Hendrix v. Espinoza

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedApril 3, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-00607
StatusUnknown

This text of Hendrix v. Espinoza (Hendrix v. Espinoza) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hendrix v. Espinoza, (D. Nev. 2024).

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 JAMAL DAMON HENDRIX, Case No. 2:23-cv-00607-MMD-DJA

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 LEILANNY ESPINOZA, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Plaintiff Jamal Damon Hendrix brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 13 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at 14 Southern Desert Correctional Center. (ECF No. 1-1.) On December 22, 2023, this Court 15 ordered Hendrix to file an amended complaint by January 21, 2024. (ECF No. 3.) The 16 Court warned Hendrix that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended 17 complaint by that deadline. (Id. at 6.) That deadline expired, and Hendrix did not file an 18 amended complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 19 II. DISCUSSION 20 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 21 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 22 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 23 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 24 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 25 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 26 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 27 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 28 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 2 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 3 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 4 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 5 Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 7 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Hendrix’s 8 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 9 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 10 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 11 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 12 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 14 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 15 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 16 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 17 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 18 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 19 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 20 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 21 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 22 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 23 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 24 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 25 unless Hendrix files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order 26 setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only 27 delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here 28 do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Hendrix needs 1 || additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s screening order. Setting 2 || another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth 3 || factor favors dismissal. Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court 4 || finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal. 5 || lll. CONCLUSION 6 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 7 || Hendrix’s failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with this Court's December 8 || 22, 2023, order. 9 It is further ordered that Hendrix’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 10 || No. 1) is denied as moot. 11 The Clerk of Court is further directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this 12 || case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Hendrix wishes to 13 || pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 14 DATED THIS 3% Day of April 2024.

16 17 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Hendrix v. Espinoza, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hendrix-v-espinoza-nvd-2024.