Hellasandros v. County of Santa Barbara

Opinion

Case 2:21-cv-05806-SPG-MAR Document 28 Filed 11/03/22 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #:321

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4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

9 10 SANTANA HELLASANDROS, Case No. 2:21-cv-05806-SPG (MAR) 11 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING CASE 12 v. 13 COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA, ET 14 AL, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 On June 14, 2021, Santana Hellasandros (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in 21 forma pauperis (“IFP”), constructively filed1 a Civil Rights Complaint (“Complaint”) 22 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1. On November 15, 2021, 23 the Court dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend (“ODLA”), granting Plaintiff 24 twenty-one (21) days to file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Dkt. 13. To date, 25 26 1 Under the “mailbox rule”, when a pro se prisoner gives prison authorities a pleading 27 to mail to the court, the court deems the pleading constructively “filed” on the date it is signed. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010). 28 Case 2:21-cv-05806-SPG-MAR Document 28 Filed 11/03/22 Page 2 of 7 Page ID #:322

1 Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s November 15, 2021 ODLA. For the 2 reasons below, the Court DISMISSES this action, without prejudice. 3 II. 4 BACKGROUND 5 On June 14, 2021, Plaintiff constructively filed the instant Complaint. Dkt. 1. 6 On November 15, 2021, the Court dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend in 7 an ODLA, granting Plaintiff twenty-one (21) days to file a FAC. Dkt. 13. The 8 ODLA cautioned Plaintiff that failure to timely file a response to the ODLA “will 9 result” in the dismissal of the Complaint for failure to prosecute. Dkt. 13 at 20. 10 Plaintiff requested several extensions of time, which the Court granted. Dkts. 17, 18, 11 20, 21. 12 On June 9, 2022, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) giving 13 Plaintiff until June 30, 2022 to show why this action should not be dismissed for 14 failure to prosecute. Dkt. 22. Plaintiff was warned that, “[f]ailure to respond to the 15 Court’s Order will result in the dismissal of the action.” Id. (emphasis added). On 16 September 26, 2022, the Court issued a Second OSC, ordering him to comply within 17 fourteen (14) days. Dkt. 26. The Court again warned that failure to respond “will” 18 result in the dismissal of the action. Id. To date, Plaintiff has not responded to the 19 Court’s OSCs. Plaintiff has not corresponded with the Court at all since they 20 requested an extension of time on March 18, 2022. Dkt. 20. In fact, both OSCs were 21 returned to the Court as undeliverable, indicating that Plaintiff may have been released 22 from custody. Dkts. 24, 27. 23 III. 24 DISCUSSION 25 A. APPLICABLE LAW 26 District courts have sua sponte authority to dismiss actions for failure to 27 prosecute or to comply with court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link v. Wabash 28 R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1962); Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest 2 Case 2:21-cv-05806-SPG-MAR Document 28 Filed 11/03/22 Page 3 of 7 Page ID #:323

1 Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating courts may dismiss an action under 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute 3 or comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the court’s orders); Ferdik v. 4 Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (ordering dismissal for failure to 5 comply with court orders). 6 In deciding whether to dismiss for failure to prosecute or comply with court 7 orders, a district court must consider five (5) factors: “(1) the public’s interest in 8 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the 9 risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases 10 on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Omstead v. Dell, 11 Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 12 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). 13 “[The Ninth Circuit] ‘may affirm dismissal where at least four factors support 14 dismissal . . . or where at least three factors “strongly” support dismissal.’” Yourish v. 15 California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hernandez v. City of 16 El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998)). In a case involving sua sponte 17 dismissal, however, the fifth Henderson factor regarding the availability of less drastic 18 sanctions warrants special focus. Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 399. 19 B. ANALYSIS 20 1. The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation 21 In the instant action, the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation 22 weighs in favor of dismissal. See Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 23 2002) (“The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors 24 dismissal.” (quoting Yourish, above) (internal quotation omitted)). Plaintiff has not 25 filed a FAC in compliance with the Court’s On November 15, 2021 ODLA or 26 otherwise responded to the Court’s OSCs. In fact, Plaintiff has not corresponded 27 with the Court at all since he March 18, 2022. Dkt. 20. Given that Plaintiff has failed 28 to interact with the Court for over six (6) months, this factor weighs in favor of 3 Case 2:21-cv-05806-SPG-MAR Document 28 Filed 11/03/22 Page 4 of 7 Page ID #:324

