Heimerle v. Attorney General

575 F. Supp. 1175, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10882
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 13, 1983
Docket82 Civ. 5900 (LBS)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 575 F. Supp. 1175 (Heimerle v. Attorney General) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Heimerle v. Attorney General, 575 F. Supp. 1175, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10882 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).

Opinion

OPINION

SAND, District Judge.

The plaintiff, James F. Heimerle, has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of 28 C.F.R. § 540.13, promulgated by the Bureau of Prisons. 1 Plaintiff claims that the regulation in question violates his First Amendment rights with respect to the reading of his general correspondence. 2 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and has moved pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(c) for a judgment on the pleadings or, alternatively, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant has cross-moved for summary judgment.

In a previous Opinion, this Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted, noting that the issues there discussed “require[d] further legal and factual development.” Heimerle v. Attorney General, 558 F.Supp. 1292, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). We believe that summary disposition of this case is now appropriate in light of the expanded record before us and in light of the changes in the mail handling procedures that have occurred at the Otis-ville prison since our last Opinion was rendered.

FACTS

The plaintiff is a prisoner at a federal correctional institution in Otisville, New York (“Otisville”). Plaintiff challenges the general authority granted to prison personnel under C.F.R. § 540.13 to read incoming and outgoing general correspondence. The plaintiff contends that the regulation and its implementation are violative of his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff does not allege specific acts of arbitrariness or unreasonableness on the part of prison officials and staff. Nor is there a claim that “special correspondence” is being opened.

At the time Heimerle filed this action, outgoing general correspondence was routinely opened and read by prison mail room staff. After the plaintiff filed this action, the security level of the prison, F.C.I. Otis-ville, New York (“Otisville”), was changed from “level 4” to “level 3” for the purpose of implementing the Bureau of Prisons regulations. 3 As a result of this change, outgoing general correspondence may be sealed by the inmate, and is not subject to being read on a “routine” basis, but only where there is reason to believe that the particular item of correspondence would be threatening to the recipient or would facilitate criminal activity, or if the correspon *1177 dence is between inmates. See July 25, 1983 affidavit of Z. Stephen Grzegorek, Regional Director, Northeast Region, Federal Bureau of Prisons (“Grzegorek aff.”) ¶ 4; and see 28 C.F.R. § 540.13.

Prior to opening incoming general correspondence, Otisville officials are required, under 28 C.F.R. § 540.13, to obtain prisoners’ permission to do so. Prisoners can choose not to sign a waiver form which permits authorized staff to open, inspect and read incoming general correspondence, but in doing so, they forfeit their right to receive their mail.

In response to this Court’s suggestion, the General Counsel of the Bureau of Prisons, Clair Cripe, has proposed instructions for guiding the prison mail room staff in reading mail. The Mail Management Manual, which contains these instructions, “will be distributed to each administrative systems manager (who supervises those having responsibility for inspecting and reading inmate mail) and to each mail officer within the Bureau.” See Affidavit of Clair Cripe, Appendix A hereto.

The Mail Management Manual proposed by the Bureau of Prisons will be distributed to prison personnel who handle mail and will be used in their training. This manual informs prison personnel of their duty to maintain the confidentiality of the correspondence they read. In instances where mail room staff read mail and determine that it may pose a threat to security, the manual instructs such personnel to disclose this information to the appropriate prison officials.

DISCUSSION

A. Outgoing Mail

As previously noted, the redesignation of the security level at Otisville means that prisoners’ outgoing mail is no longer subject to routine scrutiny. Since plaintiff has sought only injunctive relief with respect to this issue, his claims are hereby dismissed as moot.

B. Incoming Mail

In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), the Supreme Court held that regulations promulgated by the California Department of Corrections regarding censorship of prisoners’ mail constituted a violation of the First Amendment rights of prisoners and their correspondents. However, in so holding, the Court set forth a two-pronged test for evaluating such regulations. Under this test, mail censorship is constitutionally permissible if:

(1) [it furthers] one or more of the important and substantial governmental interests of security, order and rehabilitation.
(2) [it is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved. Id., at 413, 94 S.Ct. at 1811.

In Martinez, the regulations promulgated by the Director of the California Department of Corrections were not justified by a legitimate governmental interest. Specifically, they prohibited inmate correspondence that “unduly complain[ed],” “magnif[ied] grievances,” expressed “inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views” or contained “matter deemed ‘defamatory’ or ‘otherwise inappropriate.’ ” Id. at 415, 94 S.Ct. at 1812. The Supreme Court affirmed a District Court determination that the regulations in question were “without adequate justification” and “were void for vagueness.” Id. at 400, 94 S.Ct. at 1805.

We note at the outset that this case is distinguishable from Martinez in that the practice at issue here involves only the reading of mail as opposed to censorship. However, even the reading of mail implicates First Amendment interests because it exerts a potentially chilling effect upon the freedom of expression of the inmates and their correspondents. We will therefore assume that Martinez standards are applicable to this case. See Finney v. Arkansas Board of Correction,

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Related

Heimerle v. Attorney General
753 F.2d 10 (Second Circuit, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
575 F. Supp. 1175, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10882, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heimerle-v-attorney-general-nysd-1983.