Helaine Michele McKendrick

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 22, 2021
Docket20-51568
StatusUnknown

This text of Helaine Michele McKendrick (Helaine Michele McKendrick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Helaine Michele McKendrick, (Tex. 2021).

Opinion

$5 BANKER, b> Sia XO | Ree □ \ ef > KY DisTRICs Signed January 22, 2021.

Ronald B. King Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION RE: § § HELAINE MICHELE MCKENDRICK, § CASE NO. 20-51568-RBK § DEBTOR § CHAPTER 13 OPINION REYN Holdings, LLC (“REYN’”) filed a proof of claim in this bankruptcy case for $48,110.74 that the debtor Helaine Michele McKendrick (the “Debtor’’) allegedly owes to REYN. The Debtor was the guarantor of a Lease Agreement (the “Lease”) between REYN, as landlord, and Jon-Bi, LLC d/b/a Diamond Spa (“Diamond Spa’), a company owned by the Debtor, as tenant. The Debtor objected to REYN’s proof of claim. The Debtor asserts that $48,110.74 for unpaid rent and other expenses incurred as a result of Diamond Spa’s breach of the Lease is excessive because it doesn’t account for rent received by REYN from subsequent tenants during Diamond Spa’s Lease term. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with the Debtor and sustains the Debtor’s objection in part.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), (b)(2)(B), and 1334(b). As a proceeding to determine the allowance or disallowance of a claim against the estate, this matter is a core proceeding arising under title 11 referred to the Court by the Standing Order

of Reference in the Western District of Texas. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a). II. BACKGROUND. In 2015, Westwood Venture Limited Partnership (“Westwood Venture”) leased a commercial suite in Boerne, Texas (the “Leased Premises”), to Diamond Spa. In 2017, REYN purchased the Leased Premises from Westwood Venture and assumed the Lease as landlord. The Lease term commenced on December 1, 2015, and was to end on December 31, 2020. The Lease provided for monthly rents of $1,400.00 from February 2016 through December 2017, $1,800.00 for each month in 2018, and $2,000.00 for each month in 2019 and 2020. The Lease also required Diamond Spa to pay, as additional rent, $300.00 per month for its estimated pro rata

share of the property’s real-estate taxes, common-area maintenance costs, management fees, and insurance costs (collectively, “Building Costs”). At the end of each year and at the end or termination of the Lease, these estimated Building Costs would be adjusted, or “trued up,” to reflect the actual amount of such costs, with REYN being paid or Diamond Spa being refunded as necessary. The Debtor also executed a Continuing Lease Guaranty (the “Guaranty”) by which she unconditionally guaranteed the full and prompt payment of rent and all other sums required to be paid by Diamond Spa under the Lease. The Debtor also promised to pay all of the landlord’s costs

2 and expenses (including reasonable attorneys’ fees) incurred in collecting the guaranteed payments or enforcing the Guaranty as well as all damages suffered by the landlord in case of any default or breach under the Lease or the Guaranty. Beginning November 1, 2017, Diamond Spa ceased paying rent on the Leased Premises,

and Diamond Spa vacated the Leased Premises in December 2017. In an event of default under the Lease, section 22 of the Lease provided REYN with the option to terminate the Lease or to terminate Diamond Spa’s right to possession of the Leased Premises. In the event of such termination, the Lease still obligated Diamond Spa “to pay rent and all other amounts due or to become due as provided in this Lease for and during the entire unexpired portion then remaining of the Lease term” plus interest at a rate of 18% per annum. The Lease also provided REYN with two options in the event of termination. The first option allowed REYN to relet the Leased Premises, with Diamond Spa responsible to pay REYN all brokerage and/or legal fees incurred in connection with reletting the Leased Premises. In this scenario, the Lease provided that REYN “shall credit [Diamond Spa] only for such amounts as are actually

received from such reletting during the then remaining Lease term.” The second option allowed REYN to recover as damages from Diamond Spa the value of the remaining rent due under the Lease term reduced by the present rental value of the Leased Premises for the remainder of the Lease term. REYN chose the first option. REYN leased the Leased Premises to GMCCJP LLC d/b/a Twisted Oak Hunting and Outfitter Supply (“Twisted Oak”), with payment of rent to begin July 16, 2018, through August 31, 2019. Twisted Oak’s lease provided for rents of $875.00 from July 16, 2018, to July 31, 2018, $1,750.00 for August 2018, and $2,250.00 per month from September

3 2018 through August 2019. Twisted Oak’s lease also provided for CAM fees of $460.00 per month. REYN subsequently leased the Leased Premises to Premium Pharma, LLC (“Premium Pharma”) beginning September 1, 2019, with the lease term running beyond December 31, 2020,

the end of Diamond Spa’s Lease term. Premium Pharma’s lease provided for rents of $2,700.00 per month from September 2019 through August 2020 and $2,775.00 per month from September 2020 through December 2020, when Diamond Spa’s Lease term ended. The Debtor filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy on September 2, 2020 (the “Petition Date”). Shortly thereafter, REYN filed a proof of claim in the amount of $48,110.74 seeking unpaid rents and other fees and expenses allegedly owed by Diamond Spa, and for which the Debtor would be liable under the Guaranty. The amount of the claim included: (i) $19,852.61 in unpaid rents from November 1, 2017, through July 16, 2018,1 as well as Building Costs and true-up amounts; (ii) $1,201.25 in late fees; (iii) $541.25 in electrician fees for replacement of light fixtures removed by Diamond Spa; (iv) $146.68 in locksmith fees for replacing locks on the Leased Premises; (v)

$2,280.00 for a brokerage commission incurred in reletting the Leased Premises; (vi) $12,507.39 in legal fees; (vii) $13,081.56 in interest; and (viii) a credit for a $1,500.00 deposit paid by Diamond Spa. The Debtor objected to REYN’s proof of claim and argued that, pursuant to the Lease, Diamond Spa should have been credited for rent payments from REYN’s subsequent tenants, which payments were frequently in excess of the rent Diamond Spa owed. The Debtor argued that, because a guarantor’s liability cannot exceed that of the principal obligor, this credit should

1 This is the period in which the Leased Premises were vacant and for which REYN received no rent payments. 4 be applied to reduce the amount of REYN’s proof of claim. The Debtor also argued that the amounts REYN claimed for electrician and locksmith fees, the brokerage commission, and interest thereon lacked a proper predicate and should be disallowed. In response, REYN argued that defenses of offset and failure to mitigate are exclusive to

the principal obligor and are unavailable to guarantors. Thus, according to REYN, the Debtor is unable to raise these defenses and is liable for the full amount owed under the Lease and the Guaranty. A hearing was held and argument was heard on the Debtor’s objection to REYN’s proof of claim on December 3, 2020. At the hearing, REYN submitted into evidence invoices related to the electrician and locksmith fees as well as the brokerage commission. John Nichols, a Manager with REYN, testified as to the authenticity of these invoices. Mr. Nichols also testified as to the accuracy of the late fees and the true-up amounts for the Building Costs. Cassidy Daniels, counsel to REYN, testified as to the amount, reasonableness, and necessity of her legal fees. III. DISCUSSION.

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Helaine Michele McKendrick, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/helaine-michele-mckendrick-txwb-2021.