IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Heidi Carter, May 30 2024, 8:41 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
May 30, 2024 Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-CR-817 Appeal from the Vanderburgh Circuit Court The Honorable David Kiely, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 82C01-2110-MR-5792
Opinion by Judge Pyle Judges Tavitas and Foley concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 1 of 23 Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] Heidi Carter (“Carter”) appeals, following a jury trial, her conviction for
murder.1 She argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motion to
dismiss the refiled murder charge;2 and (2) there is insufficient evidence to
support her conviction. Concluding that: (1) the trial court did not err when it
denied her motion to dismiss; and (2) there is sufficient evidence to support her
murder conviction, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Carter’s motion to dismiss the refiled murder charge.
2. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Carter’s murder conviction.
1 IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 and I.C. § 35-41-2-4. The trial court also entered judgment of conviction for two counts of Level 1 felony rape and two counts of Level 3 felony criminal confinement. Carter does not appeal those convictions. 2 The trial court also denied Carter’s motion to dismiss a refiled felony murder charge. However, after the trial court denied Carter’s motion, the State dismissed the refiled felony murder charge. Accordingly, we only review the trial court’s denial of Carter’s motion to dismiss the refiled murder charge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 2 of 23 Facts [3] The facts most favorable to the verdict reveal that in 2021, thirty-six-year-old
Carter lived in Evansville. Her fiancé, Carey Hammond (“Hammond”) lived in
a work release safe house but visited Carter every morning at 7:30 when he got
off work. In June 2021, Carter sent a social media message to a friend and told
the friend that she and Hammond wanted “a pet[,]” which she explained was
“a submissive lil slut [Carter and Hammond could] have anytime all the time
and do what we want[.]” (Ex. Vol. 5 at 207).
[4] In July 2021, Carter sent another friend a social media message wherein she
stated that she was “[a] sociopath[,]” who liked “righteous violence[.]” (Ex.
Vol. 5 at 208, 209). The following month, Carter sent a friend the following
social media message: “I want a pet. . .when I’m done using and abusing her
then sell her or dispose[.]” (Ex. Vol. 5 at 210). At the end of September 2021,
Carter sent Hammond the following social media messages: “I’ve not found
ANYONE yet!!!! . . . I have a feeling ur gonna have to be the one to get a
gurl[.] . . . [I]f by chance there’s an opportunity and you are able to bring home
a candidate then don’t be ridiculous BRING THE PET HOME[.]” (Ex. Vol. 5
at 215).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 3 of 23 [5] In October 2021, Carter placed on a dating app a classified ad seeking a woman
to join her and Hammond in sexual activities. A.S. (“A.S.”)3 and her
boyfriend, Tim Ivy (“Ivy) had placed a similar classified ad on the same dating
app, and A.S. and Carter began texting each other. In two of the text messages,
Carter referred to A.S. as “[her] Pet[.]” (Ex. Vol. 5 at 132, 134). Carter and
A.S. discussed restraints, sexual activity, and boundaries. A.S. told Carter that
she “ha[d] no objection to being tied up or tied down” but that “anal [was] a
hard limit.” (Ex. Vol. 5 at 170, 173). When A.S. asked Carter to come to her
house, Carter responded that her fiancé would not allow it and that her fiancé
“would KILL someone over [her.]” (Ex. Vol. 5 at 141). When A.S. suggested
that both she and Ivy meet Carter at Howell Park, Carter responded that her
“fiancé won’t have it[.]” (Ex. Vol. 5 at 149). Carter then clarified that “as long
as [Ivy] [did]n’t touch her[,] [her] fiancé should be fine[.]” (Ex. Vol. 5 at 150).
[6] In the early morning hours of October 19, 2021, Carter sent A.S. the following
text message: “Can you come fuck me? Ur dude can watch[.]” (Ex. Vol. 5 at
159). A.S., who had just used methamphetamine, responded that Carter had
“really good timing [because A.S.] was getting fucked up right [then.]” (Ex.
Vol. 5 at 195). After Carter and A.S. had agreed to meet at a park, Carter sent a
friend a social media message, which stated that Carter had “one bitch on her
way” and that the “other bitch” would be headed there by “daybreak[.]” (Ex.
