1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JACOB DANIEL HEIM, Case No.: 24-cv-02476-AJB-DEB
12 Petitioner, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED 14 M. GAMBOA, Warden, et al., IN FORMA PAUPERIS; AND 15 Respondents. (2) NOTIFYING PETITIONER OF 16 OPTIONS TO AVOID DISMISSAL OF 17 PETITION
18 [ECF Nos. 1, 2] 19 20 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 21 Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a 2022 San Diego County Superior Court 22 conviction in case number SCD290089. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner has also filed a motion for 23 leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) For the reasons discussed, the Court 24 GRANTS the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and NOTIFIES Petitioner of his 25 options to avoid a future dismissal of the instant habeas action. 26 REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 27 Petitioner has $0.00 on account at the California correctional institution in which he 28 is presently confined (see ECF No. 2 at 4, 6), and cannot afford the $5.00 filing fee. 1 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and 2 allows him to prosecute the above-referenced action without being required to prepay fees 3 or costs and without being required to post security. The Clerk of Court will file the Petition 4 without prepayment of the filing fee. 5 FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES 6 Upon review, it does not appear state court remedies have been exhausted as to any 7 of the sixteen enumerated claims in the Petition. Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge 8 either their state court conviction or the length of their confinement in state prison must 9 first exhaust state judicial remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 10 U.S. 129, 133–34 (1987); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“[A] state 11 prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will 12 entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). “A petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion 13 requirement if: (1) he has ‘fairly presented’ his federal claim to the highest state court with 14 jurisdiction to consider it,” which in this case is the California Supreme Court, “or (2) he 15 demonstrates that no state remedy remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 16 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 17 (1999) (“[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any 18 constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate 19 review process.”). 20 Additionally, the claims presented in the federal courts must be the same as those 21 exhausted in state court and a petitioner must also allege, in state court, how one or more 22 of his federal rights have been violated. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 276 (“Only if the state 23 courts have had the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in a federal 24 habeas proceeding does it make sense to speak of the exhaustion of state remedies. 25 Accordingly, we have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same 26 claim he urges upon the federal courts.”); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365– 27 66 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of 28 prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are 1 asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim 2 that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed 3 by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state 4 court.”). 5 Of the sixteen claims presented in his federal Petition, Petitioner indicates he has not 6 raised any of these claims in the California Supreme Court. (See ECF No. 1 at 6–24.) 7 Petitioner has attached a copy of the California Supreme Court’s denial of his petition for 8 review (see ECF No. 1-8 at 33), but he does not indicate that any of the claims in the instant 9 federal Petition were presented in that petition. Petitioner indicates that he did not seek 10 collateral review in state court. (See ECF No. 1 at 3–4.) 11 In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that a 12 petition which did not contain only exhausted claims is subject to dismissal because it 13 violates the “total exhaustion rule” required in habeas petitions brought pursuant to § 2254, 14 but that a petitioner must be permitted an opportunity to cure that defect prior to dismissal. 15 Id. at 514–20. Because the one-year statute of limitations imposed on section 2254 habeas 16 petitions after Lundy was decided created a risk of a claim dismissed under Lundy 17 becoming time-barred, the Supreme Court subsequently approved of a procedure by which 18 a federal Petition could be stayed while a petitioner returned to state court to exhaust. See 19 Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277–78 (2005); see also Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 912 20 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] district court has the discretion to stay and hold in abeyance fully 21 unexhausted petitions under the circumstances set forth in Rhines.”). The Supreme Court 22 has instructed “stay and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances” and 23 was appropriate where: (1) “there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his 24 claims first in state court,” (2) the “unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious” and 25 (3) “there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation 26 tactics.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277–78. 27 The Court now notifies Petitioner of his options to avoid a future dismissal for 28 presenting a petition with only unexhausted claims, with a deadline set forth below. 1 I. First Option: Demonstrate Exhaustion 2 Petitioner may file papers in which he alleges he has exhausted the claims in the 3 Petition. If Petitioner chooses this option, these papers are due no later than March 10, 4 2025. 5 II. Second Option: Voluntarily Dismiss the Petition 6 Petitioner may move to voluntarily dismiss his entire federal petition and return to 7 state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Petitioner may then file a new federal petition 8 containing only exhausted claims. 9 Petitioner is cautioned that any new federal petition must be filed before expiration 10 of the one-year statute of limitations. Ordinarily, a petitioner has one year from when his 11 conviction became final to file his federal petition, unless he can show that statutory or 12 equitable “tolling” applies. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001); 28 U.S.C. 13 § 2244(d).1 The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus 14 petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Nino v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JACOB DANIEL HEIM, Case No.: 24-cv-02476-AJB-DEB
12 Petitioner, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED 14 M. GAMBOA, Warden, et al., IN FORMA PAUPERIS; AND 15 Respondents. (2) NOTIFYING PETITIONER OF 16 OPTIONS TO AVOID DISMISSAL OF 17 PETITION
