FILED Jul 13 2023, 9:27 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Cara Schaefer Wieneke Theodore E. Rokita Brooklyn, Indiana Indiana Attorney General
Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Heidi Marie Littlefield, July 13, 2023 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-CR-2895 v. Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael A. Casati, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29D01-2103-MR-1789
Opinion by Chief Judge Altice Judge Kenworthy and Senior Judge Robb concur.
Altice, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 1 of 15 [1] Heidi Littlefield appeals her convictions for murder, Level 1 felony conspiracy
to commit murder, and Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit murder, claiming
that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for murder, and that
the dual convictions for murder and Level 1 felony conspiracy to commit
murder constitute double jeopardy. Littlefield further contends that the 115-
year aggregate sentence is inappropriate when considering the nature of the
offenses and her character.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History 1
[3] Littlefield and Francis Kelley are the biological parents of B.K., born in early
2019. The relationship between Littlefield and Kelley soured after B.K.’s birth.
As a result, Littlefield did not want Kelley to have a relationship with B.K.; nor
did she want her adult children to interact with Kelley.
[4] In March 2020, Kelley filed a petition to establish custody, parenting time, and
child support. At some point, Littlefield approached two of her adult daughters
to assist in purchasing drugs to poison Kelley. After they refused, Littlefield
asked another daughter, Logan Runyon, to help her obtain fentanyl and poison
Kelley. Littlefield promised to give her some of the life insurance proceeds that
B.K. would receive if they succeeded in killing Kelley.
1 We heard oral argument in this matter on June 22, 2023, at the Jewish Community Center in Indianapolis. We thank all at the Center for their hospitality, and we commend counsel for their able presentations.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 2 of 15 [5] Runyon purchased the fentanyl, and in October 2020, Littlefield brought Kelley
soup that she and Runyon had laced with the drug. Although Kelley consumed
the soup and became ill, he did not die. Later that same month, Littlefield
spoke with Robert Walker—Runyon’s boyfriend—about hiring a hitman to kill
Kelley. Walker acknowledged that he “knew someone,” and Littlefield gave
him $2500 as a down payment for contacting the prospective hitman. Transcript
Vol. IV at 119-20. Runyon and Walker, however, spent the money on hotels
and drugs.
[6] On January 14, 2021, Runyon and Littlefield purchased more fentanyl. That
same day, Runyon entered Kelley’s residence after Littlefield lured him away
from the house to go shopping for B.K. Once inside, Runyon laced Kelley’s
refrigerated oatmeal with the fentanyl. The next day, Kelley texted Littlefield
and asked whether she had put something in his oatmeal because it tasted
“funny,” and he felt “light-headed.” Id. at 145. Shortly thereafter, Runyon and
Littlefield, along with B.K., drove to Kelley’s house. Runyon saw Kelley
through a window lying on the kitchen floor. Runyon entered the residence
through a window and opened the front door for Littlefield. Kelley was
breathing abnormally and gasping for air. Littlefield grabbed one of Kelley’s
neckties, tied it around his neck, lifted him “up, probably two to three feet”
several times, and slammed his head to the floor each time. Id. at 148-49. After
they left the residence, Littlefield tossed the necktie in a restaurant trash can.
[7] On January 18, Kelley’s former girlfriend—and mother of their minor child—
went to Kelley’s residence and saw him lying on a couch, deceased. She saw
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 3 of 15 no signs of forced entry, and when emergency personnel arrived, they examined
Kelley and determined that he was nonviable due to “prolonged signs of
death,” including lividity and rigor mortis. Transcript Vol. III at 35. There was
evidence of blunt force trauma to Kelley’s eye and head, and the cause of death
was determined to be “asphyxia due to strangulation/neck compression” with
“acute fentanyl intoxication” as a contributing cause. Id. at 168. The evidence
showed that the fentanyl would have made Kelley “groggy” and unable to
defend himself. Id. at 167, 170. Fentanyl can result in a “slow death,” and take
up to twelve or more hours before a person dies after ingesting the drug. Id. at
174. The fluid found in Kelley’s lungs indicated that he died “a slow death,”
and the level of fentanyl in his system could have been considered as the cause
of death, had that been the only finding in the autopsy. Id. at 174-75.
[8] Following a police investigation, Littlefield was charged with murder (Count
1), Level 1 felony conspiracy to commit murder (Count 2), and Level 2 felony
conspiracy to commit murder (Count 3). The conspiracy counts alleged the
following:
Count 2: between on or about January 1, 2021 and on or about January 15, 2021, Littlefield agreed with Runyon to commit the crime of murder (which is to knowingly or intentionally kill another human being, to-wit: Francis A. Kelley) with the intent to commit that crime, and Littlefield or Runyon performed at least one overt act in furtherance of the agreement, to-wit:
a. acquiring fentanyl b. transporting Runyon to Carmel c. transporting fentanyl to Carmel
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 4 of 15 d. accompanying Kelley away from his home on January 14, 2021 e. adding fentanyl to Kelley’s food f. entering Kelley’s home on January 15, 2021 g. battering and/or strangling Kelley.