3 In her appellate brief, Carter refers to A.S. as A.F. However, at trial, A.S. explained that A.F. was her previous married name and that her correct name was A.S. Accordingly, we refer to her as A.S.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 4 of 23 Vol. 5 at 217). At approximately 3:30 a.m., A.S. texted Carter that she and Ivy
were at the park. A.S. asked Carter where she was and told Carter that she and
Ivy were going home. Carter then texted her home address to A.S. At 3:44
a.m., A.S. texted Carter that she and Ivy had arrived at Carter’s house.
[7] A.S. and Ivy entered Carter’s house and smoked methamphetamine with one of
Carter’s friends while Carter showered. After Carter had gotten out of the
shower, her friend left. Thereafter, Carter, A.S., and Ivy watched pornographic
movies and a snuff film “where the woman [was] killed and . . . the man still
had sex with her.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 32).
[8] Although Carter and A.S. had initially agreed that they would engage in sexual
activity while Ivy watched, they subsequently agreed that Ivy would participate
in the sexual activity as well. Carter wore “a strap-on [penis] and was
penetrating [A.S.] while [Ivy] was penetrating [Carter] at the same time.” (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 56).
[9] While Carter, A.S., and Ivy were engaged in this sexual activity, Hammond
arrived at Carter’s home at his usual time. He walked into Carter’s bedroom,
saw Ivy penetrating Carter, grabbed a baseball bat, and began hitting Ivy on his
head and back. When A.S. jumped on Hammond’s back to try and stop him
from hitting Ivy, Carter grabbed A.S.’s hair, pulled her off Hammond, pushed
her to the floor, and held a gun in her face. Hammond continued to hit Ivy
with the baseball bat and then turned around, swung the baseball bat like a golf
club, and hit A.S. in the back of the head. Carter told A.S. that it was “fucked
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 5 of 23 up” that they had just watched a snuff film and “look what just happened.”
(Ex. Vol. 6, State’s Ex. 147 at 1:37:04). Hammond stated that there were not
going to be any witnesses and that both A.S. and Ivy had to die, and Carter
stated that she knew people in Indianapolis who could dispose of a body.
[10] Carter and Hammond bound Ivy’s wrists and ankles with duct tape. They also
covered Ivy’s face with duct tape and then “made a game” of kicking him
multiple times. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 60). Carter and Hammond then restrained A.S.
on the floor at the end of the bed with Velcro restraints that were already
attached to the bed.
[11] After Carter and Hammond had restrained A.S., Carter told Hammond to do
whatever he wanted to do to A.S. Carter specifically told Hammond to rape
A.S. and “put it in [her] mouth.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 65). Further, although A.S. had
previously told Carter that she was “not okay with any kind of anal sex[,]”
Carter told Hammond to “fuck [A.S.] in the ass” with the baseball bat. (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 37). Hammond engaged in vaginal and oral intercourse with A.S.
against her will. While Hammond was sexually assaulting A.S., Carter was
walking back and forth with the gun in her hand encouraging Hammond’s
actions. A.S. believed that Carter “was definitely in charge of [Hammond].”
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 48). After Hammond had sexually assaulted A.S., Carter and
Hammond had sexual intercourse on the bed to which A.S. had been
restrained.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 6 of 23 [12] Thereafter, Carter and Hammond forced A.S. to give them the password to her
cell phone. Carter and Hammond looked through the phone, noticed that it
was A.S.’s daughter’s eighteenth birthday that day, and threatened “to go get
her too” if A.S. did not cooperate with them. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 39).
[13] Later that morning, after Carter had left the house to find someone to clean it,
Ivy began to regain consciousness. He initially thought that he was late for
work and then realized that he could not see because his eyes were covered with
duct tape. A.S. was able to calm Ivy down a couple of times, but when he
stated that he had to urinate, he could not be consoled and began yelling.
Hammond came into the room, told Ivy to shut up, and kicked him. When Ivy
attempted to reach out and grab Hammond, Hammond grabbed the bungee
cord or piece of red cloth that were both around Ivy’s neck and strangled him.
A.S., who could not see well because she did not have her glasses, believed that
she had heard Hammond kill Ivy. Hammond asked A.S. if she thought this
was a game and told her that she was not going home. Hammond then
engaged in sexual intercourse with A.S. against her will while she was still
restrained on the floor at the end of the bed.
