Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis

398 U.S. 306, 90 S. Ct. 1731, 26 L. Ed. 2d 252, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 78

Opinions

Me. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit under the Jones Act¹ by a seaman who was injured aboard the ship Hellenic Hero in the Port of New Orleans. The District Court, sitting without a jury, rendered judgment for the seaman, 273 F. Supp. 248. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 412 P. 2d 919. The case is here on petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted, 396 U. S. 1000, in light of the conflict between the decision below and Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 368 F. 2d 426, in the Second Circuit.

Petitioner² Hellenic Lines Ltd. is a Greek corporation that has its largest office in New York and another office in New Orleans. More than 95% of its stock³ is owned by a United States domiciliary who is a Greek citizen — Pericles G. Callimanopoulos (whom we call Pericles). He lives in Connecticut and manages the corporation out of New York. He has lived in this country since 1945. The ship Hellenic Hero is engaged in regularly scheduled runs between various ports of the United States and the Middle East, Pakistan, and India. The District Court found that its entire income is from cargo either originating or terminating in the United States.

Respondent, the seaman, signed on in Greece, and he is a Greek citizen. His contract of employment provides that Greek law and a Greek collective-bargaining agreement apply between the employer and the seaman and that all claims arising out of the employment contract are to be adjudicated by a Greek court. And it seems to be conceded that respondent could obtain relief through Greek courts, if he desired.

The Jones Act speaks only of “the defendant employer” without any qualifications. In Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571, however, we listed seven factors to be considered in determining whether a particular shipowner should be held to be an “employer” for Jones Act purposes:

(1) the place of the wrongful act; (2) the law of the flag; (3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman; (4) allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) the place where the contract of employment was made; (6) the inaccessibility of a foreign forum; and (7) the law of the forum.

Of these seven factors it is urged that four are in favor of the shipowner and against jurisdiction: the ship’s flag is Greek; the injured seaman is Greek; the employment contract is Greek; and there is a foreign forum available to the injured seaman.

The Lauritzen test, however, is not a mechanical one. 345 U. S., at 582. We indicated that the flag that a ship flies may, at times, alone be sufficient. Id., at 585-586. The significance of one or more factors must be considered in light of the national interest served by the assertion of Jones Act jurisdiction.⁴ Moreover, the list of seven factors in Lauritzen was not intended as exhaustive. As held in Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320, 325, and approved by the Court of Appeals in the present case, 412 F. 2d, at 923 n. 7, the shipowner’s base of operations is another factor of importance in determining whether the Jones Act is applicable; and there well may be others.

In Lauritzen the injured seaman had been hired in and was returned to the United States, and the shipowner was served here. Those were the only contacts of that shipping operation with this country.

The present case is quite different.

Pericles became a lawful permanent resident alien in 1952. We extend to such an alien the same constitutional protections of due process that we accord citizens.⁵ Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 596. The injury occurred here. The forum is a United States court. Pericles’ base of operations is New York. The Hellenic Hero was not a casual visitor; rather, it and many of its sister ships were earning income from cargo originating or terminating here. We see no reason whatsoever to give the Jones Act a strained construction so that this alien owner, engaged in an extensive business operation in this country, may have an advantage over citizens engaged in the same business by allowing him to escape the obligations and responsibility of a Jones Act “employer.” The flag, the nationality of the seaman, the fact that his employment contract was Greek, and that he might be compensated there are in the totality of the circumstances of this case minor weights in the scales compared with the substantial and continuing contacts that this alien owner has with this country. If, as stated in Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships Inc., 263 F. 2d 437, the liberal purposes of the Jones Act are to be effectuated, the facade of the operation must be considered as minor, compared with the real nature of the operation and a cold objective look at the actual operational contacts that this ship and this owner have with the United States. By that test the Court of Appeals was clearly right in holding that petitioner Hellenic Lines was an “employer” under the Jones Act.

Affirmed.

1 Tbe Act provides:

“Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in ease of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.” 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688.

2 The other petitioner, Universal Cargo Carriers Inc., is a Panamanian corporation which owns the Hellenic Hero; but Hellenic Hero is managed by petitioner Hellenic Lines Ltd., a Greek corporation.

3 Pericles owns in excess of 95% of the stock of both petitioners.

4 Judge Medina, speaking for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, correctly stated the problem in the following words:

“[T]he decisional process of arriving at a conclusion on the subject of the application of the Jones Act involves the ascertainment of the facts or groups of facts which constitute contacts between the transaction involved in the case and the United States, and then deciding whether or not they are substantial. Thus each factor is to be 'weighed’ and 'evaluated’ only to the end that, after each factor has been given consideration, a rational and satisfactory conclusion may be arrived at on the question of whether all the factors present add up to the necessary substantiality. Moreover, each factor, or contact, or group of facts must be tested in the light of tiie underlying objective, which is to effectuate the liberal purposes of the Jones Act.” Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F. 2d 437, 441.

5 “The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores. But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. None of these provisions acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens. They extend their inalienable privileges to all 'persons’ and guard against any encroachment on those rights by federal or state authority.” Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 161 (concurring opinion).