Heimark v. United States

14 Cl. Ct. 643, 61 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1009, 1988 U.S. Claims LEXIS 63, 1988 WL 33731
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 15, 1988
DocketNo. 213-87T
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 14 Cl. Ct. 643 (Heimark v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Heimark v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 643, 61 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1009, 1988 U.S. Claims LEXIS 63, 1988 WL 33731 (cc 1988).

Opinion

ORDER

MEROW, Judge.

Plaintiff has moved pursuant to RUSCC 37(a) and 37(d) for an order compelling defendant to comply with plaintiff’s production requests or, in the alternative, for the imposition of sanctions against the defendant. Both the production of documents and answers to interrogatories are requested by plaintiff.

Plaintiff has been assessed the 100 percent penalty pursuant to section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) for failure to pay over withholding taxes of Getting Services, Inc. (GSI) for 1979. In this claim, he is challenging that assessment.

Defendant objected to the production requests because it claimed such requests involve disclosing tax return information regarding taxpayers who are not parties to this litigation and tax returns and return information of GSI.1 Thus, disclosure by defendant to plaintiff is barred by 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a),2 which provides for the confi-[645]*645dentíality of tax returns and return infor-ration and prohibits disclosure thereof, except as authorized. See Church of Scientology of California v. Internal Revenue Service, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 271, 98 L.Ed.2d 228 (1987) 108 S.Ct. at 274 (“In addition to the returns themselves, which are protected from disclosure by § 6103(b)(1), § 6103(b)(2) contains an elaborate description of the sorts of information related to returns that respondent is compelled to keep confidential.”).

Plaintiff provides several theories pursuant to which defendant may disclose the requested tax information, citing to 26 U.S. C. § 6103(h)(2) and (4).3 4In the alternative, [646]*646plaintiff claims that the requested information constitutes its own taxpayer return information.

Defendant responds that none of the requested information is part of the plaintiff’s taxpayer return information and, thus, may only be disclosed pursuant to an exception to 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a), i.e., 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4). According to defendant, it has produced, on the ground that the information is plaintiff’s own return information, all documents, relating to the assessment of the section 6672 penalty against plaintiff, that could be disclosed under section 6103. In addition, defendant has produced Forms 4180 for taxpayers other than plaintiff, after deleting personal information, which summarize the results of interviews with the various persons regarding the unpaid payroll taxes of GSI for the four quarters of 1979. As to the other information and IRS forms relating to these taxpayers that plaintiff requests, defendant claims they relate to whether those taxpayers will be assessed under section 6672 and thus cannot be considered plaintiffs return information. Nor can the requested returns and return information of GSI be considered plaintiff’s return information because such documents concern GSI’s tax liabilities.

Plaintiff makes an original argument to the effect that, since it has been assessed the 100 percent penalty following an IRS investigation to determine the responsible persons at GSI, any information gathered by the IRS, including that about or from third parties, must be related to the IRS’ decision to assess the plaintiff the 100 percent penalty and thus would be plaintiff’s “return information,” which may be disclosed to plaintiff as a person having a “material interest,” pursuant to section 6103(e).4 Although this is an interesting argument, plaintiff offers no support for such an interpretation of “taxpayer return information.” The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, of which the amendments to section 6103 are a part, indicates as follows;

“Taxpayer return information” is return information which is filed with or furnished to the IRS by or on behalf of the taxpayer to whom the return information relates. This includes, for example, data supplied by a taxpayer’s representative (e.g., his accountant) to the IRS in connection with an audit of his return. It would also include any data received by the IRS from a taxpayer’s representative pursuant to an administrative summons which was issued in connection with an IRS civil or criminal tax investigation of the taxpayer.

[647]*647See S.Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 319 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976 pp. 2897, 3748. Thus, “taxpayer return information” includes all data provided by the taxpayer and/or by a representative of the taxpayer to the IRS or in connection with an audit or tax investigation of the taxpayer. However, there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that data gathered pursuant to an IRS investigation of third parties regarding their own tax liabilities which may lead to the investigation of the taxpayer becomes the taxpayer’s return information because one investigation led to the other. In other words, data provided by third parties and their representatives about those taxpayers’ tax liabilities is their “taxpayer return information” and not that of another taxpayer who may become subject to an investigation by reason of that data. Since plaintiff offers no support for this argument, it is determined that disclosure of the requested data regarding GSI and third party taxpayers cannot be allowed pursuant to section 6103(e) under a theory that such “data” is the taxpayer/plaintiff’s return information within the meaning of section 6103(b)(3).

Plaintiff also argues that the requested data may be disclosed pursuant to section 6103(h)(2) and (4). However, the requested information may not be disclosed pursuant to section 6103(h)(2) as this section provides the conditions for disclosure to officers and employees of the Department of Justice. See Estate of John Stein v. United States, 81-1 USTC ¶ 13,405 (Dist.Neb.1981), in which the court found at 87,-488 that “[i]t is important to note that this exception [section 6103(h)(2)] only authorizes the I.R.S. to disclose a return or return information to employees of the Department of Justice. The exception does not authorize the Justice Department’s employees to disclose this information in a judicial proceeding.” Accordingly, it is concluded that the exception governing disclosure in a judicial proceeding involving tax administration is found in section 6103(h)(4). See, generally, Mertens Law of Fed. Income Tax § 47.52r, wherein it is stated that “[t]he rules governing the disclosure of returns or return information in a tax proceeding are substantially similar to those governing disclosure to the Department of Justice, except that in addition to the item and transactional tests, the third-party items and transactions must have a direct relationship to the resolution of an issue of the taxpayer’s liability.” (Footnotes omitted.)

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14 Cl. Ct. 643, 61 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1009, 1988 U.S. Claims LEXIS 63, 1988 WL 33731, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heimark-v-united-states-cc-1988.