Hector Espino Solorio v. William Barr

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 25, 2020
Docket18-72636
StatusUnpublished

This text of Hector Espino Solorio v. William Barr (Hector Espino Solorio v. William Barr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hector Espino Solorio v. William Barr, (9th Cir. 2020).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 25 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HECTOR JAVIER ESPINO SOLORIO, No. 18-72636

Petitioner, Agency No. A098-584-628

v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 3, 2020 Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and CALDWELL,** District Judge.

Petitioner Hector Javier Espino Solorio petitions for review of an order by

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s

(“IJ”) denial of his motion to terminate removal proceedings and his application

for cancellation of removal, and denial of his motion to remand. We review factual

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Karen K. Caldwell, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation. findings for substantial evidence and legal conclusions de novo. Azanor v.

Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004).

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s finding that Petitioner’s conviction for a drug

offense made him removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and that his

conviction did not qualify for that provision’s “personal use exception” to

removability. The BIA did not err in so finding because the circumstance-specific

approach applies to section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)’s exception to removability, and the

record establishes that the circumstances of Petitioner’s conviction disqualify him

for the exception. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 33-39 (2009).

Further, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the merits of the BIA’s

decision to affirm the IJ’s discretionary denial of Petitioner’s application for

cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Szonyi v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d

1228, 1258 (9th Cir. 2019).

Finally, the BIA did not err by denying Petitioner’s motion to remand

because the record establishes that Petitioner did not present previously

unavailable, material evidence, as the applicable regulation requires. See Angov v.

Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2015); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

PETITION DENIED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.

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Related

Nijhawan v. Holder
557 U.S. 29 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Angov v. Holder
788 F.3d 893 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Istvan Szonyi v. Matthew Whitaker
942 F.3d 874 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)

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Bluebook (online)
Hector Espino Solorio v. William Barr, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hector-espino-solorio-v-william-barr-ca9-2020.