[491]*491Deen, Presiding Judge.
1. The defendant offered five requests to charge on the subject of justifiable homicide which were refused by the trial court, including the following: "The jury may acquit of all crime if they find that the killing was necessary at the time either to prevent the commission or completion of the adulterous act . . . the jury may acquit the slayer of all crime, and should do so if they find that the killing was necessary or apparently so, either to prevent the commission of a sexual act or the completion of it. . . If the defendant came upon her husband and another woman in the act of adultery, and being so enraged at seeing the acts of the parties kills her husband or his paramour . . . this killing of the adulterer taken in the act could be justified. . . Our law will sometimes excuse the wife for slaying the seducer of her husband immediately after the guilty act is over if she acts promptly,” etc.
The requests were properly refused. The court instructed the jury they should return a not guilty verdict if they found the death to have resulted from accident, which was the justification claimed by the defendant in her testimony. Assuming that the "unwritten law” defense was also relied upon, it was not raised by the evidence. We have found no case in which it has been applied to homicide of the spouse, since the underlying rationale of this defense is that its purpose is to prevent or stop an act directed against the marriage relationship, and of course nothing so thoroughly terminates that relationship as the death of the spouse. It is stated in Daniels v. State, 162 Ga. 366, 369 (133 SE 866) as follows: "While the jury may acquit the slayer [of the paramour] of all crime, and should do so if they find that the killing was necessary, or apparently so, either to prevent the commission of a sexual act or the completion of it, yet, if the circumstances were not such as to impress a rational mind that it was necessary to take human life to prevent the sexual intercourse, and if the jury should find that the slayer killed the deceased under a violent and sudden impulse of passion, engendered by the circumstances, the homicide would be manslaughter. Mays v. State, 88 Ga. 399 (14 SE 560); Patterson v. State, [492]*492134 Ga. 264 (67 SE 816).” To the same effect see Hill v. State, 64 Ga. 453; O’Shields v. State, 125 Ga. 310 (54 SE 120); Richardson v. State, 70 Ga. 825; Wilkerson v. State, 91 Ga. 729 (17 SE 990). The distinction is drawn in Campbell v. State, 204 Ga. 399, 403 (49 SE2d 867), "Sometimes there is a tendency to confuse the law of justifiable homicide and the law of voluntary manslaughter. It must be remembered that it is unnecessary, in order to constitute the crime voluntary manslaughter, that the killing should occur at the time of the commission of an adulterous act. A killing to prevent the beginning or the completion of an adulterous act is justifiable homicide under our law. But a killing, which is unnecessary to prevent an adulterous act, but which might have been the result of passion engendered by adulterous conduct, or conduct and circumstances which are sufficient to lead the slayer to the belief that adultery is about to be committed or has been committed, may fall within the classification of 'other equivalent circumstances’ [former Code § 26-1007 relating to voluntary manslaughter] and it is generally a question for a jury to determine whether the special facts of a case before them meet the standard set by law. It is for them to say whether the slayer acted from passion or revenge.” Thus, justifiable homicide as a complete defense is available only by a spouse against a paramour or assailant surprised in the act, and for the purpose of preventing it. Feelings of rage or passion do not render the killing justifiable but only operate to reduce the penalty. "But the modern law, in the absence of statute, does not recognize adultery or seduction as a complete excuse for homicide, but merely as a matter which goes to the degree of the homicide. According to the modern rule, a man who, moved by the passion naturally engendered in finding his wife in the act of adultery with another, immediately kills her or her paramour, is guilty of manslaughter only. Even though one finds another in the act of adultery with his wife and kills him directly, upon the spot, the killing is not deemed justifiable in law.” 40 AmJur2d 415, Homicide, § 123.
The earlier cases above cited were based on former Code § 26-1016 relating to "all other instances which [493]*493stand upon the same footing of reason and justice” as those enumerated as justifiable homicide in the chapter. This language has been retained in Code Ann. § 26-901 (f), but is further explained by our present § 26-902 (b) (2) justifying one in the use of force "to the extent that he reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or a third person against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force” and only if he believes "that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or a third person, or the commission of a forcible felony.” Adultery is a misdemeanor; it has always been recognized that the force used may be justifiable in preventing the commission of a felony when it will not justify the prevention of a mere misdemeanor. Cf. Bozeman v. State, 150 Ga. 667 (2) (104 SE 640). This concept is carried into the new Criminal Code also in Code §§ 26-903 (2) and 26-904 (b), where its purpose is to provide justification only for the repulsion of a forcible felony. Adultery, in addition to the fact that it is not a felony, is a consensual and nonviolent crime. It appears unlikely, in view of the trend of modern law and reorganization of our criminal code, that except in extreme circumstances, it can stand as a complete justification for homicide, although always relevant to the degree of the crime.
