Heicklin v. Morgenthau

378 F. App'x 1

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: April 20, 2010
• Docket: 09-1474-cv
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Julian Heieklen, pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging claims against seventeen defendants, including nine New York state court judges, three New York state clerks of court, the former District Attorney for New York County and an assistant district attorney, and the former New York City Comptroller and two employees of the Comptroller’s office. In its dismissal order, the district court adopted the reasoning contained in a March 2008 order by a different district court judge which had partially dismissed a separate, prior action filed by the Appellant, which had raised the same claims against the same defendants (plus nine others), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam). See Heicklen v. Kelly, et al., No. 08-cv-2457, Doc. No. 2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that” the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Fitzgerald, 221 F.3d at 364 (holding that district court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte pursuant to § 1915(e) even when plaintiff has paid the required filing fee). This Court has not decided whether review of such dismissals is de novo or for an abuse of discretion. See Fitzgerald, 221 F.3d at 364 n. 2. However, because the reasoning of the March 2008 order, as adopted by the district court in its dismissal of the Appellant’s June 2008 complaint, withstands scrutiny under either the de novo or abuse of discretion standards of review, we need not reach that issue.

The district court properly dismissed the Appellant’s complaint. To the extent the Appellant seeks intervention by the federal courts in his ongoing state criminal proceeding, such relief is foreclosed by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), as the Appellant has failed to demonstrate the existence of “special circumstances suggesting bad faith, harassment or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate” necessary to warrant intervention. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573-74, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973). We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Appellant’s claims for damages for substantially the same reasons as articulated by the district court in the March 2008 partial dismissal order.

We have considered all of Appellant’s remaining claims of error and determined them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.