Henkel Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co.

560 F.3d 1286, 90 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1119, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5571, 2009 WL 691295
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit·Decided March 18, 2009·No. 2008-1447·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

LINN, Circuit Judge.

Henkel Corporation (“Henkel”) appeals from a final decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“the Board”), Henkel Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., Patent Interference No. 105,174 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 28, 2008) (“Board Decision”), which awarded priority of invention to The Procter & Gamble Company (“P & G”). Because the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND 1

The technology at issue in this case relates to two-region dishwasher detergent *1288 tablets having certain properties. Claim 1 of P & G’s U.S. Patent No. 6,399,564 is representative of Count 2, the only count at issue in the interference:

A detergent tablet comprising a compressed portion and a non-compressed portion wherein:
a) said compressed portion comprises a mould and dissolves at a faster rate than said non-compressed portion on a weight by weight basis, measured using a SOTAX dissolution test method;
b) said non-compressed portion is in solid, gel or liquid form;
c) said non-compressed portion is delivered onto said mould of said compressed portion; and
d) said non-compressed portion is partially retained within said mould; and wherein said non-compressed portion is affixed to said compressed portion by forming a coating over the non-compressed layer to secure it to the compressed portion or by hardening.

At issue in this appeal is limitation a), which requires that the compressed portion of the tablet dissolve at a faster rate than the non-compressed portion. In Henkel Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 485 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2007) (“Henkel I ”), we rejected the Board’s overly restrictive interpretation of the limitation and concluded that the limitation required “an appreciation by the inventors simply that the dissolution rate of the compressed region is greater than the dissolution rate of the other region.” We also concluded that Henkel had demonstrated an appreciation of this disputed limitation no later than May 1997. Id. at 1376. Accordingly, we vacated the Board’s denial of Henkel’s motion for priority as well as the Board’s denial (as moot) of P & G’s motions for priority, and remanded to the Board for further proceedings. See id.

On remand, the Board entertained P & G’s motions for priority and held, based on the evidence of record, that “P & G has proved by at least a preponderance of the evidence that it made, and at least one inventor appreciated, an embodiment within the scope of Count 2, the sole count in the interference, prior to Henkel’s earliest reduction to practice.” Board Decision at 3. Consequently, the Board awarded priority of invention to P & G.

Henkel timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Whether an invention has been reduced to practice is a question of law based on underlying facts. Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed.Cir.1998). Accordingly, the Board’s ultimate conclusion of reduction to practice is reviewed de novo, while its underlying factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. Henkel I, 485 F.3d at 1374. “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938).

B. Analysis

Following our remand in Henkel I, the Board found that P & G demonstrated an actual reduction to practice in February 1997, Board Decision at 10, predating Henkel’s reduction to practice in May 1997, and thus awarded priority of invention to P & G, id. at 69. In so doing, the Board made a key factual determination— that P & G inventors appreciated by February 1997 the limitation in the count requiring that the compressed region of the tablet dissolve at a greater rate than the non-compressed region. Id. at 61-62. Whether substantial evidence supports this finding of fact is the only issue on appeal. Henkel contends that “the objec *1289 tive evidence before the Board fails to record or establish that any P & G inventor contemporaneously appreciated, or even conceived of, an embodiment meeting the express comparative dissolution rate limitation of Count 2 prior to Henkel’s accorded actual reduction to practice date.” Henkel’s Opening Br. at 19. P & G counters that its inventors did, in fact, appreciate the differential dissolution rate limitation, and that the record evidence supports the Board’s decision.

“In order to establish an actual reduction to practice, the inventor must prove that: (1) he constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met all the limitations of the interference count; and (2) he determined that the invention would work for its intended purpose.” Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1327. The inventor must also “contemporaneously appreciate that the embodiment worked and that it met all the limitations of the interference count.” Id.; see also Henkel I, 485 F.3d at 1374. As we held in Henkel I, to demonstrate a reduction to practice of the invention at issue here the inventors need only appreciate “that the dissolution rate of the compressed region is greater than the dissolution rate of the other region.” Henkel I, 485 F.3d at 1375.

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Henkel Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 560 F.3d 1286, 90 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1119, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5571, 2009 WL 691295 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

560 F.3d 1286 (Henkel Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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