2. As to the charge of aggravated assault by defendant against the paramour of her husband, whom she caught in the act of adultery with her husband, according to defendant’s sworn testimony, it is contended that the trial judge should have charged the jury that under such circumstances the adulteress would have no right to use a deadly weapon (a knife in this instance) for the purpose of defending herself; nor would she have the right to make a deadly attack upon the innocent spouse of the husband-adulterer in order to defend herself. This was correct law, but the judge did not so charge the jury. This was clearly held to be the law in Drysdale v. State, 83 Ga. 744, 746 (10 SE 358); and the only defense open to the guilty adulterer is to escape (run away at full speed if there is any running space open). To the same effect, see Wilkerson v. State, 91 Ga. 729, 736—737, supra. The importance of this legal principle, and the importance of [494]*494the trial judge’s charging the jury accordingly, is readily obvious. If the adulteress had fled, or had not sought to attack Mattie Lou Henderson, or had not sought to defend herself with a deadly weapon, there would have been no occasion for Mattie Lou Henderson to have cut or otherwise assaulted Catherine Thomas. As it was, Catherine Thomas stood her ground and fought Mattie Lou Henderson with a deadly weapon, thus forcing Mattie Lou Henderson to fight back.
As to the charge of aggravated assault, this constituted a principal defense of defendant, supported by sworn testimony, and it is always error not to charge on a principal contention supported by evidence, even in the absence of a request to charge. See
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[491]*491Deen, Presiding Judge.
1. The defendant offered five requests to charge on the subject of justifiable homicide which were refused by the trial court, including the following: "The jury may acquit of all crime if they find that the killing was necessary at the time either to prevent the commission or completion of the adulterous act . . . the jury may acquit the slayer of all crime, and should do so if they find that the killing was necessary or apparently so, either to prevent the commission of a sexual act or the completion of it. . . If the defendant came upon her husband and another woman in the act of adultery, and being so enraged at seeing the acts of the parties kills her husband or his paramour . . . this killing of the adulterer taken in the act could be justified. . . Our law will sometimes excuse the wife for slaying the seducer of her husband immediately after the guilty act is over if she acts promptly,” etc.
The requests were properly refused. The court instructed the jury they should return a not guilty verdict if they found the death to have resulted from accident, which was the justification claimed by the defendant in her testimony. Assuming that the "unwritten law” defense was also relied upon, it was not raised by the evidence. We have found no case in which it has been applied to homicide of the spouse, since the underlying rationale of this defense is that its purpose is to prevent or stop an act directed against the marriage relationship, and of course nothing so thoroughly terminates that relationship as the death of the spouse. It is stated in Daniels v. State, 162 Ga. 366, 369 (133 SE 866) as follows: "While the jury may acquit the slayer [of the paramour] of all crime, and should do so if they find that the killing was necessary, or apparently so, either to prevent the commission of a sexual act or the completion of it, yet, if the circumstances were not such as to impress a rational mind that it was necessary to take human life to prevent the sexual intercourse, and if the jury should find that the slayer killed the deceased under a violent and sudden impulse of passion, engendered by the circumstances, the homicide would be manslaughter. Mays v. State, 88 Ga. 399 (14 SE 560); Patterson v. State, [492]*492134 Ga. 264 (67 SE 816).” To the same effect see Hill v. State, 64 Ga. 453; O’Shields v. State, 125 Ga. 310 (54 SE 120); Richardson v. State, 70 Ga. 825; Wilkerson v. State, 91 Ga. 729 (17 SE 990). The distinction is drawn in Campbell v. State, 204 Ga. 399, 403 (49 SE2d 867), "Sometimes there is a tendency to confuse the law of justifiable homicide and the law of voluntary manslaughter. It must be remembered that it is unnecessary, in order to constitute the crime voluntary manslaughter, that the killing should occur at the time of the commission of an adulterous act. A killing to prevent the beginning or the completion of an adulterous act is justifiable homicide under our law. But a killing, which is unnecessary to prevent an adulterous act, but which might have been the result of passion engendered by