No. 3 96 0374
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1996
CHARLES W. HELMIG III, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
FREDERICK LEONARD CARUS, ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit
RONNIE JAMES TONDI, CAROL F. ) La Salle County, Illinois
TONDI, MARK J. TONDI, PAMELA )
S. TONDI, CAROLYN MARIE )
HELMIG, CARRIE M. HELMIG, )
JAMES M. HELMIG, WILLIAM )
HENKEL, Petitioners )
comprising the committee of )
ten, CRYSTAL SCHLEE, PERU )
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT )
NO. 124, AND DR. JOHN )
JACOBSON, Superintendent of )
PERU ELEMENTARY SCHOOL )
DISTRICT NO. 124, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
v. )
REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL ) No. 95 MR 89
TRUSTEES OF THE LA SALLE )
COUNTY EDUCATIONAL SERVICE )
REGION, JON COOKE, PRESIDENT, )
VICKY GARRISON; JOHN GLASCOCK,)
MICHAEL JOHNSON, KENNETH )
SMALL, LLOYD VOGEL, AND )
ROBERT WIDMAN, SR., in their )
official capacities as the )
REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL )
TRUSTEES OF LA SALLE COUNTY, )
WILLIAM NOVOTNEY, in his )
capacity as Regional )
Superintendent of Schools, )
OGLESBY SCHOOL NO. 125, DR. )
JAMES BOYLE, as )
OGLESBY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. )
125, ALBERT LEMRISE, LINDA )
MUDGE, GLENDA VALLE, KATHY )
MARINIC, ROBERT T. MEEHAN, )
AND TIMOTHY O'TOOLE, ) Honorable
) Cynthia M. Raccuglia
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
The plaintiffs filed a petition seeking detachment from
Oglesby School District No. 125 (Oglesby) and annexation to Peru
Elementary School District No. 124 (Peru) fourteen weeks after the
Regional Board of School Trustees of the La Salle County
Educational Region (Board) denied a similar petition. The Board
denied the second petition, and the petitioners appeal. We affirm.
John F. Kennedy School District No. 129 was dissolved in 1992,
and the land in the district was annexed to Oglesby. A number of
the affected landowners objected to this change and filed a
petition seeking annexation to Peru. The Board denied this
petition on August 31, 1994.
On December 5, 1994, 27 of the 44 signers of the original
petition signed a second petition seeking detachment from Oglesby
and annexation to Peru. This petition included approximately 50%
less land than the first petition and would have reduced the
assessed valuation of the land in Oglesby by about half compared to
the first petition. The second petition affected three students,
while the first petition affected four. In all other relevant
respects, the petitions were identical.
The parties stipulated that evidence from the first hearing
could be considered in the second proceeding. The only additional
evidence offered at the second hearing was a certified copy of the
voter list for the revised detachment area, the testimony of
Charles W. Helmig, one of the petitioners, and the deposition
testimony of Dr. James Boyle, the superintendent of Oglesby. After
reviewing all of the evidence, the Board denied the second
petition. The petitioners appealed to the circuit court, which
affirmed the Board's decision.
I.
Before we may reach the merits of this case, we must consider
whether the Board had jurisdiction over the second petition.
Section 7 8 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/7 8 (West 1994))
generally prohibits the filing of a petition for detachment within
two years after the final denial of a similar petition. The
statute states,
"No territory, nor any part thereof, which is
involved in any proceeding to change the boundaries of a
school district by detachment from or annexation to such
school district of such territory, and which is not so
detached nor annexed, shall be again involved in
proceedings to change the boundaries of such school
district for at least two years after final determination
of such first proceeding unless during that 2 year period
a petition filed is substantially different than any
other previously filed petition during the previous 2
years ***." (Emphasis added.)
In this case, the Board denied the first petition on August
31, 1994, and the petitioners filed the second petition on December
5, 1994. Thus, the second petition was barred by statute unless it
was "substantially different" from the petitioners' first request.
See 105 ILCS 5/7 8.
In Board of Education of Community Unit School District No.
337 v. Board of Education of Community Unit School District No.
338, 269 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1027, 647 N.E.2D 1019, 1024 (1995),
this court stated that the legislature intended the statutory
exception for "substantially different" petitions to be construed
consistent with its intent to prevent harassment of parties
affected by the petitions. We found no potential for harassment in
that case because the same school districts were not involved in
both petitions. Board of Education, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 1028, 647
N.E.2D at 1025.
We refused to apply a bright-line test to determine when
substantial quantitative differences exist between districts or to
delineate the precise combination of quantitative and qualitative
factors necessary to qualify for this exception. Board of
Education, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 1028, 647 N.E.2D at 1025.
Quantitative factors are those that involve numerical or
statistical differences between the petitions, such as changes in
land area, assessed valuations and property taxes revenues, other
financial effects on the districts and the number of petitioners
and students affected. Qualitative considerations include the
identity of the petitioners and the districts, the nature of the
evidence presented to the Board, the parties' interests and
purposes, the potential for change in the districts' state
recognition status or programs and public policy issues.
