Hendra Ko v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 5, 2026
• Docket: 18-71140
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 5 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HENDRA KO, No. 18-71140

Petitioner, Agency No. A088-322-623

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 2, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, CLIFTON, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Hendra Ko, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of a

decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his motion to

reopen based on changed country conditions. Ko converted to Christianity after

the agency denied his initial applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). relief under the Convention Against Torture. See Ko v. Lynch, 649 F. App’x 476

(9th Cir. 2016). He now fears he will be persecuted for his Christian beliefs if he

returns to Indonesia. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.

See Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2022). The BIA’s

decision may be reversed only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Go

v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d

770, 773 (9th Cir. 2008)).

1. The BIA acted within its discretion when it denied Ko’s motion to

reopen, citing his failure to provide evidence of the conditions for Christians in

Indonesia in 2012. To demonstrate that country conditions have changed, a

petitioner must submit evidence that illustrates the relevant conditions at “two

points in time . . . the time of the petitioner’s previous hearing, and . . . the time of

the motion to reopen.” Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016). The

evidence Ko submitted did not meaningfully describe conditions for Indonesian

Christians in 2012, the time of his prior hearing. Without a baseline for

comparison, the BIA reasonably concluded that it could not determine whether

conditions for Indonesian Christians had worsened in the intervening period.

2. Even assuming that Ko’s scant documentation of conditions in 2012

2 19-73037 was sufficient to establish a baseline, the record as a whole does not show that a

material change in country conditions for Indonesian Christians had occurred by

the time of Ko’s motion to reopen. A petitioner must show circumstances or

events that are meaningfully new and different, not merely a continuation of

existing conditions. See Rodriguez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir.

2021). Much of Ko’s evidence broadly describes the rise of ISIS in Indonesia,

rather than providing specific evidence of circumstances affecting Christians. To

the extent that Ko’s evidence does pertain to Indonesian Christians, it shows a

continuation of conditions that were present in 2012, rather than a change. There

are several references to “rising religious intolerance,” and the “escalating” of

“anti-Christian hostility,” but these conclusory descriptions are not sufficient to

show changed conditions unless accompanied by substantive evidence bearing

them out. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 989 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying

motion to reopen where report claimed that Iran’s “human rights record [had]

worsened,” but the conditions described therein were an “almost carbon copy” of

those in prior years).

PETITION DENIED.1

1 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 1) is otherwise denied.

3 19-73037