1 dismissal. See Dkt. 20; see also Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 (finding that the 2 plaintiff’s failure to pursue the case for almost four (4) months weighed in favor of 3 dismissal). 4 2. The Court’s need to manage its docket 5 The second factor—the Court’s need to manage its docket—likewise weighs in 6 favor of Dismissal. Courts have “the power to manage their dockets without being 7 subject to the endless vexatious noncompliance of litigants.” See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 8 1261. As such, the second factor looks to whether a particular case has “consumed . . 9 . time that could have been devoted to other cases on the [Court’s] docket.” See 10 Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642; Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th 11 Cir. 2004) (“[R]esources continue to be consumed by a case sitting idly on the court’s 12 docket.”). 13 On November 15, 2021, the Court issued an ODLA ordering Plaintiff to file a 14 FAC within twenty-one (21) days. Dkt. 13 at 20. The ODLA cautioned Plaintiff that 15 failure to timely file a response to the ODLA “will result” in the dismissal of the 16 Complaint for failure to prosecute. Id. (emphasis in original). 17 On June 9, 2022, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) why the 18 action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Dkt. 22. The OSC again 19 warned that “failure to respond to the Court’s Order will result in the dismissal 20 of the action.” Id. (emphasis in original). 21 The Court issued a second OSC on September 26, 2022, again warning that 22 failure to respond will result in dismissal. Dkt. 26. 23 Plaintiff has failed to comply with any of the Court’s Orders, all of which 24 warned Plaintiff that his failure to comply could or would result in the recommended 25 dismissal of the Complaint. See Dkts. 13, 22, 26. Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute and 26 follow Court Orders hinders the Court’s ability to move this case toward disposition 27 and suggests Plaintiff does not intend to or cannot litigate this action diligently. 28 Consequently, the Court’s need to manage its docket favors dismissal here. 4 Case 2:21-cv-05806-SPG-MAR Document 28 Filed 11/03/22 Page 5 of 7 Page ID #:325

1 3. The risk of prejudice to Defendant 2 The third factor—prejudice to Defendant(s)—also weighs in favor of dismissal. 3 A rebuttable presumption of prejudice to defendant arises when plaintiffs 4 unreasonably delay prosecution of an action. See In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1452–53 5 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he failure to prosecute diligently is sufficient by itself to justify 6 dismissal . . . [t]he law presumes injury from unreasonable delay.”). 7 Nothing suggests such a presumption is unwarranted in this case. Plaintiff has 8 not provided any reason for his failure to comply with either the Court’s ODLA or 9 OSCs and for his failure to communicate with the Court since March 17, 2022. Dkt. 10 12. Given the length of the delay, the Court finds Plaintiff’s delay in prosecuting this 11 case to be unreasonable. Thus, prejudice is presumed and weighs in favor of 12 dismissal. See, e.g., In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 13 1227 (“The law . . . presumes prejudice from unreasonable delay.”). 14 4. Public policy favoring disposition on the merits 15 The fourth factor—public policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits— 16 ordinarily weighs against dismissal. See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod. Liab. 17 Litig., 460 F.3d at 1228. Here, as it usually does, the fourth factor weighs against 18 dismissal. It is, however, Plaintiff’s responsibility to move towards disposition at a 19 reasonable pace and avoid dilatory and evasive tactics. See Morris v. Morgan Stanley, 20 942 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff has not discharged this responsibility 21 despite having been: (1) instructed on his responsibilities; (2) granted sufficient time 22 in which to discharge them; and (3) warned of the consequences of failure to do so. 23 See Dkts. 13, 22, 26. Under these circumstances, and without any other information 24 from Plaintiff, the policy favoring resolution of disputes on the merits does not 25 outweigh Plaintiff’s failure to obey Court Orders or to file responsive documents 26 within the time granted. 27 /// 28 /// 5 Case 2:21-cv-05806-SPG-MAR Document 28 Filed 11/03/22 Page 6 of 7 Page ID #:326

1 5. Availability of less drastic alternatives 2 The fifth factor—availability of less drastic sanctions—also weighs in favor of 3 dismissal. A “district court need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 4 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” 5 Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. Less drastic alternatives to dismissal include warning a 6 party that dismissal could result from failure to obey a court order. See Malone, 833 7 F.2d at 132 n.1. Further, “a district court’s warning to a party that his [or her] failure 8 to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal can satisfy the ‘consideration of 9 alternatives’ requirement.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262 (citations omitted). 10 Here, the Court cannot move the case toward disposition without Plaintiff’s 11 compliance with Court Orders or participation in this litigation. Plaintiff has shown 12 he is either unwilling or unable to comply with Court Orders by filing responsive 13 documents or otherwise cooperating in prosecuting this action. Given this record, the 14 Court finds that any less drastic alternatives to dismissal would be inadequate to 15 remedy Plaintiff’s failures to obey Court Orders and to prosecute. 16 6. Summary 17 Finally, while dismissal should not be entered unless Plaintiff has been notified 18 dismissal is imminent, see W. Coast Theater Corp. v. City of Portland, 897 F.2d 1519, 19 1523 (9th Cir. 1990), the Court has warned Plaintiff about the potential dismissal in 20 the November 15, 2021 ODLA and in two (2) separate Orders. See Dkts. 13, 22, 26. 21 As discussed above, four (4) of the Rule 41(b) factors weigh in favor of 22 dismissal. Accordingly, this action is subject to dismissal. 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 6 Case 4:21-cv-05806-SPG-MAR Document 28 Filed 11/03/22 Page 7of7 Page ID #:327

1 IV. 2 ORDER 3 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Petitionet’s case is DISMISSED 4 | without prejudice. 5 6 Dated: November 3, 2022

7 HONORABLE SHERI VNT DEACE GARNETT 9 United States District Judge Presented by: | Ase 10 | MARGO A.ROCCONT ul United States Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -