Hendrik Dorssers v. James Rigby, Jr.

584 F. App'x 481
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedAugust 8, 2014
Docket13-35351
StatusUnpublished

This text of 584 F. App'x 481 (Hendrik Dorssers v. James Rigby, Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hendrik Dorssers v. James Rigby, Jr., 584 F. App'x 481 (9th Cir. 2014).

Opinion

Hendrik Dorssers and Concept Dorssers (together, “Dorssers”) appeal the district court’s decision affirming the judgment of the bankruptcy court. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). We review the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 763 (9th Cir.2000), and we affirm.

1. The bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that the February Note and Medina Deed of Trust were never consummated. See Willener v. Sweeting, 107 Wash.2d 388, 730 P.2d 45, 49 (1986). Likewise, the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in discrediting Dorssers’ self-serving testimony that Dorssers held the February Note, see Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir.2010); in finding that Thomas Hazelrigg, III, was not Dorssers’ agent, see Nordstrom Credit, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 120 Wash.2d 935, 845 P.2d 1331, 1335 (1993); or in finding that the payments Dorssers received related to the November Note, not the February Note, see Willener, 730 P.2d at 49. In each instance, the bankruptcy court’s findings were supported by Dorssers’ own testimony. The bankruptcy court also did *482 not err in concluding that the February Note and Medina Deed of Trust were invalid sham transactions and avoidable fraudulent transfers.

2. The bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that Dorssers failed to establish a good faith defense under 11 U.S.C. § 548(c). See Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. (In re Figter Ltd.), 118 F.3d 635, 638 (9th Cir.1997). The bankruptcy court provided a lengthy list of objective, well-supported reasons for finding that Dorssers lacked good faith. Dorssers’ contrary arguments, which concern his subjective good faith in Michael Mastro, do not undermine the bankruptcy court’s finding. See Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners-A (In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc.), 916 F.2d 528, 536 (9th Cir.1990).

AFFIRMED.

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Related

Retz v. Samson (In Re Retz)
606 F.3d 1189 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Willener v. Sweeting
730 P.2d 45 (Washington Supreme Court, 1986)
Nordstrom Credit, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
845 P.2d 1331 (Washington Supreme Court, 1993)
Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham)
229 F.3d 750 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
584 F. App'x 481, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hendrik-dorssers-v-james-rigby-jr-ca9-2014.