[14] In the meantime, Carter had gone to a house where a renovation company was
doing work to find someone to clean her house. She found Cynthia Weinzapfel
(“Weinzapfel”), whom she had met the previous day. Carter and Weinzapfel
used methamphetamine, and Carter showed Weinzapfel her gun. Carter told
Weinzapfel that she had had to do some rough work that day and pointed to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 7 of 23 some blood on her boots. Carter asked Weinzapfel to return to her house with
her and to clean it because her landlord was going to inspect it.
[15] Carter and Weinzapfel arrived at Carter’s house at approximately 4:30 p.m.,
and Hammond was angry that Carter had brought Weinzapfel to the home.
Weinzapfel immediately began cleaning because there “was just dog poop and
pee about this far deep through the whole house, you could smell it from
outside[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 127). While Weinzapfel was cleaning in the front of
the house, Carter and Hammond went into the bedroom at the back of the
house, wrapped a dead Ivy in blankets, and dragged his body into the dining
room. Carter then left the house to purchase cigarettes and food. When
Weinzapfel was ready to clean the dining room, Hammond encouraged her to
take a break. Hammond and Weinzapfel smoked methamphetamine and
talked. When Weinzapfel made a joke about cross-dressing, Hammond
grabbed a baseball bat and told her to sit down and shut up or he would “bash
[her] head in like he did earlier that day[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 128). Weinzapfel told
Hammond that she wanted to leave, but Hammond took her backpack and
phone and told her to wait until Carter returned.
[16] Carter, who had been gone for several hours, eventually returned to her home
without food or cigarettes. Hammond and Carter ordered a pizza, which was
delivered at approximately 10:30 p.m. Carter, Hammond, and Weinzapfel
went into the dining room to eat the pizza, and Carter jokingly told Weinzapfel
to sit on the Christmas tree, which looked “like a really long ottoman, covered
in clothes, clutter, and dirt and trash.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 131). Hammond jokingly
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 8 of 23 commented that it was “Christmas tree Tim.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 130). Before
Weinzapfel sat down, one of Carter’s dogs sniffed the ottoman-like object and
backed away from it. Carter commented that “the dog don’t even want to be
near something like that[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 130). A confused Weinzapfel sat
down on the ottoman-like object, put her hands down, and realized that she
was sitting on a body. Weinzapfel screamed, jumped up, grabbed her
backpack, and fled out the door. As she left the house, Weinzapfel heard a
woman’s voice calling for help from the back of the house.
[17] After briefly hiding in Carter’s van, Weinzapfel ran down the street and saw a
state police vehicle in the driveway four houses away from Carter’s house.
Weinzapfel pounded on the front door of the state police trooper’s house.
When the trooper came to the door, Weinzapfel told him that she had seen a
dead body in the house down the street and that there was also a woman being
held hostage in that house. The trooper contacted local law enforcement, and
multiple Evansville Police Department officers arrived at the scene, surrounded
the house, and apprehended Carter outside the house near her van. When
Hammond exited the house holding an item in his hands with his arms
extended, law enforcement officers, who believed that he was holding a gun,
told him to drop the item in his hands and surrender. When Hammond failed
to comply with the officers’ commands, the officers shot and killed him. The
officers then entered the house and found A.S, who was transported to the
hospital. The officers also found Ivy’s body.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 9 of 23 [18] Before Carter was transported to the police station, an officer performed a pat
down search and found a loaded handgun in the leg of Carter’s pants. When
Carter arrived at the police station, an Evansville Police Department detective
interviewed her. During the two-hour interview, Carter denied participating in
the crimes perpetrated against A.S. and Ivy but told the detective that
Hammond had said from the beginning that there were not going to be any
witnesses and that both A.S. and Ivy had to die. Carter further told the
detective that she had not called 911 when she had left the house because she
had been afraid that Hammond would kill everyone.
[19] Forensic pathologist Dr. James Jacobi (“Dr. Jacobi”) performed Ivy’s autopsy.
