Henfield v. Taylor

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Decided: March 12, 2003
• Docket: 2003-UP-190
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Debra Henfield,        Appellant,

v.

John Taylor & Adlerian Enterprises d/b/a Parkside Mobile Homes,        Respondents,

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Appeal From Charleston County
Roger M. Young, Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-190
Heard October 9, 2002 - Filed March 12, 200

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REVERSED and REMANDED

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A. Christopher Potts, of Charleston, for appellant.

Stephen L. Brown, Randell C. Stoney, Jr., and Stephen P. Groves, Jr., all of Charleston, for respondents.

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PER CURIAM:  Debra Henfield appeals the trial court’s order granting Adlerian Enterprises’ (“Adlerian”) motion for summary judgment in favor of John Taylor.  Henfield argues Adlerian did not have standing to file the motion in favor of Taylor, and in the alternative, a question of material fact existed making the grant of summary judgment inappropriate.  We reverse and remand.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Henfield sued Taylor and Adlerian alleging they were jointly and severally liable for injuries she sustained when she fell down the stairs of a mobile home rented by Taylor but located in a mobile home park owned by Adlerian.  Adlerian timely answered Henfield’s complaint and denied all liability.  Taylor did not answer the complaint but was never placed in default.

The parties conducted limited discovery, during which Adlerian deposed Henfield.  In her deposition, Henfield stated she fell from the steps of Taylor’s mobile home because “he didn’t want any company that day” and had “hurried [her] out.”  As she exited the mobile home, she tripped on the steps, reached for a handrail, but because none existed, fell and hit her head on the mobile home door.  In her deposition, Henfield also indicated she did not mean to sue Taylor because she felt he had not contributed to her injuries.  However, later in her deposition, Henfield stated she and Taylor were in a “pushing match” just prior to her accident, and he pushed her too hard out of the mobile home door.

Adlerian filed a motion to dismiss Taylor, arguing he should not be a party to the lawsuit.  Specifically, Adlerian asserted Henfield’s deposition clearly indicated she never intended to sue Taylor because he had done nothing to contribute to her injuries.  At the hearing, the trial court converted Adlerian’s motion into one for summary judgment, agreed Taylor should not be a party to the lawsuit, and granted summary judgment in favor of Taylor. [1]   Henfield appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is granted “when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Osborne v. Adams, 346 S.C. 4, 7, 550 S.E.2d 319, 321 (2001).  “On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court will review all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.”  Ferguson v. Charleston Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 349 S.C. 558, 563, 564 S.E.2d 94, 96 (2002).

DISCUSSION

Henfield argues the trial court erred in granting Adlerian’s motion for summary judgment in favor of Taylor because a question of material fact existed regarding whether Taylor contributed to Henfield’s injuries.  We agree.

The trial court dismissed Taylor stating, based on Henfield’s deposition “it appears that the Plaintiff did not intend to sue Taylor, nor does she think he did anything to contribute to her injury.”  However, ample evidence exists in the record to support Henfield’s contention that she intended to sue Taylor and that Taylor’s negligence contributed as the proximate cause of her injuries.

Henfield’s counsel filed a complaint against Taylor, opposed Adlerian’s motion to dismiss Taylor as a party, and is now appealing the trial court’s order dismissing Taylor.  Notwithstanding Adlerian’s contention that Henfield never intended to file suit against Taylor, Henfield has never moved to dismiss Taylor as a party, asked her counsel to be removed for failing to dismiss Taylor as a party, or sought to obtain new counsel pursuant to Rule 11(b), SCRCP.  Therefore, this Court must treat the actions of Henfield’s counsel, Henfield’s alter-ego, as those of Henfield.  See Williams v. Williams, 335 S.C. 386, 391, 517 S.E.2d 689, 691 (1999) (holding “this Court has consistently recognized an attorney is the ‘alter-ego of his client’ and the attorney stands in the place of the client” (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 198 S.C. 412, 415, 18 S.E.2d 9, 10 (1941)).  Thus, by filing the complaint against Taylor, opposing Adlerian’s motion to dismiss Taylor, and appealing the trial court’s grant of that motion, Henfield has sufficiently demonstrated her intent to sue Taylor.

Additionally, although Henfield stated in her deposition Taylor did not contribute to her injuries, she stated “[Taylor] was flailing his arms” as he “hurried [her] out of the trailer.”  She further stated she was “quite sure [Taylor] was behind me rushing me out of the house.”  Furthermore, Taylor himself testified during his deposition:

We were physically [sic] . . . .  I had my arms on her pushing her back . . . .  I said, please leave, please leave . . . .  I pushed her too hard . . . .  She fell out the door.

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I pushed her, but I pushed her too hard.  This I am guilty of.

[W]e had a pushing match.  She pushed me, I pushed her, and I pushed too much.  I pushed her too hard because she didn’t leave.

[S]he didn’t leave and fell [sic] . . . .  Leave my house, leave my house.  She pushed me, I pushed her.  Leave my house.  And I pushed too hard . . . .

(emphasis added)  By Taylor’s own admission, he pushed Henfield and caused her to fall down the stairs of his mobile home.  Reviewing the “ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light most favorable to” Henfield, see Ferguson, 349 S.C. at 563, 564 S.E.2d at 96, we conclude the record contains sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material with respect to whether Taylor contributed to Henfield’s injuries.

CONCLUSION [2]

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order granting Adlerian’s motion for summary judgment in favor of Taylor is

REVERSED and REMANDED.

HEARN, C.J., GOOLSBY and HOWARD, JJ., concur.

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[1] Because neither party appeals the circuit court’s decision to convert Adlerian’s motion to dismiss in favor of Taylor into one for summary judgment, it is the law of the case.  See ML-Lee Acquisition Fund, L.P. v. Deloitte & Touche, 327 S.C. 238, 241, 489 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1997) (holding an unappealed ruling is the law of the case).  Therefore, we will treat the case as if Adlerian had originally filed a motion for summary judgment.

[2] Because we hold a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether Taylor contributed to Henfield’s injuries, we need not address whether Adlerian had standing to file a motion for summary judgment in favor of Taylor, or the timeliness of Taylor’s oral joinder of Adlerian’s motion.