Although we continue to hew to fact-driven determinations in
these cases, certain factors are relevant in deciding whether a
subsequent petition fits within the statutory prohibition.
Relevant considerations include: (1) the geographic boundaries of
the subject areas (see Board of Education, 269 Ill. App. 3d at
1028, 647 N.E.2D at 1025), (2) the identity and purposes of the
petitioners and the districts (see Board of Education, 269 Ill.
App. 3d at 1028, 647 N.E.2D at 1025), (3) the convergence of the
subject territory and the petitioners' interests, (4) the
similarity of the evidence supporting the petitions, (5) public
policy concerns and (6) the length of time between the filings.
A.
Factors Related to the Subject Territories & the Petitioners
Although the subject areas and the districts' assessed
valuations differed in the two petitions, these factors are
directly related and must be considered within the full procedural
and factual context of the case. Each of the 27 signers of the
second petition had also signed the original petition, and the same
two school districts were involved in both proceedings. In
addition, the petitions involved nearly the same number of
students.
In these cases, courts should also consider the convergence of
the subject territories and the petitioners' interests. Here, the
families of the only school age children in the detachment
territory supported both petitions, and the parties took the same
legal positions and represented the same set of interests at both
hearings. The second petition simply reduced the geographic scope
of the earlier petition to more narrowly focus on the families most
directly affected by the change. This combination of quantitative
factors and qualitative interests suggests that the two petitions
are substantially the same.
B.
The Evidence Presented
This conclusion is further bolstered by the admission of
essentially the same evidence at both proceedings. Even the new
evidence admitted at the second hearing related to the same
educational programs, benefits, and interests that were examined
during the first hearing. The similarity of the evidence also
indicates that there is no substantial difference in the two
petitions.
C.
Public Policy
The degree to which the second petition implicates the
legislative purpose of section 7 8 is a critical qualitative
factor. Here, both proceedings required the same two school
districts to expend resources to protect their interests. This
duplication of effort and prevention of harassment of the
defendants is precisely the reason the legislature adopted section
7 8. See Board of Education, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 1027, 647 N.E.2D
at 1024.
D.
Timing of Subsequent Filing
The length of time preceding the filing of the second petition
is technically not a factor to be considered since section 7 8 bars
any petition concerning boundary changes that is filed within two
years after the denial of a substantially similar petition.
However, as this period of time decreases, the potential for
harassment increases. Thus, a relatively short time between the
board's denial of a petition and the filing of another petition may
merit particular scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding the
second petition. In the instant case, the second petition was
filed only fourteen weeks after the first petition was denied, an
extremely short time period in which to ask the Board to reconsider
the merits of a similar petition.
E.
Summary
Although changes in boundaries, assessed valuations, or the
number of petitioners and students may be significant, these
quantitative factors alone do not make a subsequent petition
substantially different per se. Indeed, a closer examination of
the two petitions in this case shows many similarities. Here, less
is not necessarily "substantially different." Courts must consider
the full set of facts in each case, including the relevant
qualitative factors. Because the petitions were not "substantially
different", the second petition was barred by section 7 8 and
should have been dismissed by the Board.
II.
Even if the Board had jurisdiction over the second petition,
the evidence adequately supports its decision. The evidence showed
that Oglesby would have suffered substantial financial harm if the
petition had been granted; this harm was exacerbated by the fact
that the special state aid Oglesby received due to its merger with
the former Kennedy district was to end soon. If the petition had
been granted, Peru's equalized assessed valuation would have been
$85,508 per student, while Oglesby would have received only $65,293
per student, despite serving a larger proportion of low-income
students. In addition, granting the petition would have required
Peru to add a special minibus at a cost of approximately $4,375 per
year, while Oglesby was able to accommodate the affected students
without a significant increase in its transportation expenditures.
The record also supports the trial court's conclusion that
even though Oglesby is a smaller district, its curriculum,
facilities and staff are comparable to those of Peru. Standardized
test scores from the two districts strengthen this conclusion. The
record also indicates that Oglesby spends more per pupil and has a
better student/teacher ratio than Peru. In sum, the petitioners
failed to show that the educational needs of the three children in
the subject territory would be better served by attending school in
Peru.
The evidence shows that the petitioners have meaningful
community ties to Oglesby. The children in the subject territory
have friends who live in Oglesby, and the after-school care
provider for one of the children resides in Oglesby. Although the
petitioners have a strong personal preference for Peru, this factor
alone is insufficient to support the petition where the other
relevant factors do not favor it. See Steichen v. Lemon, 192 Ill.
App. 3d 714, 723, 548 N.E.2d 1385, 1391 (1990).
As we said in the first detachment case involving these
petitioners, the Board's denial of the petition was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence nor was the opposite conclusion
clearly evident from the record. See Board of Education, 269 Ill.
App. 3d at 1025, 647 N.E.2D at 1023.
III.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
La Salle County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
HOLDRIDGE, J., concurs and SLATER, J., specially concurs.