Helvering v. State-Planters Bank & Trust Co.

130 F.2d 44, 143 A.L.R. 333, 29 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1041, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 4678
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedAugust 18, 1942
Docket4927
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 130 F.2d 44 (Helvering v. State-Planters Bank & Trust Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Helvering v. State-Planters Bank & Trust Co., 130 F.2d 44, 143 A.L.R. 333, 29 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1041, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 4678 (4th Cir. 1942).

Opinion

PARKER, Circuit Judge.

This is a petition by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to review a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. The taxpayer is a commercial bank of Richmond, Virginia. During the years 1931-1938, it charged off as worthless and deducted from its income tax returns certain debts which it subsequently collected in the year 1939. The Commissioner determined deficiencies in the income and excess profits taxes of taxpayer for the year 1939 based upon its collection of these debts, and taxpayer appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals. The Board sustained the Commissioner as to the recoveries of debts charged off during years wherein the returns of taxpayer showed losses in an amount less than the amount of debts charged off, but reversed the Commissioner with respect to recoveries of debts which had been charged off in years wherein the loss shown by the returns was greater than the amount of the debts. The action of the Board in the latter respect was based upon the idea that recoveries of bad debts are to be included in income only to the extent that a tax benefit has been received from a prior deduction of the debt, and that no such benefit can be predicated of a deduction allowed in a year where the return shows a loss greater than the deduction. We think the Board was in error.

Sec. 22 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev.Code, § 22, provides: “ ‘Gross income’ includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service (including personal service as an officer or employee of a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing), of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever. í¡S

Bad debts are allowed as a deduction in the computation of net income, if ascertained to be worthless and charged off within the taxable year. 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev. Code, § 23 (k) (1). But any amount subsequently received on a bad debt thus charged off must be included in gross income for the taxable year in which received. Treasury Regulations 103, sec. 19.23 (k)-l, provides: “Any amount subsequently received on account of a bad debt or on account of a: part *46 of such debt previously charged off and allowed as a deduction for income tax purposes, must be included in gross income for the taxable year in which received. * * *”

And that bad debts subsequently collected after being charged off as worthless should be included in income, see Putnam Nat. Bank v. Com’r, 5 Cir., 50 F.2d 158; Com’r v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 6 Cir., 59 F.2d 320; Askin & Marine Co. v. Com’r, 2 Cir., 66 F.2d 776; S. Rossin & Sons v. Com’r, 2 Cir, 113 F.2d 652.

There is nothing in the regulation or in any statute which makes the inclusion in gross income of collections on bad debts, previously charged off as worthless, dependent upon whether or not the charge off has resulted in a tax benefit to the taxpayer. It is argued that the language of the regulation providing for the inclusion of the collection only where the debt has been “charged off and allowed as a deduction for income tax purposes” has this effect; but manifestly a debt is charged off and allowed as a deduction for income tax purposes when it is claimed and allowed as a deduction in the return of the taxpayer, for the charge off and allowance is made in connection with the return, not in connection with the payment of the tax.

It is to be noted that only where the bad debt has been charged off and allowed as a deduction is it to be included in income when collected. The taxpayer is thus given an option by the statute and, only where he exercises the option, is he required, to account for the collection as income. Where he does exercise it, however, by charging off the debt as worthless in his return, he is bound by the election so made. Cf. J. E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Com’r, 311 U.S. 55, 61 S.Ct. 95, 85 L.Ed. 36; Scaife Co. v. Com’r, 314 U.S. 459, 62 S.Ct. 338, 86 L.Ed. -. When he collects the debt thereafter he must account for the collection as income ; for by electing to charge it off, he is precluded from treating it as capital or its collection as the restoration of capital and under the existing regulation impliedly consents that it be treated as income. When a debt has thus been charged off in one year and collected in a subsequent year, the fact that such charge off did or did not result in tax benefit cannot be considered in connection with the taxability of its collection as income both because the taxability is determined by the charge off and not by the tax benefit accruing therefrom and because each taxable year must be regarded as an independent unit for income tax purposes. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co, 282 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 150, 75 L.Ed. 383.

It is argued that a bad debt constitutes a capital loss, that recovery thereon is a mere restoration of capital, and that only on the theory of estoppel, because the deduction of the debt has been used to reduce taxable income, is it permissible to include the recovery in gross income. This, however, not only ignores the fact that the taxpayer elects, by charging off the debt, to eliminate it as a capital item and treat any possible collection of it as income, but, in the case of a business, is clearly contrary to proper accounting theory and practice. Bad debts are ordinarily treated as operating expense of a business in arriving at net operating gain or loss; and consequently a recovery on debts previously charged off is properly treated as income rather than as a return of capital, irrespective of what effect the charge off may have had upon income tax. The statutory provision for deduction of bad debts and the regulation requiring subsequent recovery thereon to be included in gross income is but recognition of this well established accounting practice. As said in G. C. M. 22163, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 76: “Bad debts charged off in any business are deductible under a specific provision of the Revenue Acts rather than as ordinary and necessary business expenses. They are, nevertheless, under well-established accounting practices, recognized as operating expenses of the business deductible as such in arriving at the net operating gain or loss for the periods involved. See Finney, Principles of Accounting, 1934 Edition, Volume 1, page 37, and Kester, Principles of Accounting Fourth Edition, pages 46, 116, and 554.

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130 F.2d 44, 143 A.L.R. 333, 29 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1041, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 4678, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/helvering-v-state-planters-bank-trust-co-ca4-1942.