Hector Fernandez v. Bright, et al.

• Court: District Court, C.D. Illinois
• Decided: November 12, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03212
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

HECTOR FERNANDEZ, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 25-3212 ) BRIGHT, et al. ) ) Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Graham Correctional Center, was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The case is now before the Court for a merit review of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint, and through such process to identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. The Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements and labels are insufficient—the facts alleged must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges that he was incarcerated at Western Illinois Correctional Center. Plaintiff alleges that he awakened to his cellmate masturbating in front of him, and that the cellmate continued to do so while attempting to pull down Plaintiff’s pants. Plaintiff alleges that prison officials separated him from his cellmate for the night and moved him to a different cell the next day. Plaintiff alleges that he suffers flashbacks and nightmares about the incident. Plaintiff alleges that he later reported the incident pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) and angered Internal Affairs officers as a result. Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with deliberate indifference to “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

The risk of harm to which the prisoner was subjected must be objectively serious. Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2018). “[I]t does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. A prison official acts with deliberate indifference if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. A plaintiff “normally proves actual knowledge of impending harm by showing

that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his safety.” Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Generalized, vague, or stale concerns about one’s safety typically will not suffice. Id. at 480-81. Prison officials with knowledge of an objectively serious risk cannot be held liable if they responded reasonably, even if the harm was ultimately not averted. LaBrec v. Walker, 948 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2020). Plaintiff’s allegations do not permit a plausible inference that prison officials knew that he faced a substantial risk of sexual assault prior to the event in question. Plaintiff also does not describe how the officials he named as defendants were personally involved in any deprivation. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”). The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend as directed below to permit Plaintiff the opportunity to clarify his allegations and provide any additional information he

desires the Court to consider. Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Counsel (Doc. 5) Plaintiff has no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in this case. In considering the Plaintiff’s motion, the court asks: (1) has the indigent Plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself? Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff has not shown that he made a reasonable effort to obtain counsel on his own. A plaintiff usually does this by attaching copies of letters sent to attorneys seeking representation

and copies of any responses received. His unsubstantiated claims that he contacted lawyers is not sufficient. Balle v. Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545, 559-60 (7th Cir. 2023); Tackett v. Jess, 853 F. App’x 11, 16-17 (7th Cir. 2021). Because Plaintiff has not satisfied the first prong, the Court does not address the second. Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff’s motion is denied with leave to renew. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the entry of this order to file an amended complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint will result in the dismissal of this case, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff's amended complaint will replace Plaintiff's original complaint in its entirety. The amended complaint must contain all allegations against all Defendants. Piecemeal amendments are not accepted. 2) Clerk is directed to send Plaintiff a blank complaint form. 3) Plaintiff’s Motion [5] is DENIED with leave to renew. Entered this 12th day of November, 2025.

s/Sara Darrow SARA DARROW CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE