F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 9 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
DARLINE HEMSING,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 98-2033 v. (D. New Mexico) PHILIPS SEMICONDUCTORS, a foreign corporation, and PHILLIP (D.C. No. CIV-96-0172) EDELMAN, individually,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before PORFILIO and LUCERO, Circuit Judges, and COOK,** District Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. ** The Honorable H. Dale Cook, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case is therefore submitted without oral
argument.
Plaintiff-appellant Darline Hemsing (Hemsing), appeals from the district court’s
order granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee Philips Semiconductors
(Philips), on plaintiff’s claims of disability discrimination, retaliation and several state
law claims related to her alleged wrongful termination, and to defendant-appellee Phillip
Edelman (Edelman) on plaintiff’s claims for defamation, intentional interference with
contractual relations, prima facie tort and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§ 1291, and affirm.
Hemsing, a registered nurse, was employed by Philips as an occupational health
nurse and supervisor of its in-house health services unit from May, 1993 to August, 1994,
when her employment was terminated. Hemsing claims that she was terminated in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et.
seq. Hemsing alleges that she became disabled in the 1970's when she was involved in
two separate vehicle accidents, the first as a pedestrian and the latter as a passenger on a
motorcycle. Hemsing alleges that these accidents caused injuries to her legs and back
which restricts her mobility. Hemsing claims she is unable to lift any significant amount
of weight, perform strenuous physical tasks, run, walk long distances, work without the
assistance of pain medication, or work more than a 40-hour work week. She claims that
her pain tolerance is worse as the day progresses.
2 At the commencement of her employment with Philips, Hemsing informed Philips
that she was disabled and requested that Philips accommodate her by permitting her to
work the early shift from 5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Philips agreed. Hemsing claims that after
she was hired, her supervisor, Richard Timmons, attempted to modify her work shift.
Plaintiff again requested accommodations through a letter from her private physician,
who recommended against changing her work schedule. A company-approved physician
concurred with the recommendation of Hemsing’s private physician. Hemsing’s shift
was never changed. In October, 1993, Hemsing wrote to the Human Resource Manager
at Philips complaining of violations of the ADA, against her and other employees. These
complaints included the failure to accommodate her disability, the lack of adequate
handicapped parking spaces, and the denial of educational benefits. In January, 1994,
Hemsing applied for the position of Safety Supervisor at Philips. In late March, 1994,
James Cochran assumed the position of Safety Supervisor and became Hemsing’s
supervisor. In reviewing Hemsing’s performance in April, 1994, Cochran investigated
complaints against Hemsing of poor care of three employees at Philips, and substandard
work. Following the inquiry, Cochran recommended that Hemsing be placed on decision-
making leave, which is Philips’ term for disciplinary action. Hemsing was told not to
come to work on April 18 and to either commit herself to “meeting expectations or to
voluntarily resign.” Based on this action, Hemsing told Cochran that she was going to
3 file a complaint with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) and
she did so on April 16.
Also in April, 1994, Cochran consulted with Mr. Jim Casey, Philips’ corporate
counsel, for authorization to go outside the company and hire a consultant to conduct an
audit of Philips’ health services unit. Authorization was given to hire a California
physician, defendant-appellee Dr. Phillip Edelman, as the consultant. Edelman spent two
days in June, 1994, interviewing Hemsing and others, and reviewing the charts, medical
records, practices and emergency procedures of the health services unit. At the
conclusion of his review, Edelman presented Philips with an outline of how the health
services unit should be organized and operated. Edelman returned to Philips on a second
occasion specifically to interview Hemsing regarding his assessment of “inexplicable
deficiencies” in employee medical charts and in the emergency care procedures used by
Hemsing. Edelman submitted the medical records and charts to a New York physician,
Dr. Robert Hoffman, for an independent review. In early July, 1994, Hoffman informed
Edelman that he concurred with his evaluation. Edelman sent Philips’ legal counsel a
letter dated July 6, 1994, which opined that Hemsing’s “clinical skills are seriously below
the level of competence expected for her job” and “the quality of her charting is seriously
deficient and below the standard of care.” Edelman concluded that Hemsing’s clinical
assessment, judgment, supervision, and knowledge of fundamental issues for critical
patients are “grossly beneath the standard of care necessary and customary” and in
4 “several instances seriously endangered the life and well being of employees.” (emphasis
in text). Hemsing was terminated shortly thereafter. Hemsing filed this suit, contending
the actions of Philips in terminating her employment violated the ADA.
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. We apply the same standard
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) used by the district court: we determine whether a genuine
issue of material fact was in dispute, and, if not, whether the substantive law was
correctly applied.” Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1081 (10th
Cir.1997).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is
qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodations; and (3) the employer terminated her employment because of her alleged
disability. See, White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 9 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
DARLINE HEMSING,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 98-2033 v. (D. New Mexico) PHILIPS SEMICONDUCTORS, a foreign corporation, and PHILLIP (D.C. No. CIV-96-0172) EDELMAN, individually,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before PORFILIO and LUCERO, Circuit Judges, and COOK,** District Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. ** The Honorable H. Dale Cook, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case is therefore submitted without oral
argument.
Plaintiff-appellant Darline Hemsing (Hemsing), appeals from the district court’s
order granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee Philips Semiconductors
(Philips), on plaintiff’s claims of disability discrimination, retaliation and several state
law claims related to her alleged wrongful termination, and to defendant-appellee Phillip
Edelman (Edelman) on plaintiff’s claims for defamation, intentional interference with
contractual relations, prima facie tort and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§ 1291, and affirm.
Hemsing, a registered nurse, was employed by Philips as an occupational health
nurse and supervisor of its in-house health services unit from May, 1993 to August, 1994,
when her employment was terminated. Hemsing claims that she was terminated in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et.
seq. Hemsing alleges that she became disabled in the 1970's when she was involved in
two separate vehicle accidents, the first as a pedestrian and the latter as a passenger on a
motorcycle. Hemsing alleges that these accidents caused injuries to her legs and back
which restricts her mobility. Hemsing claims she is unable to lift any significant amount
of weight, perform strenuous physical tasks, run, walk long distances, work without the
assistance of pain medication, or work more than a 40-hour work week. She claims that
her pain tolerance is worse as the day progresses.
2 At the commencement of her employment with Philips, Hemsing informed Philips
that she was disabled and requested that Philips accommodate her by permitting her to
work the early shift from 5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Philips agreed. Hemsing claims that after
she was hired, her supervisor, Richard Timmons, attempted to modify her work shift.
Plaintiff again requested accommodations through a letter from her private physician,
who recommended against changing her work schedule. A company-approved physician
concurred with the recommendation of Hemsing’s private physician. Hemsing’s shift
was never changed. In October, 1993, Hemsing wrote to the Human Resource Manager
at Philips complaining of violations of the ADA, against her and other employees. These
complaints included the failure to accommodate her disability, the lack of adequate
handicapped parking spaces, and the denial of educational benefits. In January, 1994,
Hemsing applied for the position of Safety Supervisor at Philips. In late March, 1994,
James Cochran assumed the position of Safety Supervisor and became Hemsing’s
supervisor. In reviewing Hemsing’s performance in April, 1994, Cochran investigated
complaints against Hemsing of poor care of three employees at Philips, and substandard
work. Following the inquiry, Cochran recommended that Hemsing be placed on decision-
making leave, which is Philips’ term for disciplinary action. Hemsing was told not to
come to work on April 18 and to either commit herself to “meeting expectations or to
voluntarily resign.” Based on this action, Hemsing told Cochran that she was going to
3 file a complaint with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) and
she did so on April 16.
Also in April, 1994, Cochran consulted with Mr. Jim Casey, Philips’ corporate
counsel, for authorization to go outside the company and hire a consultant to conduct an
audit of Philips’ health services unit. Authorization was given to hire a California
physician, defendant-appellee Dr. Phillip Edelman, as the consultant. Edelman spent two
days in June, 1994, interviewing Hemsing and others, and reviewing the charts, medical
records, practices and emergency procedures of the health services unit. At the
conclusion of his review, Edelman presented Philips with an outline of how the health
services unit should be organized and operated. Edelman returned to Philips on a second
occasion specifically to interview Hemsing regarding his assessment of “inexplicable
deficiencies” in employee medical charts and in the emergency care procedures used by
Hemsing. Edelman submitted the medical records and charts to a New York physician,
Dr. Robert Hoffman, for an independent review. In early July, 1994, Hoffman informed
Edelman that he concurred with his evaluation. Edelman sent Philips’ legal counsel a
letter dated July 6, 1994, which opined that Hemsing’s “clinical skills are seriously below
the level of competence expected for her job” and “the quality of her charting is seriously
deficient and below the standard of care.” Edelman concluded that Hemsing’s clinical
assessment, judgment, supervision, and knowledge of fundamental issues for critical
patients are “grossly beneath the standard of care necessary and customary” and in
4 “several instances seriously endangered the life and well being of employees.” (emphasis
in text). Hemsing was terminated shortly thereafter. Hemsing filed this suit, contending
the actions of Philips in terminating her employment violated the ADA.