Count 3: between on or about October 1, 2020, and on or about October 31, 2020, Littlefield agreed with Robert James Walker to commit the crime of murder (which is to knowingly or intentionally kill another human being), to-wit: Kelley with the intent to commit that crime, and Littlefield performed at least one overt act in furtherance of the agreement, to-wit:
a. paid money to Robert James Walker.
Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 19.
[9] Following a jury trial, Littlefield was found guilty as charged, and the trial court
entered judgments of conviction on all counts. At the sentencing hearing on
October 7, 2022, the trial court found the following aggravating circumstances:
a) Kelley’s vulnerability when Littlefield strangled him; b) the planning and
premeditation of the offenses exceeded what was necessary to establish a
conspiracy; c) Littlefield’s commission of the offenses deprived B.K. of her
parents; d) her plans to kill Kelley resulted in prison sentences for Runyon and
Walker; and e) Littlefield’s threats against Runyon to cooperate in the plan.
The trial court identified Littlefield’s lack of criminal history as a mitigating
factor, and after determining that the aggravators substantially outweighed the
sole mitigating circumstance, the trial court sentenced Littlefield to sixty years
on Count 1, thirty-five years on Count 2, and twenty years on Count 3.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 5 of 15 Littlefield was ordered to serve the sentences consecutively, thus resulting in an
aggregate 115-year executed sentence.
[10] Littlefield now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[11] Littlefield argues that her murder conviction must be reversed because the State
failed to establish that she killed Kelley. Littlefield maintains that while the
State presented sufficient evidence to show that “she attempted to kill Kelley,”
the “State’s own evidence did not establish that she killed him.” Appellant’s Brief
at 13 (emphasis added).
[12] When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither
reweigh the evidence nor reassess the credibility of the witnesses. Hall v. State,
177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). Rather, we consider the evidence most
favorable to the verdict and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). Moreover, when
faced with conflicting evidence, we consider only that which is favorable to the
judgment. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). If there exists
substantial evidence of probative value to support the jury’s conclusion, the
conviction will be affirmed. Willis, 27 N.E.3d at 1066.
[13] In accordance with Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1, the offense of murder is committed
when a defendant “knowingly or intentionally kills another human being.” In
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 6 of 15 support of her sufficiency of the evidence claim, Littlefield notes that the
primary cause of Kelley’s death was determined to be asphyxia due to
strangulation rather than acute fentanyl intoxication. Although Runyon
testified at trial that Littlefield strangled Kelley with a necktie and banged his
head on the floor numerous times, Littlefield argues that Kelley was alive when
she and Runyon left the residence. According to Littlefield, the evidence
established that Kelley could not have died on the floor “because livor mortis
would have settled on the front part of [Kelley’s] body.” Appellant’s Brief at 14.
Littlefield also notes that the State’s evidence showed that Matthew Duncan—
the father of one of Littlefield’s other children—had spoken with Runyon and
Walker about killing Kelley and that Duncan’s cell phone was tracked in the
vicinity of Kelley’s home on the afternoon of January 16. In light of this
evidence, Littlefield claims that there was a “strong possibility that . . . Duncan
visited the home . . . and strangled Kelley [to death] . . . .” Id. at 15. In short,
Littlefield maintains that because “the State never presented any evidence to
show that Littlefield in any way aided, induced, or caused Duncan to kill
Kelley,” the murder conviction must be reversed. Id.
[14] Notwithstanding Littlefield’s contentions, the evidence most favorable to the
judgment established that Littlefield and Runyon purchased fentanyl to poison
Kelley’s food with the intention of killing him. Littlefield developed the plan
for Runyon to enter Kelley’s house while he was not there and poison his
oatmeal. Littlefield set the plan in motion by luring Kelley from his house, and
Runyon entered while he was away.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 7 of 15 [15] The evidence further showed that when Kelley texted Littlefield asking if she
put something in his oatmeal, Littlefield threatened Runyon and compelled her
to continue to assist in the plan to kill Kelley. The two proceeded to Kelley’s
house and once inside, Littlefield strangled Kelley with a necktie and slammed
his head repeatedly on the ground, causing severe injury and blunt force
trauma. Runyon then walked outside and waited in the car for approximately
ten minutes until Littlefield exited the residence. The two then drove to a
restaurant where Littlefield threw the necktie in the trash. The evidence
established that Littlefield was the last known person to have seen Kelley alive.
