Helm v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada

624 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 45 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2032, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96972, 2008 WL 4981135
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Arkansas
DecidedNovember 24, 2008
DocketCivil 07-2112
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 624 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (Helm v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Helm v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 45 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2032, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96972, 2008 WL 4981135 (W.D. Ark. 2008).

Opinion

ORDER

JIMM LARRY HENDREN, District Judge.

Now on this 24th day of November, 2008, comes on for consideration the captioned matter, and from the Administrative Record, and the briefs of the parties, the Court finds and orders as follows:

1. The pending action is an appeal of an administrative decision under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). When the events in suit began, plaintiff Michael D. Helm (“Helm”) was the President and CEO of Sparks Health System in Fort Smith, Arkansas (“Sparks”), and was a participant in an employee welfare benefit plan (the “Plan”) sponsored by Sparks and insured by defendant Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (“Sun Life”).

2. Sparks was both the Plan Administrator and the Plan Sponsor, but it delegated to Sun Life “its entire discretionary authority to make all final determinations regarding claims for benefits under the benefit plan ____” Where an ERISA plan administrator — or, by extension, its delegate — has discretionary authority to make benefits decisions, the administrative decision is judicially reviewed for abuse of discretion. Groves v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 438 F.3d 872 (8th Cir.2006).

In abuse of discretion review, the Court must affirm the administrative decision if a reasonable person could have reached the same decision on the evidence before the administrator — i.e., the evidence in the Administrative Record — regardless of whether that hypothetical reasonable person actually would have reached the same decision. The quantum of proof required is “substantial evidence,” which has been defined as “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Ferrari v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass’n., 278 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir.2002). Both the quantity and the quality of the evidence are evaluated in this light, and courts are “hesitant to interfere” with the administrative decision. Groves, supra.

3. The foregoing standard is not absolute and inflexible. Where a plaintiff presents “probative evidence demonstrating that (1) a palpable conflict of interest or a serious procedural irregularity exist *1036 ed, which (2) caused a serious breach of the plan administrator’s fiduciary duty,” the level of deference is adjusted to take those factors into consideration. Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.1998). When circumstances justify application of the sliding scale approach, “the evidence supporting the plan administrator’s decision must increase in proportion to the seriousness of the conflict or procedural irregularity.” 144 F.3d at 1162.

In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008), the Supreme Court held that where a plan administrator (whether employer or insurance company) “both evaluates claims for benefits and pays benefits claims,” a conflict exists. Based on Glenn, the Court concludes that the first factor of the Woo test is met.

4. Neither a conflict of interest nor a procedural irregularity will trigger sliding scale analysis unless it causes a serious breach of the Plan Administrator’s fiduciary duty.

The alleged procedural irregularity must have some connection to the substantive decision reached by the administrator, and give rise to “serious doubts” about whether the, result reached was the product of “an arbitrary decision” or “whim,” before we vary from the usual standard of review.

LaSalle v. Mercantile Bancorporation, Inc. Long Term, Disability Plan, 498 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir.2007).

An ERISA plan administrator is called upon to “discharge [its] duties in respect to discretionary claims processing solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan.” Glenn, supra, 128 S.Ct. at 2350 (internal quotation marks omitted). That does not mean, of course, that a plan administrator is charged with finding a way to provide benefits in every case. Fiduciary obligations extend to the plan as a whole, and all its beneficiaries, not just the individual beneficiary, and a breach occurs when benefits are granted to an unqualified claimant, just as surely as when benefits are denied to a qualified claimant. Barnhart v. UNUM Life Insurance Company of America, 179 F.3d 583, 586-87 (8th Cir.1999). However, when the financial interests of the fiduciary — -rather than the merits of the claim — affect a benefits decision, fiduciary duty is clearly breached.

5. The alleged breach of fiduciary duty in the case at bar is Sun Life’s reliance on the opinion of one medical consultant — -who only examined Helm’s medical records — rather than the opinions of four doctors who examined and/or treated Helm. The Court has also considered, in this regard, Sun Life’s failure to obtain the opinion of another medical consultant who examined only records on the central issue of job stress and its impact on Helm’s health.

Helm reasons that this breach was caused by the conflict of interest, and the Court finds his argument persuasive. The Administrative Record reflects that — to the extent Helm was eligible for benefits— he was eligible for the maximum amount, $10,000 per month. Under the Plan, benefits are payable to a predetermined Maximum Benefit Period or Normal Retirement Age, whichever is longer. For Helm, born in October, 1946, benefits would be payable until he is 66 years of age. As will be seen from the summary below, benefits were stopped when Helm had just turned 60. An additional six years of benefits, at $10,000 per month, would cost Sun Life some $720,000.

For the reasons set forth below, the enormous savings Sun Life will realize if benefits in the case terminate as of November 30, 2006, coupled with its reliance entirely on one consultant’s opinion in the face of strong, credible evidence in contra *1037 diction thereof, create serious doubts in the Court’s mind about whether the result reached was an arbitrary decision. The Court will, therefore, evaluate the facts set forth in the Administrative Record with less than the usual deference to the administrative decision on appeal.

6. The Plan defines “Total Disability” and “Totally Disabled,” for purposes of long term disability (“LTD”) benefits, as follows:

... during the Elimination Period and the next 24 months, the Employee, because of Injury or Sickness, is unable to perform the Material and Substantial Duties of his Own Occupation.

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624 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 45 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2032, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96972, 2008 WL 4981135, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/helm-v-sun-life-assur-co-of-canada-arwd-2008.