Henkels and McCoy, Inc. v. United Specialty Insurance Company

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 14, 2023
• Docket: 2:21-cv-07210
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

Case 2:21-cv-07210-RSWL-RAO Document 43 Filed 03/14/23 Page 1 of 5 Page ID #:1153

1 'O' 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CV 21-7210-RSWL-RAO x 12 HENKELS AND MCCOY, INC. et al., ORDER re: 13 Defendant’s Motion to Plaintiff, 14 Vacate Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment v. 15 [38] 16 UNITED SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 17 Defendant. 18 19 Plaintiff Henkels and McCoy, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) 20 initiated this Action against Defendant United Specialty 21 Insurance Company (“Defendant”) for breach of contract, 22 declaratory relief, and breach of the duty of good faith 23 and fair dealing. Compl., ECF No. 1. Currently before 24 the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Order on 25 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [38] (the “Motion”). 26 In the Motion, Plaintiff indicates that the parties have 27 settled, the current Motion is unopposed, and the 28 1 Case 2:21-cv-07210-RSWL-RAO Document 43 Filed 03/14/23 Page 2 of 5 Page ID #:1154

1 Court’s prior Order regarding the earlier Motion for

2 Partial Summary Judgment (“MPSJ”) should be vacated.

3 Having reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to 4 the Motion, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: 5 the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion. 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 A. Factual Background 8 The Complaint alleges: 9 Plaintiff is incorporated in Pennsylvania, has its 10 principal place of business in Pennsylvania, and does 11 business in the State of California, County of Los 12 Angeles. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. Defendant is 13 incorporated in Delaware, has its principal place of 14 business in Bedford, Texas, and does business in the 15 State of California, County of Los Angeles. Id. ¶ 3. 16 Plaintiff was hired to replace a utility pole in 17 San Gabriel, California. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff hired a 18 traffic and control services company to assist in the 19 replacement of the pole. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff’s 20 contract with the traffic and control services company 21 required the company to buy insurance that covered 22 Plaintiff from liability while replacing the pole. Id. 23 ¶¶ 25-26. The traffic and control services company 24 bought insurance from Defendant which covered Plaintiff 25 during the pole replacement work. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. 26 An accident occurred at the intersection where 27 Plaintiff was replacing the pole. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff 28 was sued and settled with the parties injured at the 2 Case 2:21-cv-07210-RSWL-RAO Document 43 Filed 03/14/23 Page 3 of 5 Page ID #:1155

1 intersection. Id. ¶ 46. Defendant refused to defend or

2 indemnify Plaintiff at any point during the prior

3 lawsuit. Id. ¶ 49. As a result of Defendant’s breach 4 of contract to defend and indemnify Plaintiff, Plaintiff 5 suffered actual damages. Id. ¶ 50. 6 B. Procedural Background 7 On September 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed its Complaint 8 [1]. On September 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed a MPSJ [21]. 9 On November 14, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s MPSJ 10 [27]. 11 On December 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed a notice of a 12 conditional settlement [33]. On February 13, 2023, 13 Defendant filed the instant Motion [38]. 14 II. DISCUSSION 15 A. Legal Standard 16 Pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 17 (“Rule”) 60(b), a district court may “relieve a party or 18 a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, 19 order, or proceeding” for several reasons. In 20 determining whether to vacate a judgment, district 21 courts must consider “the consequences and attendant 22 hardships of dismissal or refusal to dismiss” and “the 23 competing values of finality of judgment and right to 24 relitigation of unreviewed disputes.” American Games, 25 Inc. v. Trade Products, Inc., 142 F.3d 1164, 1168 26 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 27 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1995)). 28 Courts are not mandated to vacate a prior order at 3 Case 2:21-cv-07210-RSWL-RAO Document 43 Filed 03/14/23 Page 4 of 5 Page ID #:1156

1 the behest of the parties to facilitate settlement. See

2 Bates v. Union Oil Co., 944 F.2d 647, 650 (9th Cir.

3 1991). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that if courts 4 were required to vacate prior rulings after settlement 5 “any litigant dissatisfied with a trial court’s findings 6 would be able to have them wiped from the books.” 7 Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of 8 Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721 (9th Cir. 1982). 9 B. Discussion 10 Defendant argues that given the Court’s prior MPSJ 11 Order was “based on the specific factual circumstances 12 of this case” and that the Court did not adopt any 13 “unique or novel legal issues,” that the Court should 14 vacate the Order. Mot. at 6:1-6. 15 Even when parties stipulate to an order regarding a 16 motion for summary judgment to be vacated, courts 17 typically do not vacate their particular orders. See, 18 e.g., POLAR-Mohr Maschinenvertriebsgesellschaft GmbH & 19 Co. KG v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 17-cv-01804-WHO, 2018 20 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231990, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2018); 21 Reynolds v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. C 10-4893 SI, 2012 22 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144695, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 23 2012). “Judicial precedents are presumptively correct 24 and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They 25 are not merely the property of private litigants and 26 should stand unless a court concludes that the public 27 interest would be served by a vacatur.” Izumi Seimitsu 28 Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 4 Case 2:21-cv-07210-RSWL-RAO Document 43 Filed 03/14/23 Page 5 of 5 Page ID #:1157

1 27, 40 (1993). 2 Here, as it relates to the public interest,

3 Defendant offered no reasons for why the Court should 4 vacate its prior MPSJ Order. See Zinus, Inc. v. Simmons 5 Bedding Co., No. C 07-3012 PVT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6 33359, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2008) (“The public paid 7 for this use of court resources through its tax dollars. 8 Vacatur would render that expenditure a waste, and the 9 parties cite no public interest that would be served by 10 vacatur [of the court’s order] which would justify the 11 waste of public funds.”). 12 For the foregoing reasons, the instant Motion to 13 vacate the Court’s prior MPSJ Order is DENIED. 14 III. CONCLUSION 15 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES 16 Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Order on Motion for Partial 17 Summary Judgment. 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 21 DATED: March 14, 2023 /s/Ronald S.W. Lew HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW 22 Senior U.S. District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28 5