Heidelberg Materials v. IPT Allentown

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 14, 2025
• Docket: 1042 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A25022-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

HEIDELBERG MATERIALS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NORTHEAST, LLC, F/K/A HANSON : PENNSYLVANIA AGGREGATES PENNSYLVANIA, LLC : : Appellant : : : v. : : No. 1042 EDA 2024 : IPT ALLENTOWN DC, LLC, AND IPT : ALLENTOWN DC II, LLC : v. : : : BLUE ROCK CONSTRUCTION, INC. :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 6, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-M-0053

HEIDELBERG MATERIALS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NORTHEAST, LLC, F/K/A HANSON : PENNSYLVANIA AGGREGATES PENNSYLVANIA, LLC : : Appellant : : : v. : : No. 1043 EDA 2024 : IPT ALLENTOWN DC, LLC, AND IPT : ALLENTOWN DC II, LLC :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 6, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-M-0054

HEIDELBERG MATERIALS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NORTHEAST, LLC, F/K/A HANSON : PENNSYLVANIA AGGREGATES PENNSYLVANIA, LLC : : Appellant : J-A25022-24

: : v. : : No. 1044 EDA 2024 : IPT ALLENTOWN DC II, LLC :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 6, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-M-0055

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED APRIL 14, 2025

Appellant, Heidelberg Materials Northeast, LLC, f/k/a Hanson

Aggregates Pennsylvania, LLC, appeals from the March 6, 2024 order entered

in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in

favor of Appellees, IPT Allentown DC, LLC (“IPT”), IPT Allentown DC II, LLC

(“IPT II”), and Blue Rock Construction, Inc., in these consolidated cases. After

review, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for the trial

court to address Appellant’s request to amend its lien claims pursuant to the

Mechanics’ Lien Law of 1963.1

This case involves the construction of three warehouses across three

adjoining parcels of land. IPT owns two of the parcels, and IPT II owns the

third parcel. IPT and IPT II engaged Blue Rock to serve as general contractor

“on the entire project.” Trial Ct. Op., 3/6/24, at 2. Blue Rock then contracted

with Dobrinski Brothers, Inc. who subcontracted with Appellant, “to provide

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1 49 P.S. §§ 1101-1902.

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asphalt, labor, and materials to construct the parking lots and entranceways

at each of the three warehouses.” Id. at 3.

On December 8, 2021, Appellant filed a mechanics’ lien claim against

each of the three properties, claiming $1,276,132.10 on each property. The

claims were “identical in terms of the services provided and the amount

sought,” with the $1,276,132.10 constituting the total amount owed for labor

and materials across the three properties. Id. at 4-5 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

On January 25, 2022, the court approved the parties’ joint stipulation to

consolidate the cases and permit Blue Rock to intervene and discharge the

liens against IPT and IPT II’s properties by filing a single bond for the

consolidated claims.2 The parties agreed that “the three cases [arose] out of

substantially the same claims and raise[d] substantially the same questions

of fact and law[.]” Joint Stipulation, 1/25/22, at 2 (unpaginated).

On March 30, 2022, Appellant filed a complaint to enforce the lien claims

against IPT, IPT II, and Blue Rock (collectively “Appellees”). In its answer and

new matter, Blue Rock asserted that the liens overstated Appellant’s claims

by 300% because they asserted the total due in each of the three claims. Blue

Rock Answer and New Matter, 7/21/22, at ¶ 12. Blue Rock maintained that

the total amount should have been apportioned between the three liens ____________________________________________

2 Specifically, Blue Rock provided a bond of $2,552,264.20, double the total

amount claimed by Appellant, pursuant to 49 P.S. § 1510(d) (permitting discharge of the lien based upon “security in lieu of cash” “in double the amount of the required deposit”).

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because the projects did not constitute “a single business or residential plant”

as required by the Mechanics’ Lien Law, 49 P.S. § 1306(b). Id. at ¶ 36. Based

on this claim, Appellees argued that the liens did not comply with the

Mechanics’ Lien Law.

In June 2023, following discovery, Appellant filed for partial summary

judgment, and Appellees filed for summary judgment. Importantly, in

response to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, Appellant argued that

the court “should permit [Appellant] leave to amend the lien claims to allow

for apportionment of the claims.” Appellant’s Brief in Opposition to Blue Rock’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/13/23, at 11-12 (citing 49 P.S. § 1504);

Appellant’s Response to Blue Rock’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/13/23,

at ¶ 22.

On March 6, 2024, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary

judgment and dismissed Appellant’s motion for partial summary judgment as

moot. The court relied upon Section 1306(b) of the Mechanics’ Lien Law,

which requires a claimant to apportion the total debt between separate claims,

if the “debt is incurred for labor or materials furnished by the same claimant

for work upon several different improvements which do not form all or part of

a single business or residential plant[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 7 (quoting 49 P.S.

§ 1306(b)). The court concluded that Appellant should have filed either a

single lien for the total amount, if the project constituted a single business

plant, or three separate liens apportioning the total amount amongst the three

parcels, if it did not constitute a single business plant. Trial Ct. Op. at 8.

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Finding that Appellant did not strictly comply with the Mechanics’ Lien

Law in filing its lien claims, the trial court granted summary judgment to

Appellees, striking the three lien claims and dismissing Appellant’s complaint.

