IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
Nos. 10-08-00292-CR, 10-08-00293-CR, 10-08-00294-CR, and 10-08-00295-CR
HELEN MAYFIELD, Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 361st District Court Brazos County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 07-05453-CRF-361, 07-05454-CRF-361, 07-05455-CRF-361, and 07-05456-CRF-361
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Helen Mayfield of forgery, and the trial court sentenced her to
twenty-four months in State jail. Mayfield challenges: (1) the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the constitutionality of the forgery statute; (3) the State‖s
designation of experts; (4) the denial of her motion to sever; (5) the admission of her
recorded statements; (6) the State‖s closing argument; (7) the denial of her motion to
suppress; (8) the denial of her motion for mistrial; (9) the State‖s alleged failure to correct perjured testimony and disclose exculpatory evidence; (10) the admission of
extraneous-offense evidence; (11) the denial of her motion for grand jury testimony; and
(12) the appointment of standby counsel. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mayfield was charged with passing twelve forged American Express traveler‖s
checks. A teller at First National Bank testified that Mayfield expressed no concerns
about cashing the first two checks. Karen Urban, First National‖s former senior vice-
president of security, testified that the checks contained misspellings, slanted numbers,
inconsistent coloring, and micro-ink that was not machine readable, which is common
for counterfeit items. American Express investigator Robbie Henegar testified that the
checks purported to be the act of American Express, but were counterfeit. They
contained invalid water marks, holograms, spellings, security brands, and numbers.
Urban further testified that two wire transfers to Mayfield‖s account had been
reversed as fraudulent. Mayfield told Urban that she was expecting the wire transfers
per business contracts. She denied being the victim of a scam, but admitted having
problems with scams in the past. Mayfield admitted passing the traveler‖s checks, but
claimed that the checks were payments from a man with whom she had a contract.
Mayfield told Detective James Arnold that the transactions had been ongoing for
about two years, were not her specialty, and had not previously been engaged in.
Arnold testified that Mayfield mentioned consignments and claimed to be the victim of
a scam. Mayfield gave Arnold a packet of documents and claimed possession of other
documents, which she never provided. She did not claim to be an international lawyer
Mayfield v. State Page 2 or a back-order payment representative. She claimed that the traveler‖s checks were a
customs fee. One of her emails, however, indicated that the checks were a loan.
During a search of Mayfield‖s home, police found counterfeit checks,
Moneygram orders, and gift checks. At trial, witnesses testified to three checks that
were not authorized. Senior Corporal Randy Turner responded to a forgery call
regarding a check from S‖Kool Smartz, Inc. Mayfield told Turner that she received the
check as a business investment. In a supplemental report, Detective Patrick Bassinger
stated that Mayfield said she was trying to verify the check and did not negotiate the
check. Turner, Arnold, and a bank employee testified to the contrary.
Teresa Cook testified that the $850 Moneygram orders were not authentic. They
were not machine -printed, contained a yellow heat-seeking spot instead of a pink spot,
and lacked magnetic ink. Ninety percent of counterfeit orders are for $850.
Sergeant Billy Couch testified that he found several $100 American Express gift
checks in Mayfield‖s home. The checks were found in an envelope postmarked
Cotonou Jericho Republic Du Benin. Henegar testified that the gift checks were not
authorized by American Express.
Arnold testified that Mayfield maintained approximately thirty bank accounts,
through which hundreds of thousands of dollars had traveled. Over one-hundred wire
transfer receipts were found in Mayfield‖s home, sent by either Mayfield or others, to
California, New York, and several foreign countries. Arnold learned that Mayfield‖s
Western Union privileges had been suspended. He received three suspected activity
reports regarding Mayfield, two of which were filed by Western Union.
Mayfield v. State Page 3 Arnold also discovered the following email from Mayfield:
I received your checks but am afraid to use them. If they are forgeries, I can go to jail. This is a state jail forgery. I cannot take a chance. More likely than not they are forgeries.
Mayfield had not voluntarily disclosed this email, which was written the day before she
cashed the first two traveler‖s checks.
