202li DEC -4 l"M Li: 55 CLER:'\ Or COURT
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM
KAMLESH K. HEMLANI, individually and CIVIL CASE NO. CV1527-13 derivatively and in the name of and on behalf of RAD HI PURAN TRUST,
Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR vs. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MANU & ANITA MELWANI, JETHMAL K. MELWANI, ISHWARP HEMLANI, VINOD I. & YOGITA V. HEMLANI, RADHI P. HEMLANI ESTATE, PARAMANAND MELWANI ESTATE, RADHl'S FOUNDATION, RADHI PURAN TRUST, RADHI FAMILY TRUST, PACIFIC RAINBOW, INC., SAFETY 1st SYSTEMS INC., PACIFIC AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE & ESCROW COMPANY, VASUDEV B. HEMLANI, P.D. HEMLANI FOUNDATION, LTD., CHITRA HEMLANI, SONA HEMLANI, PADI DARYANANI, and DOES 1-95,
Defendants,
This matter came before the Honorable John C. Terlaje on August 23, 2024, for a Hearing
on Defendant Radhi Puran Foundation's ("Defendants") Motion for Declaratory Summary
Judgment against Plaintiff Kamlesh K. Hemlani, individually and derivatively and in the name of
and on behalf ofRadhi Puran Trust ("Plaintiff'). Present was Attorney Thomas M. Tarpley Jr. on
behalf of Plaintiff, and Attorneys Rodney J. Jacob, Louie Yanza, Minakshi Hemlani, and Bill R. DECISION AND ORDER (Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment) CVJ 527-13,· Kamlesh K. Hemlani v. Manu & Anita Melwani, et al.
Mann on behalf of Defendants. After reviewing the record, relevant law, and arguments from the
parties the Court finds that Defendants successfully proved that there are no genuine issues as to
material facts and that the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Motion for
Declaratory Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Plaintiffs claim in this case originated in CV0758-12, where Defendant sought a
declaration of the Court that Radhi Hemlani-settlor and trustee of Radhi Puran Trust-
was incapacitated; Plaintiff also sought the Court remove Radhi Hemlani as trustee and
name Plaintiff as trustee. Verified Compl. (June 25, 2012).
2. On July 10, 2013, Presiding Judge Lamorena issued a decision and order granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and ordering CV0758-12 dismissed. Decision & Order on
Joint Mot. to Dismiss (July 10, 2013).
3. Presiding Judge Lamorena reasoned that Plaintiff did not have standing because Defendant
was still alive and there was no finding of her incompetence. Id.
4. On August 13, 2013, Radhi Hemlani died, making the reasons stated for the dismissal
moot. Suggestion of Death, Ex. A (Aug. 28, 2013).
5. Plaintiff filed a new complaint, which created case no. CV1527-13, and the case was
originally assigned to the Honorable James L. Canto II. Notice of Judge Assignment (Feb.
13, 2014).
6. On July 14, 2015, Judge Canto issued a decision and order granting the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss and ordering CV1527-13 dismissed. Decision & Order (July 14, 2015).
2 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment) CVJ 527-13; Kamlesh K. Hemlani v. Manu & Anita Melwani, et al.
7. Plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court of Guam reversed Judge Canto's rulings and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Kamlesh K. Hemlani v. Anita & Manu Melwani,
2016 Guam 33.
8. On remand, this case was assigned to Presiding Judge Lamorena. Notice of Judge
Assignment (Nov. 7, 2017).
9. Presiding Judge Lamorena issued a decision and order granting the Defendants' Motions
for Summary Judgment and ordering CV 1527-13 dismissed. Decision & Order (June 18,
2018).
10. Presiding Judge Lamorena reasoned that Plaintiff could not bring a lawsuit on behalf of the
trust because he did not have permission of at least one other co-trustee. Id
11. Additionally, Plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the MOS and the distributions
made therefrom. Id.
12. Plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court of Guam affirmed the dismissal for lack of
standing against the named estates or trusts, reversed the dismissal for lack of standing
against the individual defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Kamlesh
K. Hemlani v. Anita & Manu Melwani, 2021 Guam 26.
13. On May 31, 2023, the case was assigned to Judge John C. Terlaje. Notice of Judge
Assignment (May 31, 2023).
14. On June 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed its Request for Scheduling Conference. Pl.'s Req. for
Scheduling Conference (June 12, 2023).
3 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment) CVJ 527-13; Kamlesh K. Hemlani v. Manu & Anita Melwani, et al.
