Heiser v. Islamic Republic Of
This text of Heiser v. Islamic Republic Of (Heiser v. Islamic Republic Of) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
__________________________________________ ESTATE OF MICHAEL HEISER, et. al. ) ) Plaintiffs ) 00-CV-02329 (RCL) v. ) ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al. ) Defendants ) Consolidated With __________________________________________) ESTATE OF MILLAR D. CAMPBELL, et al ) ) Plaintiffs ) 01-cv-02104 (RCL) v. ) ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et. al. ) ) Defendants ) _____________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
These consolidated actions, which are now in the post-judgment phase, arise from the
1996 terrorist bombing of the Khobar Towers, a residential complex on a United States military
base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. See Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229
(D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.). At the time of the attack, the Khobar Towers housed members of
the United States Air Force. Plaintiffs are the family members and estates of 17 of the 19
officers and airmen who were killed in the bombing. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), plaintiffs litigated this civil action against defendants
the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, and the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corp. The defendants did not appear in these actions, and, consistent with
28 U.S.C. § 1608(e), this Court ultimately entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the
amount of $254,431,903.00. To date, that judgment remains unsatisfied.
1 Last year, the 2008 National Defense Appropriations Act (“NDAA”) ushered in sweeping
changes in the law with respect to civil actions against state sponsors of terrorism. See Pub. L.
No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3, § 1083. See also Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (construing § 1083 and discussing changes in the law with respect to actions against state
sponsors of terrorism). Among other changes, Section 1083 of the NDAA repeals § 1605(a)(7)
and replaces that provision with an entirely new state sponsor of terrorism exception, 1605A.
This new enactment is much more advantageous to plaintiffs than §1605(a)(7) in many signifcant
respects. For instance, in actions under §1605A, plaintiffs may now seek an award of punitive
damages against states sponsors of terrorism.
In an effort to lay claim to an award of punitive damages against Iran and to achieve all
the benefits of the new statute, plaintiffs, consistent with § 1803(c)(2) of the NDAA, filed a
motion requesting that this Court convert their prior action under § 1605(a)(7) to a new action
under the terms of § 1605A. This Court granted plaintiffs’ motion on January 13, 2008. See Dk.
# 143. Consistent with that ruling, this Court is now in the process of reviewing plaintiffs’
recommendations with respect to additional damages now available to these plaintiffs by virtue
of § 1605A.
In the motion now pending, plaintiffs ask this Court to provide a form and procedure for
Lis Pendens, one of the many new entitlements now available to FSIA plaintiffs who maintain
their actions under § 1605A. Specifically, plaintiffs rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(g). That new
provision provides as follows:
2 (g) PROPERTY DISPOSITION.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—In every action filed in a United States district court in which jurisdiction is alleged under this section, the filing of a notice of pending action pursuant to this section, to which is attached a copy of the complaint filed in the action, shall have the effect of establishing a lien of lis pendens upon any real property or tangible personal property that is— (A) subject to attachment in aid of execution, or execution, under section 1610; (B) located within that judicial district; and (C) titled in the name of any defendant, or titled in the name of any entity controlled by any defendant if such notice contains a statement listing such controlled entity. (2) NOTICE.—A notice of pending action pursuant to this section shall be filed by the clerk of the district court in the same manner as any pending action and shall be indexed by listing as defendants all named defendants and all entities listed as controlled by any defendant. (3) ENFORCEABILITY.—Liens established by reason of this subsection shall be enforceable as provided in chapter 111 of this title.
Generally speaking, lis pendens is a doctrine of state law that enables parties involved in
litigation over real property to file notices with the Court indicating that any rights concerning
that property are subject to the outcome of the civil litigation. See 51 Am. Jur. 2d Lis Pendens §
2 (2008). Technically speaking, a notice of lis pendens is not a lien, but, assuming the proper
procedures are adhered to, the legal effect of the notice is that any third-party purchaser who
receives title to the property is bound by the outcome of the civil case, without any additional
rights to the property. See id. Because a notice of lis pendens severely undermines the
alienability of property, the procedure is usually limited to lawsuits that directly concern the right
to own or use real property. See id at § 8. Some jurisdictions, however, have allowed the
doctrine to be used in a broader range of civil actions. See Id.
3 Prior to the enactment of § 1083, federal courts did not have procedures for the filing of
notices of lis pendens. See Elsea, Jennifer K., Suits Against State Sponsors of Terrorism,
Congressional Research Serv. Rep. RL31258, p. 51 (updated August 8, 2008). To the extent that
parties in civil actions in the federal courts had any right to avail themselves of lis pendens, it
was a right only to be found in the laws of the state jurisdictions and administered through the
state courts exclusively. Id. Now that § 1605A(g) is on the books, however, litigants pursuing
civil cases against state sponsors of terrorism are entitled to a federal lis pendens procedure
administered through the federal courts. No other federal civil actions qualify for such an
extraordinary measure.
The new power of lis pendens afforded to FSIA plaintiffs under § 1605A is exceedingly
broad. At the very outset of civil action against state sponsors of terrorism, plaintiffs may file a
notice in any federal district court “establishing a lien of lis pendens on any real property or any
tangible personal property” located within that federal district, provided such property is subject
to attachment in aid of execution, or execution, of the civil judgment that may be entered in the
plaintiffs’ case. See § 1605A(g)(1) (emphasis added). This new statutory provision offers little
in terms of specific guidance for how federal courts might implement lis pendens. Thus, the
devil may be in the details with respect to this new federally required and federally administered
procedure. This Court suspects that a variety of legal challenges and practical difficulties may
arise as plaintiffs in these terrorism cases initiate liens of lis pendens in federal judicial districts
throughout the country.
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