Notably, the court did not address Appellant’s request to amend the lien

claims.

On April 3, 2024, Appellant filed three notices of appeal. Appellant

additionally filed a motion to consolidate the appeals, which this Court

granted. Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by ruling that [Appellant] failed to comply with the requirements of the Mechanics’ Lien Law of 1963 by filing three separate mechanics’ liens against three different parcels for the entire amount claimed to be owed when there were three separate parcels with two different owners of the parcels on which work was performed, the amount claimed was pursuant to one contract, and the outstanding balance could not be partitioned at the time of filing of the mechanics’ liens?

2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by ruling that [Appellant] failed to comply with the requirements of the Mechanics’ Lien Law of 1963 by filing three separate mechanics’ liens against three different parcels for the entire amount claimed to be owed when Blue Rock and [Appellant] stipulated to the claim amount and where the three actions were consensually consolidated into a single action in which the three claims were consolidated into a single claim, with the amount of claim in the consolidated action amounting to a single recovery as permitted under the Mechanics’ Lien Law of 1963?

3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by failing to consider whether [Appellant] was permitted, as it requested, to amend the mechanics’ lien claims pursuant to Section 504 of the Mechanics’ Lien Law of 1963 as requested by [Appellant’s] Response to Blue Rock’s Motion for Summary Judgment?

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4. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in not determining that by posting a single bond discharging the mechanics’ lien claims that Blue Rock waived its ability to assert that the mechanics’ lien claims had been improperly filed and rendered the issue moot?

Appellant’s Br. at 5-6.

We address Appellant’s third issue first, as we conclude it is dispositive

of the appeal. In this issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in

granting Appellees summary judgment without addressing Appellant’s request

to amend its lien claims pursuant to the Mechanics’ Lien Law. Id.

“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only in those cases where the

record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Summers

v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).

Appellate courts review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment for “error

of law or an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). A trial court’s

determination of “whether there are no genuine issues as to any material fact

presents a question of law.” Id. Therefore, “our standard of review is de

novo[,]” and our scope of review is plenary. Id. (citation omitted). In

evaluating summary judgment motions, courts “must take all facts of record

and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-

moving party.” Id.

This case involves the Mechanics’ Lien Law, which created a statutory

remedy, unknown at common law, permitting a contractor or subcontractor to

obtain a priority lien on property for the labor and materials the claimant

invested in that property. See Terra Firma Builders, LLC v. King, 249 A.3d

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976, 983 (Pa. 2021); El-Gharbaoui v. Ajayi, 260 A.3d 944, 961 (Pa. Super.

2021). As mechanics’ liens are “extraordinary remedies[,]” “a contractor

seeking the benefit of the lien must judiciously adhere to the requirements of

the Mechanics’ Lien Law in order to secure a valid and enforceable lien.” Terra

Firma Builders, LLC, 249 A.3d at 983 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

While imposing various requirements on claimants, the Mechanics’ Lien

Law also provides for amendment of lien claims:

A claim may be amended from time to time without prejudice to intervening rights by agreement of the parties or by leave of court, except that no amendment shall be permitted after the time for filing a claim has expired which undertakes to:

(1) substitute a different property than that described in the claim; or

(2) substitute a different party with whom the claimant contracted; or

(3) increase the aggregate amount of the claim.

49 P.S. § 1504. The 1964 commentary to Section 1504 explains that the

intent of clause 3, which prohibits amendments increasing the aggregate

amount of the claim, was to clarify “that so long as the total amount of the

claim is not increased, amendments which change itemizations or break down

lump sums are permissible.” Id. at cmt. This Court has opined that Section

1504 “should be liberally construed in favor of the allowance of the

amendment.” Zeigler Lumber & Supply Co. v. Golden Triangle

Development Co., Inc., 326 A.2d 524, 525 (Pa. Super. 1974).

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As stated, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in

granting summary judgment against it without first addressing its request to

amend the lien claims by apportioning the total amount amongst the three

claims, pursuant to Section 1504 of the Mechanics’ Lien Law. Appellant’s Br

at 31-33. Appellant requested to amend the claims in its brief in response to

Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, but the trial court did not address

the request. Appellant’s Response to Summary Judgment Motion, 7/13/23,

at ¶ 22; Appellant’s Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion,

7/13/23, at 11-13.

Appellant asserts that none of the exceptions to Section 1504’s

amendment provision apply to the instant case as it is not attempting to

substitute a different property or party or to increase the aggregate amount

of the claim. Appellant’s Br. at 32. Additionally, it maintains that Blue Rock

would not suffer prejudice due to the amendment, given that Blue Rock

utilized the total amount as the basis for its bond when it sought intervention

in the joint stipulation. Id. at 27-28.

After review, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in

failing to address Appellant’s request to amend. We observe that Section

1504 provides for permissive amendment so long as the opposing party would

not suffer prejudice and the case does not fall within the three exceptions.

None of the exceptions are applicable in this case. Notably, Appellant did not

seek to substitute a different property or party nor to increase the aggregate

amount of the lien. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting summary

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judgment to Appellees and remand for the trial court to address Appellant’s

request to amend its lien claims.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 4/14/2025

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