Secret Service agent James Napolitano testified that common terms used in a
scam include “payment representative” and “consignment.” Napolitano testified that
signs of active participation include the use of Moneygram and Western Union to
transfer money, the use of numerous accounts, and failure to declare income on tax
returns. He explained that people often use emails to show innocence, but when their
homes are searched, investigators find other non-disclosed documents. Too many
documents, too much activity, and notification of the scam indicates that a person is
probably an “active participant” who knew something was wrong, but chose to
continue their involvement “as a way to make a living.” Napolitano testified that
Mayfield has not filed tax returns since 2002.
Christopher McCloskey testified that he probably warned Mayfield about email
scams and admitted that Mayfield asked him to wire money. McCloskey believed that
Mayfield was a victim. Dale Calcarone testified that he knew about the traveler‖s
checks because Mayfield told him that she handled other people‖s accounts.
Mayfield testified that she practices international law and became a back-order
payment representative after talking with some international attorneys. She admitted
being warned about email scams. Mayfield testified that she eventually received some
Mayfield v. State Page 4 bad documents from Benin and determined that documents from this location are
probably false. Mayfield testified that she did nothing with documents that could not
be verified. She testified that some checks looked questionable, but were verified by the
bank. She testified that other checks were not verified, such as an Ontario check that
was initially verified and placed on hold. She explained that the S‖Kool Smartz check
was a loan, but that it was a bad check and she was scammed. She also knew one of the
other checks was a scam. She stopped cashing Canadian checks.
Mayfield testified that she would do no more business with a company after
receiving a bad check. She attempted to obtain loans from investment companies, but
never received any good money. Specifically, she testified that several of the counterfeit
checks were loans. She denied getting any money out of the transactions and testified
that only one check was ever cashed as part of the back-order payment business. She
sent paperwork to an ex-police officer to review for authenticity. She admitted
communicating with people even after she was warned about them.
Mayfield testified that she received the traveler‖s checks as customs fees for a
consignment. She testified that consignments are “pies in the sky” and “mirages,” but
are fine when the internet is not involved. She advised the bank teller of her concerns
regarding the checks. She assumed that First National verified the checks. She never
expected that First National would not call American Express to verify the checks. She
had attempted to do so herself, but was referred to First National. She did not
reimburse First National because the bank would not sign a release.
Mayfield v. State Page 5 LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY
In points one and two, Mayfield challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of
the evidence to support her forgery conviction, specifically knowledge and intent.
To prove the offense of forgery by passing, the State must show that the
defendant: (1) with intent to defraud or harm another (2) passed (3) a writing (4) that
purported to be the act of another and (5) that other person did not authorize the act.
See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 32.21(a)(1)(B), (b) (Vernon Supp. 2009); Williams v. State, 688
S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Intent to defraud or harm requires proof of
knowledge that the instrument is forged. See Williams, 688 S.W.2d at 488. Intent may be
established by circumstantial evidence. Id. Intent may be inferred if the State
establishes that the defendant knew the instrument was forged. See Beaty v. State, 156
S.W.3d 905, 909 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.). “A finding of such knowledge
generally requires evidence of at least ―suspicious circumstances‖ showing that the
defendant knowingly passed the forged check.” Laws v. State, No. 14-00-01093-CR, 2001
Tex. App. LEXIS 7576, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 8, 2001, no pet.)
(not designated for publication).
Mayfield contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient because:
(1) she did not forge the traveler‖s checks; (2) she signed her own name on the checks;
(3) she did not know that the checks were counterfeit; (4) she merely received the checks
in the mail; and (5) she did not profit from the transactions. However, several
suspicious circumstances support a finding of intent and knowledge.
Mayfield v. State Page 6 First, to be guilty of passing a forged check, it was unnecessary that Mayfield be
the actual maker of the check. See McFarland v. State, 605 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980). Under § 32.21(a)(1)(B), it is sufficient that the person “utters (or passes,
issues, etc.)…a writing that is forged.” Id. Henegar testified that American Express did
not authorize the checks. The checks purported to be the act of American Express, but
were actually counterfeit. Mayfield admitted passing the checks.
Second, the traveler‖s checks were payable to Mayfield; thus, signing her own
name on the checks was the only way to deposit the check. See Laws, 2001 Tex. App.
LEXIS 7576, at *16. Signing her own name does not negate intent or knowledge.
Third, Urban and Henegar testified to numerous defects on the face of the
checks. The day before cashing the first two checks, Mayfield wrote an email
expressing concerns that the checks were forgeries. By her own admission, she took the
checks to the bank to verify them. Four days later, she cashed the remaining checks.
This evidence suggests an awareness of the checks‖ fraudulent nature. See Velu v. State,
No. 10-07-00327-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1353, at *11-13 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 25,
2009, pet. ref‖d) (not designated for publication); see also Laws, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS
7576, at *13, 15.
Fourth, Mayfield gave conflicting stories regarding the purpose of the traveler‖s
checks, i.e., a customs fee, part of a contract, and a loan. The jury was entitled to
consider these conflicts as evidence of guilt and bore the burden of resolving such
conflicts either for or against Mayfield. See Velu, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1353, at *8-9; see
also Kemmerer v. State, 113 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet.
Mayfield v. State Page 7 ref‖d); Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Wyatt v. State, 23
S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Fifth, Napolitano‖s testimony establishes that Mayfield has engaged in activities
and used terminology that suggests she is an active participant in the scam. Intent and
knowledge may be inferred ”from any facts which tend to prove its existence, including
the acts, words, and conduct of the accused.” Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002).
Finally, forgery by passing “does not require a showing that the defendant
actually received consideration in exchange for the check.” Landry v. State, 583 S.W.2d
620, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); see McGee v. State, 681 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984); see also Velu, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1353, at *10-11.
In summary, the jury could reasonably conclude that Mayfield, a licensed
attorney who knew about email scams and had prior problems with such scams, was
not the victim of a scam, but knew that the traveler‖s checks were fraudulent and chose
to cash them. Knowing the checks to be fraudulent, but making the conscious decision
to attempt to cash them, evidences intent to defraud or harm another. See Velu, 2009
Tex. App. LEXIS 1353, at *13; see also Beaty, 156 S.W.3d at 909.
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could
reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mayfield committed the offense
of forgery. See Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). The proof of
guilt is not so weak nor the conflicting evidence so strong as to render the jury‖s verdict
Mayfield v. State Page 8 clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-15 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Because the
evidence is legally and factually sufficient to sustain Mayfield‖s forgery conviction, we
overrule points one and two.
THE FORGERY STATUTE
In point three, Mayfield argues that section 32.21 of the Texas Penal Code, which
defines “forgery,” is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and unconstitutional as
applied. However, facial and “as applied” challenges to the constitutionality of a
statute must be raised at trial, not for the first time on appeal. See Karenev v. State, 281
S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Flores v. State, 245 S.W.3d 432, 437 n.14
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Because Mayfield failed to challenge the constitutionality of the
forgery statute at trial, point three is not preserved for appellate review.
EXPERT WITNESSES
In point four, Mayfield challenges the State‖s designation of experts.1 She first
complains that the State designated experts by placing a “slash” after the names; yet,
she did not object to any such defects. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). She also complains
that the trial court failed to conduct Daubert hearings, but she never requested any such
hearings. See Stephens v. State, 276 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet.
ref‖d); see also Scherl v. State, 7 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. ref‖d).
Finally, she complains about the denial of her requests to voir dire Detective Arnold
1 Mayfield contends that the trial court refused to conduct hearings on her pre-trial motions for State‖s witnesses and disclosure of expert witnesses. The trial court held two different pre-trial hearings, during which Mayfield could have urged her motions.
Mayfield v. State Page 9 and Agent Napolitano. However, she did not ask to take Napolitano on voir dire. At
the time she asked to take Arnold on voir dire, Arnold was about to testify to Mayfield‖s
delivery of emails to him and her purpose for doing so, not his expert opinion. See TEX.
