Hellard v. City of San Rafael

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: April 19, 2022
• Docket: 4:22-cv-02001
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JAMES HELLARD, Case No. 22-cv-02001-JSW

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING APPLICATION 9 v. FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 10 CITY OF SAN RAFAEL, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 3 Defendants. 11

12 13 This matter comes before the Court on consideration of the application for a temporary 14 restraining order (“TRO”) filed by Plaintiff James Hellard (“Mr. Hellard”). The Court has 15 considered Mr. Hellard’s application and opposition briefs filed by the City of San Rafael (“San 16 Rafael”) and the California Department of Transportation (“CalTrans”).1 Mr. Hellard did not file 17 a reply by the deadline set by the Court. Having considered those papers, relevant legal authority, 18 and the record in this case, the Court it DENIES Mr. Hellard’s application. 19 BACKGROUND 20 On March 29, 2022, Mr. Hellard, acting pro se, filed a complaint in which he asserted 21 claims against the City, CalTrans, Ms. Murphy, and Sergeant Huber, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 22 1983 for alleged violations of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the 23 United States Constitution.2 (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. at 3.) Mr. Hellard alleges the City stole his car 24 1 Neither Lynn Murphy (“Ms. Murphy”) nor San Rafael Police Sergeant Carl Huber 25 (“Sergeant Huber”) have appeared, but the Court’s ruling is equally applicable to the claims against them. 26

2 Mr. Hellard’s application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted and the matter was 27 reassigned to this Court. (Dkt. No. 6.) Accordingly, the Court is limited to considering the 1 “forcing [him] to be exposed to COVID … and into dangerous living on the streets.” (Id. at 4.) 2 Mr. Hellard also alleges he is being forced to live in a City-operated homeless encampment under 3 Highway 101, which he claims has caused permanent hearing loss and respiratory illness. (Id. at 4 5; see also App. at 1; Declaration of James Hellard (“Hellard Decl.”), ¶¶ 1, 3.) Mr. Hellard attests 5 that he is forced to live in the encampment because “living anywhere else means my survival gear 6 will be confiscated and I can be arrested at any time…” (Hellard Decl., ¶ 4.) Mr. Hellard also 7 attests that the living conditions in the encampment are neither hygienic nor safe, and he asks the 8 Court to enjoin the City “from forcing him to camp under the freeway underpass … and to allow 9 [him] to escape to safely camp outside” the encampment. (Hellard Decl., ¶¶ 9-14; App. at 1.) 10 According to the City, the encampment at issue was set up as a temporary “Service 11 Support Area” (“SSA”) to provide services to unhoused individuals who had been living in 12 encampments on park-and-ride lots owned by CalTrans. (See, e.g., Murphy Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, 12-13; 13 Dkt. 13-6, Declaration of Lindsey Lara (“Lara Decl.”) ¶ 4, Ex. B at 3-4.) According to the record, 14 CalTrans intends to clear out the encampment at issue in August 2022. (Id. ¶ 7.) Ms. Murphy and 15 Sergeant Huber attest that none of the individuals living in the encampment, including Mr. Hellard 16 and his ex-wife, were required to relocate there and can leave at any time. (Murphy Decl. ¶¶ 8-9, 17 17, 19; Huber Decl., ¶ 3.) 18 The City’s regulations include a provision that provides: 19 Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit camping on all public property, including parks, when there is no alternative shelter 20 available to the person camping; provided that the City Manager may nevertheless absolutely prohibit camping at any time in one or 21 more specific parks where such prohibition is determined to be a threat to the public, health, safety, or welfare. 22 23 San Rafael Municipal Code § 19.20.080(C)(3).3 24 Sergeant Huber attests that “the San Rafael Police Department has not cited or arrested 25 anyone for camping on public property within the San Rafael city limits,” since the United States 26 Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Martin v. Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 27 1 2019). (Huber Decl., ¶ 8.) The Department will, however, enforce City ordinances that preclude 2 camping in open spaces and has cleared encampments from such spaces. The department also 3 enforces ordinances prohibiting camping in one public park and City parking garages. (Id. ¶ 9; 4 Lara Decl., Ex. D.) Sergeant Huber attests that there are no records that Mr. Hellard has been 5 cited or arrested for camping on public property within City limits. (Id. ¶ 11.) 6 The Court will address additional facts as necessary. 7 ANALYSIS 8 Preliminary injunctive relief, whether in the form of a TRO or a preliminary injunction, is 9 an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” that is never awarded as of right. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 10 674, 689-690 (2008) (internal citations omitted). In order to obtain such relief, Plaintiff must 11 establish: “he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 12 absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is 13 in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). In Alliance 14 for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, the Ninth Circuit held that the “serious questions” sliding scale 15 approach survives Winter. 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011). 16 Thus, the Court may grant Mr. Hellard’s application for a TRO if he demonstrates that 17 there are serious questions going to the merits and a hardship balance that tips sharply in his favor, 18 if the other two elements of the Winter test are also met. Id. at 1132. This allows the Court “to 19 preserve the status quo where difficult legal questions require more deliberate investigation.” See 20 Sencion v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., LLC, No. 10-cv-3108 JF, 2011 WL 1364007, *2 (N.D. Cal. April 21 11, 2011). 22 The Court concludes Mr. Hellard has not demonstrated it is likely that he will suffer 23 irreparable harm if the Court fails to grant a TRO. First, the record shows that none of the 24 Defendants are requiring him to live in the encampment. Second, he has not demonstrated that the 25 City is likely to arrest him if he chooses to camp elsewhere or that he has been arrested for doing 26 so. The Court also concludes that Mr. Hellard has not met his burden to show he is likely to 27 succeed on the merits or that there is a serious question on the merits and that the balance of ] purportedly caused him harm. With respect to the alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment 2 || rights, as set forth above, the City’s anti-camping ordinance exempts unsheltered individuals and 3 || there is no indication Mr. Hellard has been or is likely to be arrested for violating the ordinance. 4 Mr. Hellard also alleges the Defendants violated his Due Process rights, relying on the 5 state-created danger doctrine. “The Due Process Clause is a limitation on state action and is not a 6 || guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. ... Simply failing to prevent acts of a 7 || private party is insufficient to establish liability.” Martinez v. City of Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260, 1271 8 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In general, “a state is not liable for its 9 || omissions.” Jd. However, an exception exists if a state “affirmatively places [an individual] in 10 || danger by acting with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger.” /d. (internal 11 quotations and citations omitted). Based on the existing record, including Mr. Hellard’s statement 12 || that he was living under the freeway before the SSA was created, the Court concludes he has not E 13 met his burden to show that any of the Defendants created or exposed him to a danger that he 14 |] would not otherwise have faced. /d. at 1271-72.4 3 15 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Mr. Hellard’s application for a TRO. 16 IT ISSO ORDERED. 7) i 17 || Dated: April 19, 2022 ( / . // At 18 \LOF5 19 JEPPREY/S/ WHITH United Syftes Distry¥/t Judge 20 / 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 4 Because the Court concludes Mr. Hellard fails to meet his burden on the first two Winter factors, it does not reach the remaining factors. See California v. Azar, 950 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th 28 Cir. 2020) (en banc) (“If a movant fails to establish likelihood of success on the merits, we need not consider the other factors.”).