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. We apply the same standard
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) used by the district court: we determine whether a genuine
issue of material fact was in dispute, and, if not, whether the substantive law was
correctly applied.” Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1081 (10th
Cir.1997).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is
qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodations; and (3) the employer terminated her employment because of her alleged
disability. See, White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir.1995).
To be a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA, the individual must have
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Hemsing contends that her physical impairment substantially limits the major life
activities of walking, standing, sitting, and working. In order for a physical impairment to
be substantially limiting, the individual must be:
5 (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform the same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).
The district court found that Hemsing failed to demonstrate that she is substantially
physically impaired in a major life activity, including working. It noted that working is a
major life activity, but Hemsing’s only limitations are (1) the need for an early morning
shift; (2) a job that does not require her to run or walk briskly; and (3) hours of not more
than 40 hours per week. The record shows that Philips agreed to Hemsing’s request to
accommodate these limitations. Hemsing claims, in the alternative, that Philips perceived
her as disabled because she informed her supervisor that she was disabled prior to
accepting employment with Philips. There is no indication in the record of a causal link
between the action taken by Philips in terminating Hemsing and her requests for limited
accommodations. The evidence supports the district court’s conclusion granting
summary judgment on Hemsing’s claim for disability discrimination.1
1 Hemsing takes prescription pain medication and contends that it would be difficult for her to perform her job without such medication, and that she is substantially limited in the major life activities of walking, running, standing, lifting thinking and working without the use of medication. Under Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. , WL 407488 (1999), such corrective measures can be considered in evaluating the substantiality of a limitation on a major life activity.
6 Hemsing also brings a claim of retaliation. To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under the ADA, the plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) protected employee action; (2) adverse action by an employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected action; and (3) a causal connection between the employee’s action and the employer’s adverse action. Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th Cir.1997).
The protected activities Hemsing claims are (1) her complaints about Philips’
failure to accommodate other disabled employees; (2) her request for an early shift; and
(3) the filing of the OFCCP charge in April, 1994. Hemsing’s employment with Philips
terminated four months later in August, 1994. The district court found that the first
activity was too vague to consider, that Philips accommodated the second activity, and
that the third activity occurred after Hemsing was disciplined for poor patient care.
Additionally, the district court found that these activities were too remote in time to
establish a causal connection of retaliation. We agree.
It is undisputed that Hemsing did not file her OFCCP charge until after she had
been disciplined for poor patient care. The district court found that the undisputed facts
established Hemsing’s termination was a result of a process that had already been set in
motion. The district court relied on Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., supra, in which the plaintiff’s
employment was terminated on January 16, 1995, five months after she filed a charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The court
noted that the plaintiff had been receiving disciplinary action both before and after she
filed the administrative charge. The termination, the court held, “simply completed the
7 disciplinary process already set in motion.” 108 F.3d at 1324. Such is the case here. We
therefore affirm summary judgment on Hemsing’s claims under the ADA and her state
law claims relative to wrongful discharge.
We affirm summary judgment for Edelman on the intentional interference with
contractual relations because there is no contract of employment. Hemsing was, at all
times, an employee-at-will. A claim of intentional interference with contract requires
“the existence of a valid, enforceable contract.” Tatum v. Philip Morris, Inc., 809 F.
Supp. 1452, 1468 (W.D.Okla.1992), aff’d, 16 F.3d 417 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114
S.Ct. 1833 (1994).
We affirm summary judgment for Edelman on the claim of defamation because
under New Mexico law there is a qualified privilege when the alleged defamatory
communication is made in the discharge of a private or public duty. Zuniga v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co., 671 P.2d 662, 664 (N.M.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 671 P.2d 1150 (1983).
This privilege applies between parties who share a common business interest in the
subject matter of the publication. See, Poorbaugh v. Mullen, 653 P.2d 511, 521
(N.M.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 653 P.2d 878 (1982). Edelman was hired by Philips to
conduct the audit and his conclusions and opinions conveyed to Philips are subject to a
qualified privilege. The district court correctly determined that there was no showing that
Edelman acted in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the statements made or that
he abused the privilege.
8 In light of our conclusion that Hemsing has failed to show that she is disabled
within the meaning of the ADA or subject to retaliation, we need not address the other
state law claims relating to wrongful discharge. The judgment of the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
H. Dale Cook Senior United States District Judge