R. EVID. 701; see also TEX. R. EVID. 705(b); Goss v. State, 826 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992); Meier v. State, No. 05-08-00486-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 2051, at *21-22
(Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 25, 2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Under these
circumstances, point four is not preserved for appellate review.
MOTION FOR SEVERANCE
In point five, Mayfield challenges the denial of her motion to sever offenses.
Mayfield did not urge her motion to sever until after the jury was sworn and testimony
had begun. Because her motion was not timely raised, point five is not preserved for
appellate review. See Thornton v. State, 986 S.W.2d 615, 617-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
ADMISSION OF RECORDINGS AND TRANSCRIPTS
In point six, Mayfield challenges the admission of recordings and transcripts of
her statements because the tapes were never disclosed and contain “discrepancies.”
Detective Arnold testified that exhibits 4B, 4C, and 4D are true and accurate
recordings of his conversations with Mayfield. Transcripts for exhibits 4C and 4D were
published to the jury. The trial court instructed the jury on the use of transcripts. The
trial court overruled Mayfield‖s objections to these exhibits.
The State represented that the recordings were disclosed to Mayfield before trial.
Even assuming they were not, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d
215 (1963) does “not apply when the appellant was already aware of the information.”
Mayfield v. State Page 10 Hayes v. State, 85 S.W.3d 809, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Mayfield knew she made the
statements and was aware of the contents of those statements because she was present
when they were made. See id.; see also Pollard v. State, No. 09-06-00294-CR, 2007 Tex.
App. LEXIS 7302, at *13 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 5, 2007, pet. ref‖d) (not designated
for publication). The record further contains authenticating testimony from a witness
with knowledge, Arnold, that the recordings are what they are “claimed to be.” See
TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(1); see also Angleton v. State, 971 S.W.2d 65, 67-68 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998); Ball v. State, No. 10-04-00093-CR, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 2575, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—
Waco Mar. 30, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication). There is no affirmative
evidence of any alterations to the tapes. See Ballard v. State, 23 S.W.3d 178, 183 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2000, no pet.). We overrule point six.
CLOSING ARGUMENT
In point seven, Mayfield contends that the State engaged in improper closing
arguments by expressing belief regarding her guilt or the truth of her testimony.
During closing arguments, the State‖s attorney stated:
…the defendant in this case is nothing more than a fraud. She is a scam artist. Since 2002, she has pulled off scam after scam after scam and she has profited off of scam after scam after scam; and I submit to you that she has come before you-all all through this week and she is trying to pull off yet another scam, perhaps her greatest scam of all.
The prosecutor later argued, “There are two things that Miss Mayfield said when she
took the stand that were true. My name is Helen Mayfield, and I‖m a lawyer.
Everything else was a lie.” Mayfield did not object to either argument.
Mayfield v. State Page 11 Mayfield contends that it was unnecessary for her to object because her
substantial rights were affected. It is an established rule that “a defendant‖s failure to
object to a jury argument or a defendant‖s failure to pursue to an adverse ruling his
objection to a jury argument forfeits his right to complain about the argument on
appeal.” Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see Threadgill v. State,
146 S.W.3d 654, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Godsey v. State, 989 S.W.2d 482, 496
(Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. ref‖d). Because improper jury argument may not be raised
for the first time on appeal, point seven is not preserved for appellate review. See
Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89; see also Threadgill, 146 S.W.3d. at 670; Moreno v. State, 195
S.W.3d 321, 329 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref‖d).
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In point eight, Mayfield challenges the denial of her motion to suppress, arguing
that (1) the State admitted a search warrant and affidavit different from the one with
which she was served; (2) the warrant is not supported by probable cause; (3) the
warrant does not name an offense; (4) there is no nexus between the place searched and
the evidence; (5) the affidavit contains false statements; (6) section 312.014 of the
Government Code and articles 18.01 and 38.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were
violated; and (7) the warrant is overbroad.