18 [ECF Nos. 1, 2] 19 20 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 21 Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a 2022 San Diego County Superior Court 22 conviction in case number SCD290089. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner has also filed a motion for 23 leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) For the reasons discussed, the Court 24 GRANTS the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and NOTIFIES Petitioner of his 25 options to avoid a future dismissal of the instant habeas action. 26 REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 27 Petitioner has $0.00 on account at the California correctional institution in which he 28 is presently confined (see ECF No. 2 at 4, 6), and cannot afford the $5.00 filing fee. 1 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and 2 allows him to prosecute the above-referenced action without being required to prepay fees 3 or costs and without being required to post security. The Clerk of Court will file the Petition 4 without prepayment of the filing fee. 5 FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES 6 Upon review, it does not appear state court remedies have been exhausted as to any 7 of the sixteen enumerated claims in the Petition. Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge 8 either their state court conviction or the length of their confinement in state prison must 9 first exhaust state judicial remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 10 U.S. 129, 133–34 (1987); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“[A] state 11 prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will 12 entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). “A petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion 13 requirement if: (1) he has ‘fairly presented’ his federal claim to the highest state court with 14 jurisdiction to consider it,” which in this case is the California Supreme Court, “or (2) he 15 demonstrates that no state remedy remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 16 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 17 (1999) (“[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any 18 constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate 19 review process.”). 20 Additionally, the claims presented in the federal courts must be the same as those 21 exhausted in state court and a petitioner must also allege, in state court, how one or more 22 of his federal rights have been violated. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 276 (“Only if the state 23 courts have had the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in a federal 24 habeas proceeding does it make sense to speak of the exhaustion of state remedies. 25 Accordingly, we have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same 26 claim he urges upon the federal courts.”); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365– 27 66 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of 28 prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are 1 asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim 2 that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed 3 by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state 4 court.”). 5 Of the sixteen claims presented in his federal Petition, Petitioner indicates he has not 6 raised any of these claims in the California Supreme Court. (See ECF No. 1 at 6–24.) 7 Petitioner has attached a copy of the California Supreme Court’s denial of his petition for 8 review (see ECF No. 1-8 at 33), but he does not indicate that any of the claims in the instant 9 federal Petition were presented in that petition. Petitioner indicates that he did not seek 10 collateral review in state court. (See ECF No. 1 at 3–4.) 11 In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that a 12 petition which did not contain only exhausted claims is subject to dismissal because it 13 violates the “total exhaustion rule” required in habeas petitions brought pursuant to § 2254, 14 but that a petitioner must be permitted an opportunity to cure that defect prior to dismissal. 15 Id. at 514–20. Because the one-year statute of limitations imposed on section 2254 habeas 16 petitions after Lundy was decided created a risk of a claim dismissed under Lundy 17 becoming time-barred, the Supreme Court subsequently approved of a procedure by which 18 a federal Petition could be stayed while a petitioner returned to state court to exhaust. See 19 Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277–78 (2005); see also Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 912 20 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] district court has the discretion to stay and hold in abeyance fully 21 unexhausted petitions under the circumstances set forth in Rhines.”). The Supreme Court 22 has instructed “stay and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances” and 23 was appropriate where: (1) “there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his 24 claims first in state court,” (2) the “unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious” and 25 (3) “there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation 26 tactics.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277–78. 27 The Court now notifies Petitioner of his options to avoid a future dismissal for 28 presenting a petition with only unexhausted claims, with a deadline set forth below. 1 I. First Option: Demonstrate Exhaustion 2 Petitioner may file papers in which he alleges he has exhausted the claims in the 3 Petition. If Petitioner chooses this option, these papers are due no later than March 10, 4 2025. 5 II. Second Option: Voluntarily Dismiss the Petition 6 Petitioner may move to voluntarily dismiss his entire federal petition and return to 7 state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Petitioner may then file a new federal petition 8 containing only exhausted claims. 9 Petitioner is cautioned that any new federal petition must be filed before expiration 10 of the one-year statute of limitations. Ordinarily, a petitioner has one year from when his 11 conviction became final to file his federal petition, unless he can show that statutory or 12 equitable “tolling” applies. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001); 28 U.S.C. 13 § 2244(d).1 The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus 14 petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 15 (9th Cir. 1999); but see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an application 16
17 1 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d) provides: 18 (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus 19 by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-- 20 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or 21 the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 22 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant 23 was prevented from filing by such State action; 24 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 25 retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 26 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 27 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgement or claim is pending shall not be 28 1 is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance [by the appropriate court officer for 2 placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing 3 filings”); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a state 4 application for post-conviction relief which is ultimately dismissed as untimely was neither 5 “properly filed” nor “pending” while it was under consideration by the state court, and 6 therefore does not toll the statute of limitations), as amended, 439 F.3d 993. However, 7 absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of limitations continues to run while a federal 8 habeas petition is pending. Duncan, 533 U.S. at 181–82. 9 If Petitioner chooses this second option, he must file a voluntary dismissal with this 10 Court no later than March 10, 2025. 11 III. Third Option: File a Motion to Stay the Federal Proceedings 12 Petitioner may file a motion to stay this federal proceeding while he returns to state 13 court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. If Petitioner wishes to use the Rhines procedure, 14 he must demonstrate there are arguably meritorious claims which he wishes to return to 15 state court to exhaust, that he is diligently pursuing his state court remedies with respect to 16 those claims, and that good cause exists for his failure to timely exhaust his state court 17 remedies. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277–78. If Petitioner chooses this third option, he must file 18 a motion for a stay with this Court no later than March 10, 2025. 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// I CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion to proceed in 3 || forma pauperis [ECF No. 2] and NOTIFIES Petitioner that his Petition as currently drafted 4 subject to dismissal for failure to allege exhaustion of state court remedies. If Petitioner 5 || wishes to proceed with the instant habeas action, he must, no later than March 10, 2025, 6 notify the Court which of the options outlined above he chooses. Petitioner is cautioned 7 || that if he fails to respond to this Order, the Petition will be dismissed without prejudice. 8 || See Lundy, 455 U.S. at 522. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: January 8, 2025 © ¢ 12 Hon. Anthony J. attaglia 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28