Heidrun Eckes-Chantre-Tabet UND Kinder Vermogensanlage Gesellschaftburgerlichen Rechts III v. Largo Development Corp.

807 So. 2d 723, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 1150, 2002 WL 181106
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedFebruary 6, 2002
DocketNo. 3D01-2394
StatusPublished

This text of 807 So. 2d 723 (Heidrun Eckes-Chantre-Tabet UND Kinder Vermogensanlage Gesellschaftburgerlichen Rechts III v. Largo Development Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Heidrun Eckes-Chantre-Tabet UND Kinder Vermogensanlage Gesellschaftburgerlichen Rechts III v. Largo Development Corp., 807 So. 2d 723, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 1150, 2002 WL 181106 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

GBR3, the defendant below, appeals from a non-final order denying its motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a contract provision. For the following reasons, we reverse.1

GBR3 contracted with appellee Largo, a contractor, to construct two warehouse additions to its property. The contract contained an arbitration clause. Largo filed suit against GBR3, claiming wrongful termination and breach of contract. Largo claims it agreed to enter into settlement negotiations with GBR3 on the condition that GBR3 first file its answer and counterclaim. GBR3 claims it agreed only to send Largo a draft, not to actually file it. The parties proceeded to negotiate a settlement, but they failed to reach an agreement. Largo’s counsel then sought to depose GBR3’s corporate representative, and GBR3 moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, finding that based on GBR3’s actions throughout the litigation (furnishing Largo with a draft answer and counterclaim), GBR3 waived its right to arbitration. GBR3 appeals.

The trial court erred in finding that GBR3 waived arbitration. “All ques[724]*724tions concerning the scope or waiver of the right to arbitrate under contracts should be resolved in favor of arbitration rather than against it.” Beverly Hills Dev. Corp. v. George Wimpey of Florida, Inc., 661 So.2d 969, 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The only record activity in which GBR3 participated was the filing of its Notice of Enlargement of Time to Respond to the Complaint and its Motion to Compel Arbitration. Neither of those filings is inconsistent with the actions of a party seeking to invoke its contractual right to arbitration. See Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Adams, 791 So.2d 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Hough v. JKP Development, Inc., 654 So.2d 1241, 1242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).2

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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Related

Beverly Hills v. George Wimpey of Fla., Inc.
661 So. 2d 969 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1995)
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Adams
791 So. 2d 25 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2001)
Ojus Industries, Inc. v. Mann
221 So. 2d 780 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1969)
Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Company
280 So. 2d 678 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1973)
Lapidus v. ARLEN BEACH CON. ASSOC.
394 So. 2d 1102 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1981)
Seville Condominium No. 1 v. Clearwater Dev.
340 So. 2d 1243 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1976)
Hough v. JKP Development, Inc.
654 So. 2d 1241 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1995)
Mike Bradford & Co. v. Gulf States Steel Co.
184 So. 2d 911 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1966)
King v. THOMPSON & McKINNON, AUCHINCLOSS, ETC.
352 So. 2d 1235 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1977)

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Bluebook (online)
807 So. 2d 723, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 1150, 2002 WL 181106, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heidrun-eckes-chantre-tabet-und-kinder-vermogensanlage-fladistctapp-2002.