According to Dr. Jacobi, Ivy had suffered multiple forms of trauma, and there
was evidence of three possible causes of death. The first possible cause of death
was manual strangulation because Ivy had bruises on his neck. The second
possible cause of death was ligature strangulation because Ivy had crease marks
on his neck. The third possible cause of death was suffocation because Ivy’s
face was “completely incased in duct tape[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 122). Further,
according to Dr. Jacobi, he could not “distinguish as to which . . . was to finish
him off but you have three fatal type injuries.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 123).
[20] In October 2021, the State charged Carter with murder, felony murder, Level 1
felony rape, three counts of Level 3 felony criminal confinement, and Level 5
felony carrying a handgun without a license. The murder and rape charges
were based on accomplice liability. In November 2022, the State amended the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 10 of 23 charging information to include two additional counts of Level 1 felony rape.
Both rape charges were based on accomplice liability.
[21] One week later, the State filed a motion to dismiss, without prejudice, the
murder and felony murder charges. The trial court granted the State’s motion.
Carter’s trial for Level 5 felony carrying a handgun without a license, three
counts of Level 1 felony rape, and three counts of Level 3 felony criminal
confinement began on November 28, 2022 (“the first trial”). On the third day
of the first trial, the State filed a motion to dismiss one of the Level 3 felony
confinement charges. The trial court granted the motion.
[22] After deliberating for twelve hours in the first trial, the jury advised the trial
court that it had reached an agreement on the carrying a handgun without a
license charge but was deadlocked on the other five charges. The trial court
advised the State and Carter that the jury was deadlocked, and the following
colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: It’s my understanding that the jury has a verdict in Count 5 only which is the possession of the handgun, they’re locked up on all the other Counts. I’m going to bring the jury in, identify the presiding juror, and ask if further deliberations would be helpful. If the presiding juror tells me yes[,] I’m going to send them back in. If not[,] I’m going to ask the rest of them if any of them think further deliberations would be helpful. If I get a yes[,] I’m going to send them back[,] but if I get no’s[,] then I’m going to take the verdict in Count 5 and mis-try the other counts which means we’ll do this again at another time.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, sir. Judge after you talk to the jurors before making a ruling on whether you’re going to declare
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 11 of 23 this a mistrial or not would[,] you allow me to at least make a brief argument before making that ruling or not?
THE COURT: Yeah, I’ll let you make an argument.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Thank you.
(Supp. Tr. Vol. 2 at 248-49).
[23] Thereafter, the jury entered the courtroom, and the trial court confirmed with
the presiding juror that the jury had reached a verdict on the carrying a
handgun without a license charge. The trial court then asked the presiding
juror if he believed that further deliberations on the remaining charges would be
helpful, and the presiding juror responded that further deliberations would not
be helpful. Thereafter, the trial court asked if any of the other jurors believed
that further deliberations would be helpful, and another juror responded that
further deliberations would not be helpful. The trial court asked the presiding
juror for the verdict form on the carrying a handgun without a license charge
and announced that the jury had convicted Carter of Class A misdemeanor
carrying a handgun without a license.4 The trial court confirmed with the
presiding juror that the jurors had been unable to reach unanimous verdicts on
the other charges and stated as follows:
4 The trial court subsequently entered judgment of conviction for Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license and sentenced Carter to one-year in the county jail. The trial court further noted that Carter had served that sentence because she had accrued 433 days of jail time credit while incarcerated pending the first trial. Accordingly, the trial court “closed” that case, and that conviction is not included in this appeal. (Second Supp. Tr. Vol. 2 at 14).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 12 of 23 We thank you very much and we understand how hard it is, it’s been a long, long deliberation and we’re getting close to 12 hours. You’re going to be excused. . . . What happens on a mistrial is that we’re going to, the parties have an opportunity to do it again, the State can bring those charges where you didn’t have a unanimous verdict again, so with that being said you’re excused[.]
(Supp. Tr. Vol. 3 at 2).
[24] After excusing the jury, the trial court asked defense counsel if he wanted to
make an argument. Defense counsel responded as follows:
Well I did, Judge. I understand you’ve already made your ruling as far as the mistrial goes but I just wanted to state that they had been going at this for about 12 hours, I was going to ask the Court to consider seeing if it might have been beneficial at least to the jurors if they think if we had a chance to come back tomorrow morning and continue to discuss this because it is almost 10 p.m. in the evening and they have been going for 12 hours but I understand you’ve made your ruling but that was going to be my request is that we do this in the morning.