[16] Runyon’s testimony was corroborated by the autopsy, along with the forensic
pathologist’s testimony who concluded that Kelley was strangled to death with
fentanyl intoxication as a contributing cause. Moreover, Runyon’s testimony
that Littlefield placed the necktie around Kelley’s neck, lifted him off the
ground several times and banged his head on the floor, was corroborated by the
evidence of injury to Kelley’s neck muscles, voice box, Adam’s apple, and
tongue.
[17] In sum, Littlefield is asking that we reweigh the evidence, which we decline to
do. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Littlefield’s
murder conviction.
2. Double Jeopardy
[18] Littlefield argues that dual convictions for murder and conspiracy to commit
murder as alleged in Count 2 cannot stand because of the double jeopardy
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 8 of 15 prohibition under Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution. Littlefield
maintains that the murder conviction must be set aside when applying the
double jeopardy test announced in Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 253 (Ind.
2020).
[19] Questions of substantive double jeopardy are resolved pursuant to the
framework set forth in Wadle and Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020).
The “Wadle test” applies “when a single criminal act or transaction violates
multiple statutes with common elements and harms one or more victims,”
whereas the Powell test applies “when a single criminal act or transaction
violates a single statute but harms multiple victims” or “results in multiple
injuries.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247; Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 263. Under either
test, “the dispositive question is one of statutory intent.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at
247. Double jeopardy claims are reviewed de novo. Id. at 237.
[20] The offenses in this case involve Littlefield’s convictions for a single criminal
transaction that implicates both the murder and conspiracy statutes. See Garth v.
State, 182 N.E.3d 905, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Thus, Littlefield’s
claim triggers application of the Wadle test. See id. Under the Wadle analysis,
we first examine whether the statutes permit multiple punishments, either by
express statement or by unmistakable implication. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. If
so, there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy and “the court’s inquiry
comes to an end.” Id. If the statutes are unclear, we apply our included-offense
statutes. Id. If either offense is included in the other, either inherently or as
charged, we then consider whether the defendant’s actions are “so compressed Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 9 of 15 in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to
constitute a single transaction.” Id. at 249. If the facts show only a single
crime, judgment may not be entered on the included offense. Id. at 256.
[21] To obtain a murder conviction, the State must establish that the person
knowingly or intentionally killed another person, or the defendant aided,
induced, or caused someone else to kill the person. Ind. Code §§ 35-41-2-4, 35-
42-1-1. A person conspires to commit a felony when, with intent to commit the
felony, the person “agrees with another person to commit the felony.” I.C. §
35-41-5-2(a). To obtain a conviction for conspiracy, the State must “allege and
prove that either the person or the person with whom he or she agreed
performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.” I.C. § 35-41-5-2(b).
[22] Littlefield asserts that neither the murder statute nor the conspiracy statute
includes language that expressly states or implies that multiple punishments are
permitted. She also notes that the General Assembly did not amend the
“multiple convictions” statute 2 “to expressly permit punishment for both
conspiracy to commit murder and murder.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5. As a
result, Littlefield asserts that all the double jeopardy tests set forth in Wadle
2 I.C. § 35-41-5-3 provides that “(a) A person may not be convicted of both a conspiracy and an attempt with respect to the same underlying crime. (b) A person may not be convicted of both a crime and an attempt to commit the same crime.” This statute immediately follows the attempt and conspiracy statutes.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 10 of 15 must be applied here, and it must be concluded that her dual convictions for
murder and conspiracy to commit murder in Count 2 cannot stand.
[23] Notwithstanding Littlefield’s argument, we note that Indiana treats the offense
of conspiracy to commit an offense as a separate crime from the underlying
offense because the “agreement itself constitutes the criminal act.” Coleman v.
State, 952 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). For instance, in Garth, the
defendant was convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. In
rejecting Garth’s argument on appeal that the dual convictions violated double
jeopardy prohibitions, a panel of this court explained:
[Ind. Code] Section 35-41-5-3 explicitly prohibits convictions for both a conspiracy and an attempt with respect to the same underlying crime. It also prohibits convictions for both a crime and an attempt to commit the same crime. Id. Notably, however, it does not prohibit convictions for both a crime and a conspiracy to commit the same crime. If the legislature wanted to prohibit convictions for both a crime and a conspiracy to commit that same crime, it surely would have included such language in Section 35- 41-5-3. See N.D.F. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. 2002) (“[I]t is just as important to recognize what the statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say.”). We conclude that the murder and conspiracy statutes allow for multiple punishments, and consequently Garth’s convictions do not violate double jeopardy.