15. On July 5, 2023, Defendants filed their response to Plaintiffs Request for Scheduling
Conference and Request for Scheduling Conference. Defs.' Resp. to Pl. 's Reg. for
Scheduling Conference and Reg. for Scheduling Conference (July 5, 2023).
16. On May 15, 2024, the Court ordered the parties to file a Status Report. Order for Status R.
(May 15, 2024).
17. On June 11, 2024, the Parties agreed that there were seven (7) pending motions and that
the Summary Judgment Motions were the most important to determine which parties were
still involved in the present case. Minute Entry (June 11, 2024).
18. On August 23, 2024, the Court heard arguments from both parties regarding Defendants'
Motion for Declaratory Summary Judgment and took the matter under advisement. Minute
Entry (Aug. 23, 2024).
DISCUSSION
Under Rule 56( a) of the Guam Rules of Civil Procedure ("GRCP"), summary judgment
is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with other affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue of material fact that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." When deciding a motion for summary
judgment, "the court must draw inferences and view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party." Flores, 2004 Guam 25 ,i 7. Summary judgment is proper only where there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact. GRCP 56(a). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Bank of
Guam v. Flores, 2004 Guam 25 ,i 30 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 4 77 U.S. 242, 248
4 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment) CV1527-J 3; Kamlesh K. Hemlani v. Manu & Anita Melwani, et al.
( 1986). Whether a fact is material is determined by the governing substantive law; if the fact may
affect the outcome, it is material. However, "[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary
will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986).
The issue before this court is whether Plaintiffs actions amount to a breach of his duties
owed to the Trust and, if so, whether such breach subjects Plaintiff to removal as co-trustee for
the Trust.
I. The Undisputed Facts
The following facts are not in dispute: P.D. Hemlani and Radhi formed the RPT in 1997.
Compl., Ex. 6 (Dec. 17, 2013). Under the trust agreement, the survivor of P.D. Hemlani or Radhi
was to serve as sole trustee and the survivor was entitled to the net income of the RPT for his or
her lifetime. Id. Upon the death of the survivor, any remaining assets were to be distributed to the
Radhi Foundation. Id. P.D. Hemlani died on March 20, 2004. Compl. at 4 (Dec. 17, 2013). As the
survivor, Radhi became the sole trustee until her death on August 18, 2013. Id. at 2. Under the
trust agreement, Jack P. Helmani, Ishwar P. Hemlani (hereinafter "Don"), and Vashi were to be
appointed successor co-trustees upon the death of Radhi. Compl., Ex. 6 (Dec. 17, 2013). If any
one of the three successor co-trustees died, resigned, was removed, or was found to be
incapacitated, the remaining two successor co-trustees were to appoint a third successor co-trustee
so that there would always be three successor co-trustees. Id. A majority of the successor co-
trustees were to bind the trust for all purposes. Id. On August 4, 1998, the trust agreement was
amended by P.D. Hemlani and Radhi (hereinafter "First Amendment"). Compl. at 5 (Dec. 17,
2013 ). The First Amendment modified the appointment of successor co-trustees to Kamlesh, Don,
and Vashi. Compl., Ex. 7 (Dec. 17, 2013).
5 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment) CVI 527-13; Kamlesh K. Hemlani v. Manu & Anita Melwani, et al.
II. The District Court's Order in CV12-00028 and its Applicability to Plaintiff
i. The Foundation is the Trust's beneficiary as per the District Court's Order in CV12-00028 Although Plaintiff contends that the District Court's Order in CV12-00028, which
recognizes that the Foundation is the Trust beneficiary, does not have collateral estoppel, Plaintiff
misinterprets the law and is bound by that Order as a successor co-trustee. 1 Collateral estoppel
"means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." San
Nicolas, 1999 Guam 19 ati\ 12 (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,443, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194
(1970)). However, "a judgment does not become final until it has been finally determined on
appeal." Presto v. Lizama, 2012 Guam 24 ,r 23 (citing In re Morrow, 189 B.R. 793, 807 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1995)).
Here, Plaintiff reminds the Court that the CV12-00028 case was under appeal. Pl. 's Opp'n
to Mot. for Summ. J. (June 29, 2015). However, upon review of the record, the Court finds that
the Ninth Circuit appeal was voluntarily dismissed by agreement of both parties on July 31, 2015,
meaning that the District Court judgment for CV12-00028 on April 29, 2015 is a final judgment.