(Supp. Tr. Vol. 3 at 2-3). Following defense counsel’s response, the trial court
did not further mention Carter’s argument or the mistrial and asked the parties
when they wanted to schedule a new trial date.
[25] In December 2022, the State filed an amended charging information that
included two Level 1 felony rape charges and three Level 3 felony criminal
confinement charges. In addition, the State refiled the murder and felony
murder charges.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 13 of 23 [26] One month later, in January 2023, Carter filed a motion to dismiss the murder
and felony murder charges for “[v]indictive [r]echarging[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at
155). In support of her motion, Carter cited Owens v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1075,
1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), wherein this Court stated that “[u]nless there is new
evidence or information discovered to warrant additional charges, the potential
for prosecutorial vindictiveness is too great for courts to allow the State to bring
additional charges against a defendant who successfully moves for a mistrial.”
[27] At the January 2023 hearing on Carter’s motion, Carter argued that she had
asked the trial court to dismiss the murder and felony murder charges because
there had not been any newly discovered evidence between the date of the
mistrial and the date of the refiling of the charges. The State responded that the
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness did not apply in this case because
Carter had not successfully moved for a mistrial. Rather, the trial court had
declared a mistrial because of a hung jury. The trial court denied Carter’s
motion to dismiss the murder and felony murder charges. Thereafter, the State
dismissed the felony murder charge.
[28] Before Carter’s second trial, the trial court renumbered the charges against
Carter as follows: (1) Count 1 – Level 1 felony rape; (2) Count 2 – Level 3
felony criminal confinement; (3) Count 3 – Level 3 felony criminal
confinement; (4) Count 4 – Level 3 criminal confinement; (5) Count 5 – Level 1
felony rape; and (6) Count 6 – murder.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 14 of 23 [29] At Carter’s three-day second trial, the jury heard the facts as set forth above and
convicted Carter of all six charges. The trial court merged two of the Level 3
felony criminal confinement convictions and entered judgment of conviction for
murder, two counts of Level 1 felony rape, and two counts of Level 3 felony
criminal confinement. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Carter to sixty-five
(65) years for the murder conviction, forty (40) years for each of the two Level 1
felony rape convictions, and sixteen (16) years for each of the two Level 3
felony criminal confinement convictions. In addition, the trial court ordered
the sentences to run concurrently with each other for an aggregate sentence of
sixty-five (65) years in the Department of Correction.
[30] Carter now appeals.
Decision [31] Carter argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motion to
dismiss the refiled murder charge; and (2) there is insufficient evidence to
support her conviction. We address each of her contentions in turn.
1. Motion to Dismiss
[32] Carter first argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to dismiss
the refiled murder charge. She specifically argues that “the re-filing of the
murder charge after a hung jury was vindictive prosecution.” (Carter’s Br. 22).
We disagree.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 15 of 23 [33] “The Due Process clauses of Article 1, section 12, of the Indiana Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit
prosecutorial vindictiveness.” Owens v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1075, 1077 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005). Vindictiveness may be established if the prosecutor’s charging
decision was motivated by a desire to punish a defendant for doing something
that the law allowed him to do. Danks v. State, 733 N.E.2d 474, 483 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000), trans. denied.
[34] For example, prosecutorial vindictiveness can occur if “more numerous or
more severe charges” are filed against an accused “after the accused has
successfully exercised his statutory or constitutional rights to an appeal,” unless
the State meets its “heavy burden of proving that any increase in the number or
severity of the charges was not motivated by a vindictive purpose.” Cherry v.
State, 414 N.E.2d 301, 305 (Ind. 1981). As with a successful appeal, the same
applies to a successful motion for a mistrial because “unless there is new
evidence or information discovered to warrant additional charges, the potential
for prosecutorial vindictiveness is too great for courts to allow the State to bring
additional charges against a defendant who successfully moves for a mistrial.”
Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239, 243 (Ind. 2002). On the other hand, the
United States Supreme Court has noted that “[a] prosecutor should remain free
before trial to exercise the broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the
extent of the societal interest in prosecution. An initial decision should not
freeze future conduct.” United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382 (1982).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 16 of 23 [35] We find our decision in Sisson v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans.
denied, to be instructive in this case. In the Sisson case, the State dismissed a
firearm charge and an habitual offender allegation before Sisson’s first trial.
After that trial ended in a deadlocked jury and a mistrial, the State refiled the
firearm charge and the habitual offender allegation, and a second jury convicted
Sisson of the firearm charge and determined that he was an habitual offender.
[36] On appeal, Sisson argued that the refiling of the firearm charge and the habitual
offender allegation was vindictive prosecution. However, we distinguished the
factual scenario in Sisson’s case from the cases in which we had previously
found prosecutorial vindictiveness. Specifically, we pointed out that the State
had not filed more numerous or severe charges against Sisson following a
successful appeal. Id. at 11. Rather, the State had refiled previously dismissed
counts after Sisson’s first trial had ended in a mistrial because of a deadlocked
jury. Id. We further noted that Sisson had not moved for a mistrial in an effort
to preserve his right to a fair trial as a result of some error. Id. Rather, the trial
court had sua sponte declared a mistrial, without objection from Sisson or the
State, after the jury had indicated that it had been unable to reach a verdict. Id.
We concluded that because Sisson’s mistrial had not resulted from Sisson’s
exercise of any statutory or constitutional right, he could not claim that he had
been punished by the State for exercising such a right, and his prosecutorial
vindictiveness claim failed. Id.
[37] Here, as in Sisson, the State did not file more numerous or severe charges
against Carter following a successful appeal. Rather, the State refiled a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 17 of 23 previously dismissed murder charge after Carter’s first trial had ended in a
mistrial because of a deadlocked jury. Further, Carter did not move for a
mistrial in an effort to preserve her right to a fair trial as a result of some error.
Rather, the trial court sua sponte declared a mistrial after the jury indicated that
it had been unable to reach verdicts on several of Carter’s charges. Here, as in
Sisson, because Carter’s mistrial did not result from Carter’s exercise of any
statutory or constitutional right, she cannot claim that she was punished by the
State for exercising such a right.
[38] In an attempt to distinguish the facts of her case from those in the Sisson case,
Carter argues that unlike Sisson, she objected to the trial court’s sua sponte
declaration of a mistrial. Assuming, without deciding, that Carter telling the
trial court that she was going to ask it to consider if it might have been
beneficial to have the jurors return for deliberations the following morning was
an objection to the mistrial, that objection does not change the result in this
case. The doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness exists “[i]n order to avoid
chilling the exercise of the right to an appeal” or the right to seek a mistrial.
Owens, 822 N.E.2d at 1077; Warner, 773 N.E.2d at 242. Without this doctrine,
defendants would be discouraged from challenging the misdeeds of the State,
which in turn might encourage the State to commit misdeeds. Even if the
defendant objects to the mistrial, the doctrine and its rationale have little
application to a case in which a mistrial resulted not from any improper
conduct of the State but rather a deadlocked jury.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 18 of 23 [39] Because our review of the record in this case reveals nothing to suggest that
Carter was being subjected to a greater sentence as a punishment for the
exercise of any of her constitutional rights, her prosecutorial vindictiveness
claim fails. See Sisson, 985 N.E.2d at 11. Accordingly, the trial court did not err
when it denied her motion to dismiss the refiled murder charge.
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[40] Carter next argues that there is insufficient evidence to support her murder
conviction. Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well
settled. We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences
supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do
not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm the
conviction unless no reasonable fact finder could find the elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence is sufficient if an
inference may be reasonably drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at 147.
[41] Here, the State charged Carter with Ivy’s murder under a theory of accomplice
liability. INDIANA CODE § 35-42-1-1(1) defines murder as “knowingly or
intentionally kill[ing] another human being[.]” “The accomplice liability
statute permits a defendant to be found guilty as an accomplice without proof
the defendant committed every element of the crime when the defendant
‘knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit
an offense.’” Jackson v. State, 222 N.E.3d 321, 336-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)
(quoting I.C. § 35-41-2-4), trans. denied. “A person who aids another in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 19 of 23 committing a crime is just as guilty as the actual perpetrator.” Madden v. State,
162 N.E.3d 549, 557 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).
[42] There is no bright-line rule in determining accomplice liability. Jackson, 222
N.E.3d at 337. Rather, the particular facts and circumstances of each case
determine whether a person was an accomplice. Id. In determining whether a
person aided another in the commission of a crime, we consider the following
four factors: “‘(1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with
another engaged in criminal activity; (3) failure to oppose the crime; and (4) a
defendant’s conduct before, during, and after the occurrence of the crime.’” Id.