adulterous conduct, or conduct and circumstances which are sufficient to lead the slayer to the belief that adultery is about to be committed or has been committed, may fall within the classification of 'other equivalent circumstances’ [former Code § 26-1007 relating to voluntary manslaughter] and it is generally a question for a jury to determine whether the special facts of a case before them meet the standard set by law. It is for them to say whether the slayer acted from passion or revenge.” Thus, justifiable homicide as a complete defense is available only by a spouse against a paramour or assailant surprised in the act, and for the purpose of preventing it. Feelings of rage or passion do not render the killing justifiable but only operate to reduce the penalty. "But the modern law, in the absence of statute, does not recognize adultery or seduction as a complete excuse for homicide, but merely as a matter which goes to the degree of the homicide. According to the modern rule, a man who, moved by the passion naturally engendered in finding his wife in the act of adultery with another, immediately kills her or her paramour, is guilty of manslaughter only. Even though one finds another in the act of adultery with his wife and kills him directly, upon the spot, the killing is not deemed justifiable in law.” 40 AmJur2d 415, Homicide, § 123.
The earlier cases above cited were based on former Code § 26-1016 relating to "all other instances which [493]*493stand upon the same footing of reason and justice” as those enumerated as justifiable homicide in the chapter. This language has been retained in Code Ann. § 26-901 (f), but is further explained by our present § 26-902 (b) (2) justifying one in the use of force "to the extent that he reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or a third person against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force” and only if he believes "that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or a third person, or the commission of a forcible felony.” Adultery is a misdemeanor; it has always been recognized that the force used may be justifiable in preventing the commission of a felony when it will not justify the prevention of a mere misdemeanor. Cf. Bozeman v. State, 150 Ga. 667 (2) (104 SE 640). This concept is carried into the new Criminal Code also in Code §§ 26-903 (2) and 26-904 (b), where its purpose is to provide justification only for the repulsion of a forcible felony. Adultery, in addition to the fact that it is not a felony, is a consensual and nonviolent crime. It appears unlikely, in view of the trend of modern law and reorganization of our criminal code, that except in extreme circumstances, it can stand as a complete justification for homicide, although always relevant to the degree of the crime.
2. As to the charge of aggravated assault by defendant against the paramour of her husband, whom she caught in the act of adultery with her husband, according to defendant’s sworn testimony, it is contended that the trial judge should have charged the jury that under such circumstances the adulteress would have no right to use a deadly weapon (a knife in this instance) for the purpose of defending herself; nor would she have the right to make a deadly attack upon the innocent spouse of the husband-adulterer in order to defend herself. This was correct law, but the judge did not so charge the jury. This was clearly held to be the law in Drysdale v. State, 83 Ga. 744, 746 (10 SE 358); and the only defense open to the guilty adulterer is to escape (run away at full speed if there is any running space open). To the same effect, see Wilkerson v. State, 91 Ga. 729, 736—737, supra. The importance of this legal principle, and the importance of [494]*494the trial judge’s charging the jury accordingly, is readily obvious. If the adulteress had fled, or had not sought to attack Mattie Lou Henderson, or had not sought to defend herself with a deadly weapon, there would have been no occasion for Mattie Lou Henderson to have cut or otherwise assaulted Catherine Thomas. As it was, Catherine Thomas stood her ground and fought Mattie Lou Henderson with a deadly weapon, thus forcing Mattie Lou Henderson to fight back.
As to the charge of aggravated assault, this constituted a principal defense of defendant, supported by sworn testimony, and it is always error not to charge on a principal contention supported by evidence, even in the absence of a request to charge. See Waters v. State, 83 Ga. App. 163 (1) (63 SE2d 264); Spencer v. State, 215 Ga. 183 (1) (109 SE2d 588); Witt v. State, 231 Ga. 4 (200 SE2d 112).
Judgment reversed.
Pannell, P. J., Stolz, Webb and Marshall, JJ., concur. Bell, C. J., concurs in the judgment. Quillian, Evans and Clark, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.