Heller v. Commissioner

2 T.C. 371, 1943 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 109
United States Tax Court·Decided June 30, 1943·No. Docket No. 107639·Published·Cited by 68 cases

Opinion

Mellott, Judge:

The Commissioner determined a deficiency in the income tax of petitioner for the calendar year 1937 in the amount of $7,952.40. In an amended answer he asks for an increased deficiency in the aggregate amount of $35,265.35.

The issues are:

(1) Is petitioner entitled to a deduction of $2,145 because of a payment made during 1937 to attorneys for services rendered to him as a “dissenting shareholder,” under a California statute which authorizes a proceeding to require a corporation, merging or consolidating with another, to pay dissenting shareholders the fair market value of their stock?

(2) Did petitioner sustain a deductible capital loss in 1937 when he disposed of stock of a Delaware corporation and acquired stock of a California corporation, organized to take over the business and assets of the Delaware corporation ?

(3) Is petitioner entitled to any increased cost basis for his Delaware corporation stock as a result of transactions between him and the corporation in 1929, involving East Bay Utility District bonds? (This issue need not be decided in the event the second issue is resolved against petitioner.)

The remaining issues raised by the pleadings have either been conceded or settled by stipulation. Effect will be given thereto in the settlement under Rule 50.

Substantially ali of the facts relating to the controverted issues have been stipulated and are found accordingly.

Petitioner is a resident of San Francisco, California, and filed his income tax return for 1937 with the collector of internal revenue for the first district of California.

Issue I.

Findings of fact. — During the year 1937 petitioner paid attorneys, as his proportionate share of retainer, costs, and disbursements, $1.50 per share on 1,430 shares of the capital stock of the Associated Oil Co. owned by him or $2,145. This sum was paid in connection with litigation begun in the year 1937 and carried on throughout that year by petitioner and other dissenting stockholders of the Associated Oil Co. in the Superior Court of California. During 1937 a merger of the Associated Oil Co. into the Tidewater Oil Co. was under way. Some of the stockholders, including petitioner, refused to accept Tidewater’s offer of shares in exchangé for their shares in the Associated Oil Co., and demanded that they be paid the cash value of their shares. The litigation was instituted under and in aceordance with the provisions of section 369 of the Civil Code of California. As a result thereof, petitioner received, subsequent to the end of the year 1937, the sum of $50 per share for his Associated Oil Co. stock, in accordance with a court award. The attorneys’ fee of $2,145 was included in petitioner’s return for the calendar year 1937 as a part of a deduction of $6,495.91 claimed under the heading of “Other Expenses Authorized by Law.”

Opinion. — Respondent contends that the amount of $2,145 paid by petitioner to attorneys during 1937 should be capitalized. Petitioner contends that it is deductible as expense.

Section 23 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1936 was amended by section 121 of the Revenue Act of 1942 to allow the deduction of nontrade and nonbusiness expenses. The pertinent provisions of the latter section are set out in the margin.1

Respondent urges that the attorneys’ fee was incurred in a matter pertaining to assets of a purely capital nature; that the litigation actually involved a defense by petitioner of his rights in, and his title to, these assets; and that the expenditure, being a capital one, was not a deductible expense for 1937. He cites Chestnut Farms Dairy, Inc., 19 B. T. A. 192; affd. sub. nom., Brawner v. Burnet, 63 Fed. (2d) 129; Charles J. Livingood, Executor, 25 B. T. A. 585; and Vernor v. United States, 23 Fed. Supp. 532. See also Morgan Jones Estate, 43 B. T. A. 691; affd., 127 Fed. (2d) 231; and Central Material & Supply Co., 44 B. T. A. 279; affirmed on issue involving capital expenditures, 126 Fed. (2d) 542.

An examination of the cited cases discloses that they involved payments made in connection with the acquisition of capital assets or for the purpose of defending title to, or of protecting, such assets. In Vernor v. United States, supra, the Court of Claims pointed out that the courts and the Board of Tax Appeals have repeatedly held that fees paid for legal services, where the acquisition of capital assets or the litigation of matters pertaining to assets of a purely capital nature are involved, are capital expenditures and not deductible as ordinary and necessary ¡business expenses, citing Charles J. Livingood, Executor, supra; First National Bank of St. Louis, 3 B. T. A. 807; Stephens Fuel Co., 13 B. T. A. 666; Chestnut Farms Dairy, Inc., supra; and Hutchings v. Burnet, 58 Fed. (2d) 514. These cases were all decided prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1942.

The report of the Finance Committee which accompanied H. R. 7378 and which as amended became the Revenue Act of 1942, .in discussing the amendment to section 23 (a) providing for the deduction of nontrade or nonbusiness expenses, contains the following statement:

Expenses, to be deductible under section 23 (a) (2) must be ordinary and necessary, which rule presupposes that they must be reasonable in amount and must bear a reasonable and proximate relation to the production or collection of income, or to the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for that purpose.

It is obvious from the above that Congress intended that some expenditures pertaining to assets of a purely capital nature were to be allowed as deductions from gross income. Other statements in the report clearly indicate that this is so. Thus, in referring to the term “income” it is said that it “comprehends not merely income of the taxable year but also income which the taxpayer has realized in a prior taxable year or may realize in subsequent years, and is not confined to recurring income but applies as well to gain from the disposition of property.”

The attorneys’ fee paid by petitioner, while relating to a capital asset, bore a reasonable and proximate relation to the production or collection of income, and to the management of property held for that purpose. The litigation did not, as respondent urges, involve a defense by petitioner of his rights in, and his title to, the stock. The statute under which it was instituted presupposes that the “dissenting stockholders” own the shares which they are seeking to have appraised. The litigation concerned the exercise by petitioner of his right to receive cash for his shares and the determination of the amount thereof, he not having approved the contemplated merger or consolidation and having taken the other steps required by the statute. As a result of that litigation the fair market value of his stock was determined and paid to him in 1938. The attorneys’ fee in our judgment was paid for services rendered in connection with “the production or collection of income,” and in connection with “the management * * * of property held for the production of income.” Ke-spondent therefore erred in disallowing the claimed deduction.

Issue II.

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Heller v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 371, 1943 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 109 (tax 1943).

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