(quoting Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ind. 2003)).
[43] Carter contends that “the State did not present sufficient evidence to convict
[her] of murder under these factors.” (Carter’s Br. 16).5 We disagree.
[44] Our review of the evidence most favorable to Carter’s murder conviction
reveals that in the summer of 2021, Carter and A.S. began texting each other
after both women had placed classified ads seeking other women to join them
and their male partners in sexual activities. Carter told A.S. that she could not
go to A.S.’s house because her fiancé would kill someone over her. Carter and
5 Carter also contends that specific intent to kill is a required element of murder and that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction because the State “presented no evidence that Carter intended that [Ivy] be killed.” (Carter’s Br. 16). However, our Indiana Supreme Court has stated that specific intent to kill is not required for a murder conviction. Echols v. State, 722 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ind. 2000). Rather, either a knowing or intentional killing is sufficient to support a murder conviction. See id. Accordingly, Carter’s argument fails.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 20 of 23 A.S. eventually agreed that A.S. and Ivy would come to her house and Ivy
would watch the two women engage in sexual activity. Carter told A.S. that as
long as Ivy did not touch her, her fiancé should be fine.
[45] A.S. and Ivy arrived at Carter’s house at 3:30 a.m. on October 19, 2021. After
smoking methamphetamine and watching pornographic videos and a snuff
film, Carter, A.S., and Ivy agreed that Ivy would participate in the sexual
activity as well. While Carter, A.S., and Ivy engaged in sexual activity,
Hammond arrived at Carter’s home at 7:30 a.m., his usual time. When he
walked into the bedroom and saw Ivy penetrating Carter, Hammond grabbed a
baseball bat and began hitting Ivy on his head and back. When A.S. attempted
to intercede by jumping on Hammond’s back, Carter grabbed A.S.’s hair,
pulled her off Hammond, pushed her to the floor and held a gun to her face.
Hammond then attacked A.S. with the bat. After both A.S. and Ivy had been
subdued, Carter told A.S. that it was “fucked up” that they had just watched a
snuff film and to look at what had just happened. (Ex. Vol. 6, State’s Ex. 147 at
1:37:04). Carter and Hammond covered Ivy’s face with duct tape, bound his
wrists and ankles, and made a game of kicking him multiple times. Hammond
stated that there were not going to be any witnesses and that both A.S. and Ivy
had to die. Carter said that she knew people in Indianapolis who could dispose
of a body.
[46] Despite Hammond’s statement that both A.S. and Ivy had to die, Carter left
A.S. and Ivy in the house with Hammond when she went to find someone to
clean her house. While Carter was out of the home, she did not call 911.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 21 of 23 Rather, she smoked methamphetamine with Weinzapfel, showed Weinzapfel
the blood on her boots, and told Weinzapfel that she had had to do some rough
work that day. While Carter was out of the home, A.S. believed that she heard
Hammond kill Ivy by strangling him. When Carter and Weinzapfel returned to
Carter’s home, Weinzapfel began cleaning, and Carter helped Hammond wrap
Ivy’s dead body in blankets and drag his body into the dining room. Later that
night, when Carter, Hammond, and Weinzapfel went into the dining room to
eat pizza, Carter jokingly told Weinzapfel to sit on the Christmas tree, which
was Ivy’s dead body wrapped in blankets.
[47] Carter’s presence at the scene of the crime, her companionship with Hammond,
her failure to oppose the crime, and her conduct before, during, and after Ivy’s
murder all support a finding of accomplice liability. Based on this evidence, a
reasonable jury could have found that the State proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that Carter aided, induced, or caused Hammond to kill Ivy. The
evidence is, therefore, sufficient to support Carter’s murder convictions.
[48] Affirmed.
Tavitas, J., and Foley, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Yvette M. LaPlante Gonterman & Meyer LLC Evansville, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 22 of 23 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jodi Kathryn Stein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-817 | May 30, 2024 Page 23 of 23