.

Plaintiff Diquar D. Henley (“Plaintiff”), an inmate currently confined at King County Maleng Regional Justice Center located in Kent, Washington, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant violated his Eighth Amendment rights. (Docket #1). This order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and motion for extension of time to submit his certified trust account statement, as well as screens his complaint. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On October 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time to file his certified trust account. (Docket #4). Plaintiff filed his certified trust account statement on October 13, 2020. (Docket #7). On October 22, 2020, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $48.31. (Docket #8). Plaintiff paid that fee on November 2, 2020. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. (Docket #2). He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. Additionally, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to submit his certified trust account as moot. (Docket #4). 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff alleges that the lack of natural light and fresh air at Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility (“MSDF”) is a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and in violation of Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 350.05 and Wis. Admin. Code § SPS 321.05. (Docket #1 at 2). Further, Plaintiff alleges that the lack of natural light and fresh air, due to the MSDF’s structure, caused him to suffer depression, anxiety, and weight gain. (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiff seeks monetary relief, and to be removed from MSDF. (Id. at 4). Defendant Steven Johnson is the Warden at MSDF. 2.3 Analysis To start, Plaintiff alleges that MSDF violates two administrative code sections regarding sunlight and fresh air. A violation of state laws or regulations is not a basis for a § 1983 claim. See Guajardo–Palma v. Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 806 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus, even if the administrative codes were violated, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim.1

1Further, even if a violation of administrative codes was a basis for a § 1983 However, Plaintiff’s allegations do invoke his rights under the Eighth Amendment. To state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, Plaintiff must allege that officials were deliberately indifferent to conditions of confinement that constituted an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1970) (holding that an Eighth Amendment violation arises when prisoners are deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”). Inmates are entitled to “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). This includes sanitary and hygienic living conditions. See Myers v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 655 F. App’x 500, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2016). Whether a particular deprivation violates the Eighth Amendment depends in large measure on its duration. Id. at 504. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the lack of sunlight may constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, Plaintiff has not provided enough information regarding the length of time he was deprived of sunlight.

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Related

Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Guajardo-Palma v. Martinson
622 F.3d 801 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Williams v. Fleming
597 F.3d 820 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Jason Myers v. Indiana Department of Correcti
655 F. App'x 500 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Colbert v. City of Chicago
851 F.3d 649 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Henley v. Johnson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/henley-v-johnson-wied-2021.