Hecht v. Hampton Roads Fire & Marine Insurance
This text of 142 S.E. 351 (Hecht v. Hampton Roads Fire & Marine Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case brings before us for review, upon a writ of error, a judgment of the Law and Chancery Court of the city of Norfolk for $10,000.00 with interest at six per cent per annum from November 15, 1921, subject to a credit of $500.00 as of July 30, 1926, in favor of the Hampton Roads Fire and Marine Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff company, as it was in the court below, and against Joseph B. Hecht, hereinafter referred to as defendant, as he was in the court below.
The plaintiff company, through its agent H. G. Blaising, about September, 1921, sold defendant fifty shares of its capital stock, par value $100.00 per share, at $200.00 per share. To consummate the deal, plaintiff, after considerable negotiations with defendant, agreed to lend the defendant ten thousand dollars with which to purchase the stock.
There are two written agreements in connection with the transaction, one designated in the record as the “Subscription Agreement,” and the other as the “Col[76]*76lateral Note Agreement.” They appear in marginal notes
The controversy in the case grew out of the manner in which the collateral note referred to in the agreement was signed by the defendant, the plaintiff’s con[77]*77tention being that the note was never signed as contemplated by the agreement, the defendant’s being that it was. The question involves a construction of the agreement.
Blaising, the company’s stock salesman, carried the collateral note, which had theretofore been signed by Blainey for the company, to the defendant for his signature, secured his signature and returned to the office of plaintiff with the note, and then delivered the stock certificate to the defendant. Immediately upon discovery by Blainey, vice president of the company, that the note had not been signed by the defendant, as the former claimed, in the proper place, he called on defendant and requested that he sign it at the bottom so as to include the obligation, on the part of the maker (defendant) to furnish additional collateral security, when required by the plaintiff, company, which was a part of the form of note used by the company. (To make this statement clear a copy of the form of the note used by the company, showing the signatures of the parties thereto, appears in the margin. Note
[78]*78A controversy then arose between the parties which terminated, in the refusal of defendant to sign the note ns requested and this action ultimately followed, plaintiff contending that the note was not signed according to the terms of the agreement, and the defendant contending that it was. Plaintiff urges that the plain terms of its agreement with defendant entitle it to protect its loan to the. defendant as the form of collateral note, used by it, provides, by calling for additional security. Defendant had not been called upon to provide additional collateral, but he contended that he never could be under his contract. This action was instituted to recover the $10,000.00 loaned by plaintiff to the defendant under this alleged misapprehension. The result of the trial in the lower court was the verdict and judgment set out above.
The trial court determined, and properly we think, that the whole transaction between the parties was in writing, and that, so far as the writing dealt with the matter in controversy, there was no ambiguity in the writing. It therefore proceeded to construe the [79]*79contract in an instruction to the jury, the practical-effect of which was to direct a verdict for the plaintiff-That instruction, which was the only instruction given in the case except one as to the burden of proof, correctly interprets the contract in our opinion. It appears in the margin Note
The defendant offered numerous instructions based upon his theory of the case. Objections to the instruction given and exceptions to the action of the court in refusing the instructions asked for by the defendant, exceptions to the action of the court in excluding evidence, and to the action of the court in refusing to set aside the verdict, form the basis of ten [80]*80assignments of error, but as the court has correctly construed the contract in the instruction given, and as there could have been no other verdict properly returned than the one reached (unless there was a waiver of the right to demand the note signed as contemplated by the agreement, by accepting the note of November 15, 1921, and this question having been submitted to the jury by the instruction, upon a conflict of the evidence, the jury’s verdict is binding in this court) it is unnecessary to consider any of these assignments.
It is perfectly clear that the trial court rightly held that as the collateral note agreement provided that the loan should be “evidenced by a note made by the defendant on a form of collateral note regularly used by the company,” and as the form of that note was made certain by attaching it to the collateral agreement, and as that form contained an option in the plaintiff that the defendant should give additional collateral security when called upon by the plaintiff, it [81]*81meant exactly what it said, and the signature of the defendant at any place on the note which did not include all of its provisions, was not giving a note in compliance with the terms of the agreement.
The final sentence of the agreement, “the subscriber proposes to offer 4,000 shares of the preferred stock of American Southern Motors Corporation, said shares having a present market value of $18,000.00,” is not in conflict with this provision in the contract, as the defendant contends, but refers to the immediate arrangement as to collateral, and must be interpreted in the light of the other provisions of the contract.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Affirmed.
. No. 586 Amount $10,000.00
I hereby subscribe for fifty shares of the Capital Stock of The Hampton Roads Fire and Marine Insurance Company, of the par value of one hundred dollars ($100.00) each, and agree to pay therefor to the order of the company and for its use and benefit in creating capital, surplus and for necessary expenses incident to conducting the business of the company, the sum of two hundred dollars ($200.00) per share, it being understood that not to exceed five (5) per centum of the gross selling price of each share shall be used to cover the costs of organization.
It is agreed that the company has the right to reject all or any portion of this subscription and return to me all payments made on the portion rejected. It is further agreed that upon full payment and acceptance by the company, a certificate showing that the shares are fully paid and non-assessable shall be issued in my name. It is further agreed that no conditions or agreements other than those printed hereon shall be binding on the company. All shares are common stock.
Subscriber, Jos. B. Hecht,
Address, P. O. Box 882.
Witness:
• Jas. A. Blainey,
Company's Representative.
H. G. Blaising,
All checks and other evidences of payment shall be made payable to the company.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
142 S.E. 351, 150 Va. 73, 1928 Va. LEXIS 295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hecht-v-hampton-roads-fire-marine-insurance-va-1928.