Heidi Eikom v. Department of Health and Human Services

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 11, 2024
DocketSF-1221-20-0626-W-2
StatusUnpublished

This text of Heidi Eikom v. Department of Health and Human Services (Heidi Eikom v. Department of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Heidi Eikom v. Department of Health and Human Services, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

HEIDI A. EIKOM, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-1221-20-0626-W-2

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND DATE: March 11, 2024 HUMAN SERVICES, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Heidi A. Eikom , Mesquite, Nevada, pro se.

Joyee Joseph Lam , Esquire, and Ryan T. Birmingham , Esquire, San Francisco, California, for the agency.

Moira McCarthy , Phoenix, Arizona, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied corrective action in her individual right of action appeal alleging whistleblower reprisal. On petition for review, the appellant continues to argue that the agency’s reasons for taking the personnel actions against her are pretext 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

and that the true basis for the personnel actions is reprisal. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-10. She also argues that several of the administrative judge’s “assumptions” are not based on fact. Id. at 12-20. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to VACATE the administrative judge’s finding that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions absent the appellant’s protected disclosure or activity, we AFFIRM the initial decision. The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed prove that her November 8, 2019 complaint regarding her first-level supervisor’s treatment of her constitutes a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 2 Eikom v. Department of Health & Human Services, MSPB Docket 2 In considering whether the appellant proved by preponderant evidence that she disclosed what she reasonably believed constituted a supervisor’s abuse of authority, the administrative judge cited to Pedeleose v. Department of Defense, 107 M.S.P.R. 191, ¶ 37 (2007). The Board has since vacated that decision. See Pedeleose v. Department of Defense, 110 M.S.P.R. 508, ¶ 25 (2009). Any error in citing to this decision did not affect the parties’ substantive rights or the outcome of this appeal and, therefore, does not require reversal. Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision). 3

No. SF-1221-20-0626-W-2, Appeal File (W-2 AF), Tab 34, Initial Decision (ID) at 10-15. Nonetheless, she proceeded to consider whether the agency met its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that it would have placed the appellant on administrative/investigative leave, reassigned her, or issued her an unfavorable performance appraisal even in the absence of any protected disclosure or activity. ID at 20-39. Because we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal, 3 it was improper for the administrative judge to then consider whether the agency met its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions in the absence of the appellant’s protected disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); Clarke v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 19 n.10 (2014) (stating that the Board may not proceed to the clear and convincing evidence test unless it has first made a finding that the appellant established his prima facie case), aff’d, 623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 4 Accordingly, we vacate the initial decision’s finding that the agency showed by clear and convincing evidence that it would have placed the appellant on administrative/investigative leave, reassigned her to another health center, and issued her a lower performance appraisal even if she had not submitted her November 8, 2019 complaint.

3 We have considered whether the appellant’s November 8, 2019 complaint constitutes protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) but conclude that it does not. The appellant has not shown that her complaint was filed pursuant to any right granted by law, rule, or regulation, or that it was filed to remedy whistleblower reprisal, nor has she shown that the complaint was made to an agency component responsible for an internal investigation. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9); Mudd v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶¶ 6-7 (2013). 4 In Delgado v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 880 F.3d 913, 924-25 (7th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Board’s discussion of an exhaustion issue in Clarke. That discussion is not relevant here. 4

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5 The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction.

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Heidi Eikom v. Department of Health and Human Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heidi-eikom-v-department-of-health-and-human-services-mspb-2024.