182 N.E.3d at 920 (emphasis added).
[24] As in Garth, we conclude that there is no double jeopardy violation as to
Littlefield’s convictions for both murder and conspiracy to commit murder
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 11 of 15 under Wadle. Thus, our double jeopardy inquiry ends here, and Littlefield’s
convictions for both offenses may stand.
3. Sentencing
[25] Littlefield argues that the 115-year aggregate sentence was inappropriate when
considering the nature of the offenses and her character in accordance with Ind.
Appellate Rule 7(B). Although Littlefield acknowledges that her “repeated
attempts to kill Kelley, the father of her young child, was particularly
egregious,” she claims that her enhanced, consecutive sentence must be revised
because of her habitual drinking and her difficult childhood. Appellant’s Brief at
20.
[26] Our standard of review regarding inappropriate sentence claims is well-settled:
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) gives us the authority to revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Our review is deferential to the trial court’s decision, and our goal is to determine whether the appellant’s sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any other factors appearing in the record.
George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 73-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.
[27] Whether a sentence is inappropriate turns on the culpability of the defendant,
the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other
factors that come to light in a given case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 12 of 15 1224 (Ind. 2008). The defendant has the burden of persuading us that the
sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
More particularly, the defendant must show that her sentence is inappropriate
with “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the
offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the
defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples
of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[28] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an
appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657
(Ind. 2014). When a sentence deviates from the advisory sentence, “we
consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as
committed by the defendant that distinguishes it from the typical offense
accounted for by our legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Madden v.
State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).
[29] Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 sets forth a minimum sentence of forty-five years, a
maximum of sixty-five years, and an advisory sentence of fifty-five years for the
offense of murder. Here, the trial court sentenced Littlefield to sixty years for
that offense. Under Count 2, Littlefield was convicted of conspiracy, a Level 1
felony, which provides for a minimum sentence of twenty years, a maximum
sentence of forty years, and an advisory sentence of thirty years. The trial court
imposed a thirty-five-year sentence on that offense. Littlefield’s conviction for
Count 3 conspiracy, a level 2 felony, carries a maximum sentence of thirty
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 13 of 15 years, a minimum of ten years, and an advisory sentence of seventeen-and-one-
half years. Littlefield was sentenced to twenty years for that offense.
[30] When examining the nature of the offense, we look to the details and
circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s participation therein. Madden,
162 N.E.3d at 564. Notwithstanding Littlefield’s attempt to minimize the
egregiousness of her offenses because of her difficult childhood 3 and her alcohol
abuse, she has offered no compelling evidence of “restraint, regard, and lack of
brutality,” in the commission of the offenses. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.
The horrendous circumstances of the crimes, along with Littlefield’s persistent
pattern of trying to kill Kelley that ultimately deprived B.K. of a father, her
continued manipulation of Runyon to participate in the murder plot, and the
fact that she left her minor daughter in the car during the murder, do not
warrant a revision of the sentence when examining the nature of the offenses.
[31] Turning to Littlefield’s character, we note that “character is found in what we
learn of the offender’s life and conduct.” Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2017). We conduct our review of a defendant’s character by engaging
3 The presentence investigation report (PSI) contradicts this assertion, in that Littlefield reported to the probation department that she was raised in a good home and had “no domestic issues” with her mother and stepfather. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 211. And even if there was evidence to support Littlefield’s claim of a difficult childhood, our Supreme Court has “consistently held that [such circumstances] warrant little, if any, mitigating weight.” See Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 725 (Ind. 2007).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 14 of 15 in a broad consideration of her qualities. Madden, 162 N.E.3d at 564. A
defendant’s life and conduct are illustrative of character. Id.
[32] Although Littlefield insists that she is of good character because she has no
prior criminal convictions and was gainfully employed at the time of the
offenses, the evidence demonstrates that she tried to enlist the aid of her two
other daughters before successfully recruiting Runyon. Littlefield and Runyon
illegally purchased fentanyl on several occasions to facilitate her commission of
the murder, and Littlefield assisted Runyon in illegally entering Kelley’s home.
Indeed, a defendant’s lack of criminal history may be properly rejected as a
mitigating circumstance where there is other evidence of criminal behavior.
Bostick v. State, 804 N.E.2d 218, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Additionally,
Littlefield’s anger toward Kelley, her desire to exclude Kelley from B.K.’s life,
and her threats against her own daughter to keep her involved in the murder
plot, “speak[s] volumes” about Littlefield’s poor character. Appellee’s Brief at 31.
[33] In sum, neither the nature of the offenses nor Littlefield’s character renders
Littlefield’s 115-year executed sentence inappropriate.
[34] Judgment affirmed.
Kenworthy, J., and Robb, Sr.J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023 Page 15 of 15