Hector Fuentes-Ramos v. Todd Blanche

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 23 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HECTOR FUENTES-RAMOS, Nos. 18-70434 19-70435 Petitioner, Agency No. A088-752-466 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 12, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District Judge.***

Petitioner Hector Fuentes-Ramos, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming the

Immigration Judge’s finding of removability and denial of his applications for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture, and

cancellation of removal and adjustment of status. We review the BIA’s legal

conclusions de novo to determine the best reading of the applicable federal statute,

taking into consideration the interpretation of the BIA as the agency responsible for

implementing the statute. Leon-Briviesca v. Blanche, --- F4th ----, 2026 WL

1829532, at *6. We deny the petition.

1. Fuentes-Ramos first challenges the denial of his application for

cancellation of removal, arguing that his conviction under Oregon Revised Statutes

§ 163.160(1)(a), (3)(c) is not “a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child

abandonment” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), and that he is thus eligible for

cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). But in Diaz-Boyzo v.

Blanche, we held that Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.160(1)(a), (3)(c) describes “a crime of

child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.” --- F.4th ----, ---- (9th Cir. 2026),

slip op. at 10. Fuentes-Ramos’s conviction for assault in the fourth degree in

violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.160(1)(a), (3)(c) thus renders him ineligible for

cancellation of removal. See id.

Contrary to Fuentes-Ramos’ assertion, State v. Yong, 138 P.3d 37 (Or. App.

2006), does not establish that Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.160 is indivisible. There, the

Oregon Court of Appeals conducted a merger analysis, which is “not the same” as

our divisibility analysis. Vasquez-Valle v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 834, 843 (9th Cir.

2 18-70434 2018). And it did not suggest that a jury could convict under Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 163.160(c) without unanimously agreeing that a specific aggravating factor is

satisfied. See Yong, 138 P.3d at 51. And State v. Glaspey, 100 P.3d 730 (2004), is

similarly unavailing. There, the court concluded that the only “victim” under Or.

Rev. Stat. § 163.160(3)(c) for purposes of Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.067(2)—a separate

Oregon statute allowing cumulative charges for each victim—was the one physically

injured even if one or more children witnessed the assault. Id. at 734. It did not, as

Fuentes-Ramos contends, establish that Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.160(3)(c) is

unconcerned with harm to children or hold that a conviction does not require

circumstances likely to cause physical or mental harm to children.

2. The lack of hearing date-and-time information in Fuentes-Ramos’s Notice

to Appear was not a jurisdictional defect. See United States v. Bastide-Hernandez,

39 F.4th 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc). The time-and-place requirement of

8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b) is a claims-processing rule and not a jurisdictional

requirement. Id. at 1192. And any defect was cured by the later notice Fuentes-

Ramos was provided. Id. at 1193 n.9.

DENIED.

3 18-70434