We first note that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a
certified copy of the search warrant and affidavit. See TEX. R. EVID. 902(4); see also
Hooper v. State, No. 03-08-00125-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7880, at *19 (Tex. App.—
Austin Oct. 9, 2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
Mayfield v. State Page 12 Next, Mayfield‖s probable cause contention appears to be based on her complaint
that the warrant and affidavit do not establish an offense. In his affidavit, Arnold
explained that First National made a forgery report regarding the traveler‖s checks that
were cashed by Mayfield and returned as counterfeit. He detailed his subsequent
follow-up investigation and concluded that Mayfield was “actively involved” in a
Nigerian scam. These facts allege the offense of forgery by passing. See TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. § 32.21(a)(1)(B), (b). The warrant and affidavit need not adhere to the “strict
technical requirements imposed on charging instruments.” Vega v. State, 680 S.W.2d
515, 517 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. ref‖d).
Finally, during the suppression hearing, Mayfield did not raise a nexus
argument, identify any false statements in the affidavit,2 argue that the warrant was
overbroad, or do more than cite to sections of the United States and Texas Constitutions
or the Code of Criminal Procedure. These global arguments made at trial are not
sufficiently specific to preserve for our review Mayfield‖s remaining challenges to the
search warrant. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see also Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 365
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Noland v. State, No. 10-07-00260-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 4817,
at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Waco June 24, 2009, pet. ref‖d) (not designated for publication);
Armstrong v. State, No. 10-08-00114-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 2971, *5-6 (Tex. App.—
Waco Apr. 29, 2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication). We overrule point eight.
2 At most, Mayfield challenged statements regarding the cashing of checks in 2002. The record is unclear as to which statements Mayfield refers.
Mayfield v. State Page 13 MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
In point nine, Mayfield challenges the denial of her motion for mistrial.
The State asked Detective Arnold about a man who wired money to Mayfield:
“Emil Sheringer is about to go to trial in New York City for wire fraud and money
laundering –.” Mayfield objected on grounds of leading. The trial court overruled the
objection. The State continued:
State: Emil Sheringer, is he about to go on trial in New York City for money laundering, wire fraud, and mail fraud?
Arnold: Yes, sir, at least at the time --
Mayfield: Objection, relevance, Your Honor.
The trial court sustained the objection and granted Mayfield‖s request for an instruction
to disregard the State‖s question, but denied Mayfield‖s motion for a mistrial.
Although Mayfield evidently knew the question was objectionable when asked
the second time, she did not object until after the grounds for the objection were
apparent and the objectionable question had been asked and answered. Under these
circumstances, her objection was untimely. See Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 355
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see also Zmolik v. State, No. 10-09-00281-CR, 2010 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1912, at *5-7 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 10, 2010, no pet.) (not designated for
publication). We overrule point nine.
DUTY OF PROSECUTOR
In point ten, Mayfield contends that the prosecutor violated a duty to correct
perjured testimony and disclose exculpatory evidence.
Mayfield v. State Page 14 Mayfield argues that five of the State‖s witnesses committed perjury. At no time
did she object to any allegedly false testimony or the State‖s use of such testimony. This
complaint is not preserved for appellate review. See Davis v. State, 276 S.W.3d 491, 499-
500 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. denied).
Mayfield also argues that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence and
concealed evidence, including her statements, emails, files, wire transfer receipts,
communications, and tapes of any items being cashed. As previously stated, Brady does
not apply to evidence of which Mayfield is aware. See Hayes, 85 S.W.3d at 815; see also
Pollard, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 7302, at *13.
Mayfield further contends that the State failed to advise the jury that obtaining a
loan, accepting money for/from a client, or wiring one‖s own funds are not crimes. The
record does not show that the State ever suggested that these were criminal acts or that
Mayfield had committed an offense by engaging in such acts. This complaint presents
nothing for our review. See Johnson v. State, No. 10-07-00315-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS
5304, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Waco July 8, 2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
Finally, Mayfield argues that the State lied, coached witnesses to lie, fabricated
emails, altered documents, and failed to disclose warrantless searches of her home and
car. These are conclusory allegations that are not supported by the record. See
Khoshayand v. State, 179 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); see also
Hudson v. State, No. 03-04-00733-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7280, at *15-16 (Tex. App.—
Austin Aug. 18, 2006, no pet.) (not designated for publication). We overrule point ten.
Mayfield v. State Page 15 ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE
In point eleven, Mayfield challenges the admission of improper character
evidence in the form of alleged honor code violations, wire transfers, extraneous checks,
and American Express gift checks.
First, the record shows that the State abandoned its request to introduce evidence
of alleged honor code violations. Second, when Detective Arnold testified about
numerous wire transfers, Mayfield did not object. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see also
Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Third, Mayfield did not
object when other witnesses, including herself, were subsequently asked about and/or
testified to one or more of the four extraneous checks.3 See Lasher v. State, 202 S.W.3d
292, 295 n.1 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref‖d); see also Velu, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS
1353, at *26-27 n.2. Finally, when the State admitted the gift checks, Mayfield had “no
objections.” See Swain, 181 S.W.3d at 368; see also Grisso v. State, 264 S.W.3d 351, 354
(Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.). Under these circumstances, we overrule point eleven.
GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
In point twelve, Mayfield challenges the denial of her motion for disclosure of
grand jury transcripts. At trial, the State represented that no transcript exists. The
record does not show otherwise. Moreover, Mayfield did not advise the trial court of a
“particularized need” for the transcripts, nor has she done so on appeal. TEX. CODE
3 Mayfield contends that she received a running objection to the admission of extraneous-offense evidence. According to the record, however, standby counsel requested a contemporaneous limiting instruction to accompany the admission of each extraneous offense. The trial court granted a running objection to any instance where no contemporaneous limiting instruction was given. Mayfield neither requested nor received a running objection to admission of extraneous-offense evidence itself.
Mayfield v. State Page 16 CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 20.02(d) (Vernon Supp. 2009); see Martinez v. State, 507 S.W.2d 223,
225-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Accordingly, we overrule point twelve.
APPOINTMENT OF STANDBY COUNSEL
In point thirteen, Mayfield contends that the trial court violated the Sixth
Amendment by appointing standby counsel, whom she alleges was ineffective.
Mayfield did not object to the appointment of standby counsel or standby
counsel‖s participation at trial. See Jordan v. State, No. 08-05-00286-CR, 2007 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4118, at *17-19 (Tex. App.—El Paso May 24, 2007, no pet.) (not designated for
publication). Mayfield “controlled the organization and content of [her] defense, made
motions, argued points of law, participated in voir dire, questioned witnesses, and
addressed the court and jury at appropriate times throughout the course of the
proceedings.” Lopez v. State, No. 08-05-00032-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 666, at *7-8
(Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 31, 2007, pet. ref‖d) (not designated for publication). Once she
“competently and intelligently invoke[d] [the] right to self-representation,” she waived
the right to appointed counsel and cannot “attack [] standby counsel as being
ineffective.” Felton v. State, No. 05-92-02442-CR, 1994 Tex. App. LEXIS 3562, at *24 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Dec. 6, 1994, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (citing Dunn v. State,
819 S.W.2d 510, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)); see Flores v. State, 789 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no pet.). We overrule point thirteen. See McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184, 104 S. Ct. 944, 954, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1984).
Mayfield v. State Page 17 OTHER POINTS OF ERROR
Throughout her thirteen points of error, Mayfield has argued that: (1) the
attorney-client privilege bars prosecution; (2) the pre-emption doctrine bars
prosecution; (3) the indictment should be dismissed; and (4) the justice of the peace
court and county court at law lacked jurisdiction to allege a felony. Aside from
occasionally citing inapplicable authority, Mayfield fails to make arguments or cite
authorities to support her contentions. We will not make Mayfield‖s arguments for her.
Because these allegations are inadequately briefed, they are waived. See TEX. R. APP. P.
38.1(h) and (i); see also Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23 n.5; Johnson v. State, 263 S.W.3d 405, 416-17
(Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. ref‖d).
The judgment is affirmed.
FELIPE REYNA Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Reyna, and Justice Davis Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed July 28, 2010 Do not publish [CR25]
Mayfield v. State Page 18