The Supreme Court in People v. Angoco set forth a three-part test in determining whether
the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies. See People v. Angoco, 2004 Guam 11. The test sets out
the following three parts:
(1) An identification of the issues in the two actions for the purpose of determining whether the issues are sufficiently similar and sufficiently material in both actions to justify invoking the doctrine;
1 See 6 G.C.A. § 4209(2). (" ... the judgment or order is ... conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating the same thing under the same title and in the same capacity, provided that they have notice, actual, or constructive, of the pendency of the action or proceedings.") 6 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment) CVJ527-13; Kamlesh K. Hemlani v. Manu & Anita Melwani, et al.
(2) an examination of the record of the prior case to decide whether the issue was 'litigated' in the first case; and (3) an examination of the record of the prior proceeding to ascertain whether the issue was necessarily decided in the first case.
Id. at 1 10. Part one of the test requires a detennination that the issue considered in CV12-00028
of who is the Trust's beneficiary is the same issue of who is the Trust's beneficiary that will be
considered in this trial. Because the relevant Trust is the same Trust that was under evaluation in
CV12-00028, the issue of the Trust's beneficiary would not have changed. Thus, the issue of who
is the Trust's beneficiary is sufficiently similar and material to justify invoking the doctrine. See
id. Parts two and three of the test require an examination of the record to determine whether the
issue was "litigated" and "necessarily decided." Id. Upon review of the record, the parties in CV12-
00028 had a fair opportunity to litigate the issue and it was necessarily decided by District Court
Judge Joaquin Manibusan-deciding that the Foundation was the rightful Trust beneficiary. See
Deel. Louie Yanza, Ex. B (June 24, 2015). Thus, Defendants have met their burden in establishing
that the Foundation is indeed the beneficiary of the Trust, and Plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel in disputing the issue of who qualifies as the Trust's beneficiary.
ii. The District Court's CVI 2-00028 Order does not bind Plaintiff as a successor co-trustee of the Trust Defendants maintain that under the doctrine of resjudicata, Plaintiff is bound by the Order
as a party in privity and successor co-trustee. Def.'s Reply Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 4-
6 (Feb. 7, 2022). However, Plaintiff contends that he was not bound by the District Court's Order
because he was not a party in the District Court case. Pl. 's Opp 'n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 3 (June
29, 2015). 6 G.C.A. § 4209(2) codifies resjudicata and provides:
7 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment) CVJ 527-13; Kamlesh K. Hemlani v. Manu & Anita Melwani, et al.
... the judgment or order is ... conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating the same thing under the same title and in the same capacity, provided that they have notice, actual, or constructive, of the pendency of the action or proceedings.
In 2001, the Guam Supreme Court interpreting this section held, "[t]hree requirements must be
met in order for res judicata to apply: ( 1) a final judgment on the merits; (2) the issue decided in
the prior suit is identical with the issue presented in the later suit; and (3) the party against whom
res judicata is asserted was a party or is in privity with a party in the prior suit. '' In re Application
of Leon Guerrero, 2001 Guam 22124. Essentially, this section has been interpreted by courts as
the statutory expression of the common law doctrine of claim preclusion. Zahnen v. Limtiaco, 2008
Guam 5115.
Res judicata applies where there is "a 'final judgment' or determination of an issue so no
further judicial act remains to end the litigation." Presto, 2012 Guam 241 23 (citing People v.
Cooper, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 389,405 (Ct. App. 2007)). "[A] final judgment extinguishes all claims
with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions out of which
the previous action arose." Trans Pac. Export Co. v. Oka Towers Corp., 2000 Guam 3 1 20. A
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits and is entered
without prejudice. Stalley v. Orlando Regional Healthcare System, 524 F.3d 1229 (2008). See also
Garman v. Campbell County School Dist. No. 1, 630 F .3d 977 (201 O); Ernst v. Rising, 427 F .3d
351 (2005). If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it lacks the power to reach the merits of the
case. See generally, In re Interest ofJ T.B. and H.J T., 245 Neb. 624,514 N.W.2d 635 (1994). As
a general rule, a dismissal with prejudice is an adjudication on the merits. See Simpson v. City of
North Platte, 215 Neb. 351, 338 N.W.2d 450 (1983). Here, CV12-00028 was dismissed due to
8 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment) CVI 527-13; Kamlesh K. Hemlani v. Manu & Anita Melwani, et al.
lack of subject matter jurisdiction without prejudice, and such dismissal is not an adjudication on
the merits. Thus, the first requirement for res judicata to apply is not met.
The second requirement requires that the issue decided in the prior suit is identical with the
issue presented in the later suit. In re Application ofLeon Guerrero, 2001 Guam 22 ,r 24. Here, the
District Court in CV12-00028 ultimately decided on the issue of whether the Foundation was the
proper beneficiary of the Trust. See Deel. Louie Yanza, Ex. B (June 24, 2015). The same issue is
under evaluation in this case. Thus, the second requirement for res judicata is met.
In determining privity, "[t]he question is whether the non-party is sufficiently close to the
original case to afford the application of the principle of preclusion." A decedent's successor in
interest steps into the decedent's position as to a particular action. Exarhos v. Exarhos, 159
Cal.App.4th 898, 905 (2008). Similarly, "a new trustee 'succeed[s] to all the rights, duties, and
responsibilities of his predecessors." Moeller v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.4th 1124, 1131 (1997).
Here, Kamlesh is a successor co-trustee to Radhi, who was a party to the District Court's CV12-
00028 case. Thus, the third requirement for res judicata is met.
Because the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction m CV12-00028 is not
considered a final judgment on the merits, one out of the three requirements is not met. Thus, the
doctrine ofresjudicata does not apply to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is not bound by the District Court's
Order in CV12-00028. However, as shown above, the Superior Court's Decision in CV0506-09
collaterally estops Plaintiff from relitigating the issue of the Trust's beneficiary.
III. Plaintiff's Removal as Co-Trustee
i. Plaintiff owes a duty of loyalty and good faith to the Foundation as a beneficiary
9 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment} CV/ 527-13; Kamlesh K. Hemlani v. Manu & Anita Melwani, et al.
18 G.C.A. § 66201 emphasizes a trustee's obligation to obey the trust and states that "a
trustee must fulfill the purpose of the trust, as declared at its creation, and must follow all the
directions of the trustor given at that time, except as modified by the consent of all parties
interested, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as an employee." Here, Kamlesh, as a co-
trustee, owes a duty of loyalty to the Trust which included acting in good faith and in the best
interests of the Foundation.
ii. Plaintiff has acquired an interest that is adverse to that of the Trust and the Foundation Under Guam law, 15 G.C.A. § 3317 sets forth the standard for removal of a trustee or co-
trustee and states:
The Superior Court shall have power to remove a trustee of a testamentary trust, whether or not any property has been distributed to such trustee, who has violated or is unfit to execute the trust or has acquired any interest or become charged with any duty adverse to the interest of any beneficiary in the subject of the trust. The Superior Court may remove one or all of the co-trustees ofa testamentary trust and appoint new trustees where the Superior Court determines that hostility, ill feeling, or continued lack of cooperation among and between co-trustees has impaired the proper administration of the trust. The proceeding may be initiated by the Superior Court upon its own motion or by verified petition of a beneficiary of, or any other person interested in, the trust, including any person in being who shall or may participate in the corpus or income of the trust.
Here, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs alleged adverse interest constitutes a violation
of the Plaintiffs duties towards the Trust and the Foundation, as a beneficiary, and whether such
violation is grounds for removal of Plaintiff as a co-trustee.
In Brown v. Mem 'l Nat'! Home Found., 162 Cal.App.2d 513 (1958) (reversed on other
grounds), the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's finding of hostility of the trustee towards
the other beneficiaries. There, the President of Gold Star formed Memorial National Home
Foundation, a charitable non-profit corporation, to serve the members of Gold Star by using the
10 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment) CVJ 527-13; Kamlesh K Hemlani v. Manu & Anita Melwani, et al.
assets Gold Star provided to the Foundation. Id Ultimately, Gold Star's President served as
President for both Gold Star and the Memorial National Home Foundation. Id. The President then
diverted Gold Star assets away from being used to serve Gold Star members. Id. Such findings
were grounds for removal of the President of Gold Star as trustee. Id.
In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff is a successor co-trustee for the Trust. At the same
time, Plaintiff is a Director and the Vice President of the Kishore-Created Foundation, which
Plaintiff seeks to substitute as the beneficiary of the Trust in place of the Foundation. Deel. Louie
Yanza, Ex. A and C (June 24, 2015). On its face, there is an apparent interest, which Plaintiff has
acquired, that runs adverse to the interests of the beneficiary of the Trust-the Foundation. Plaintiff
seeks to divert the Trust's assets to the Kishore-Created Foundation. See Kamlesh Dep. at 66-68.
Plaintiffs intention of wanting to substitute the Foundation with Kishore-Created Foundation is
in clear violation of 18 G.C.A. § 66201 and 15 G.C.A. § 3317. Plaintiff did not provide any
counterarguments in his Opposition to Defendant's Motions for Declaratory Summary Judgment
nor did he do so in his detailed Memorandum in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgement
re Standing. Thus, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs interest, as Director and Vice
President of the Kishore-Created Foundation, is adverse to the Foundation's interest, and
Plaintiffs ability to remain loyal and act in good faith to the Trust and the Foundation is now an
issue.
iii. There is hostility that has impaired the proper administration of the trust
In addition to a finding that a trustee has an interest adverse to that of a trust's beneficiaries,
15 G.C.A. § 3317 also asks the Court to consider whether there is any hostility, ill feeling, or
continued lack of cooperation among and between co-trustees that impairs the administration of
11 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment) CVJ 527-13; Kamlesh K. Hemlani v. Manu & Anita Melwani, et al. --------------·----- the trust. Trustees are subjected to a duty to act in good faith, and 18 G.C.A. § 65201 states that
"[i]n all matters connected with his trust, a trustee is bound to act in the highest good faith toward
his beneficiary, and may not obtain any advantage therein over the latter by the slightest
misrepresentation, concealment, threat, or adverse pressure of any kind." Further, a trust cannot
be properly administered if there is hostility between the trustees and the beneficiary. See Brown
at 534 (reversed on other grounds) (stating that hostility between the trustees and the beneficiary
are grounds for removal of the trustees when hostility impairs the proper administration of the
Trust).
Hostility between a trustee and a beneficiary is not per se a ground for removal of a trustee.
Rennacker v. Rennacker, Ill.App.3d 712 at 715 (1987). There must be proof that the relations are
such as to interfere with the beneficial administration of the trust. Id. (citing Wylie v. Bushnell, 277
Ill. 484 ( 1917)). Such hostility is a factor to be taken into consideration where the hostilities of the
parties combine with other circumstances to render removal of the trustee essential to the interests
of the beneficiary and the execution of the trust. Id. ( citing Jones v. Bryant, 204 Ill. App. 609
(1917)).
In Rennacker, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's denial of Plaintiff beneficiary's
petition to remove the Defendant trustee. Id. at 715. There, the Court found that the hostilities
between Plaintiff and Defendant and the apparent unwillingness to communicate on a civil level
indicated a deficiency in the Defendant's ability to act as a fitting trustee. Id. Such hostility was
supported by the Defendant's claim that he had the power, under the will, to dispose of the trust
residence. Id Further, the problem of how to distribute the assets of the trust was aggravated since
the parties seemed unwilling or unable to communicate with each other. Id Additionally, the
12 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment) CVJ 527-13; Kamlesh K Hemlani v. Manu & Anita Melwani, et al.
Defendant's action of investing the proceeds of the sale under his own social security number in
the police credit union supported a hostile relationship between Plaintiff beneficiary and Defendant
trustee. Id
Similarly, hostility is apparent between the successor co-trustees and the Foundation as the
Trust's beneficiary in this case. Plaintiff admitted that he has not communicated with the other co-
trustees, Vasudev Hemlani and Ishwar Hemlani. Kamlesh Dep. at 81-82. Further, Plaintiff filed
his Complaint and included the Foundation-the beneficiary of the Trust-as a Defendant in his
suit. See Def. Radhi Puran Found. 's Mot. for Declaratory Summ. J. at 16 (June 24, 2015). Like in
Rennacker, the Parties have been unable to communicate on a civil level given the intense and
severe nature of the ongoing lawsuit. Id. Further, the problem of distributing the assets has become
difficult since the parties have been unable to communicate with each other. Id. at 17. Plaintiff did
not provide any counterarguments in his Opposition to Defendant's Motions for Declaratory
Summary Judgment nor did he do so in his detailed Memorandum in Support of His Motion for
Summary Judgement re Standing. Thus, the Court finds that the hostile nature of the parties'
relationship has hindered the administration of the Trust and impacted the Foundation as the
Trust's beneficiary.
iv. Given the totality of the circumstances, removal of Plaintiff would best serve the interests of the Trust and the Foundation, as its beneficiary Applying the facts to 15 G.C.A. § 3317, it is clear that removal of Plaintiff as co-trustee
would better serve the interests of the Trust and the Foundation, as its beneficiary. Removal of
Plaintiff would improve the cooperation among the co-trustees (with the appointment of one of the
suggested co-trustees) and improve the administration of the Trust. Removal of Plaintiff would
13 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment) CV] 52 7-13; Kamlesh K. Hemlani v. Manu & Anita Melwani, et al.
also best serve the interest of the Foundation, which is the established beneficiary of the Trust.
Finally, removal of Plaintiff would not be inconsistent with the material purpose of the Trust.
CONCLUSION
Viewing the disputed facts in the light most favorable of the non-moving party, the Court
finds that there is no question of material fact and therefore judgment can be granted as a matter
of law. Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Summary
Judgment.
SO ORDERED, this \ '2--1 4 1Zfo'l.~