Hempfling v. Hempfling

Appellate Court of Illinois

Hempfling v. Hempfling

188 Ill. App. 542, 1914 Ill. App. LEXIS 561

CourtAppellate Court of Illinois

DecidedOctober 6, 1914

DocketGen. No. 19,786

StatusPublished

This text of 188 Ill. App. 542 (Hempfling v. Hempfling) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hempfling v. Hempfling, 188 Ill. App. 542, 1914 Ill. App. LEXIS 561 (Ill. Ct. App. 1914).

Pincite

Opinion

Mr. Justice Smith

delivered the opinion of the court.

Abstract of the Decision. 1. Executors and administrators, § 379*—when personal property not primary fund for payment of debts. Ordinarily, personal property is the primary fund for the payment of debts and general legacies, unless a contrary intention appears in the will; but where from the whole will it appears by express language or necessary implication that a particular portion of the estate is to be the primary fund for the payment of debts, the remainder of the estate will be exonerated from the burden. 2. Wills, § 489*-—when construed as charging real estate with payment of debts. Where a will reads, “That after all my just debts and funeral expenses are paid, I give, devise and bequeath to my wife,” certain real estate, and there are clauses following which dispose of all the testator’s money in a bank, held it was clearly the intention of the testator to charge his real estate with the- payment of debts, and that the Probate Court had power to order a sale of the realty to pay the debts and widow’s awards though the personal estate was sufficient to pay the same.

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Mr. Justice Smith

delivered the opinion of the court.

Abstract of the Decision. 1. Executors and administrators, § 379*—when personal property not primary fund for payment of debts. Ordinarily, personal property is the primary fund for the payment of debts and general legacies, unless a contrary intention appears in the will; but where from the whole will it appears by express language or necessary implication that a particular portion of the estate is to be the primary fund for the payment of debts, the remainder of the estate will be exonerated from the burden. 2. Wills, § 489*-—when construed as charging real estate with payment of debts. Where a will reads, “That after all my just debts and funeral expenses are paid, I give, devise and bequeath to my wife,” certain real estate, and there are clauses following which dispose of all the testator’s money in a bank, held it was clearly the intention of the testator to charge his real estate with the- payment of debts, and that the Probate Court had power to order a sale of the realty to pay the debts and widow’s awards though the personal estate was sufficient to pay the same.

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Bluebook (online)

188 Ill. App. 542, 1914 Ill. App. LEXIS 561, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hempfling-v-hempfling-illappct-1914.