Heather T. v. Bennett

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 8, 2026
• Docket: 2-25-0511
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (2d) 250511-U No. 2-25-0511 Order filed April 8, 2026

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

HEATHER T., Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

NICHOLAS BENNETT, Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Kalb County. Honorable Stephanie P. Klein, Judge, Presiding. No. 2017-F-94

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Kennedy and Justice Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Appellant has failed to provide a report of proceedings or a bystander’s report for the hearing on appellee’s “Petition to Allocate Parental Rights and Responsibilities.” Without a sufficiently complete record on appeal, we will presume that the trial court’s order was in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis. Additionally, appellant has failed to support her remaining argument on appeal with citations to pertinent authority. Therefore, she has forfeited her argument that the trial court erred in denying her motion to reconsider because new email evidence was discovered that impeached the GAL.

¶2 Petitioner, Heather T., appeals from the trial court’s judgment allocating parenting

responsibilities and parenting time and its subsequent denial of her “Motion to Clarify and

Reconsider.” For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the De Kalb County trial court. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 This matter concerns the parties’ minor son, M.T., born July 25, 2015. On May 19, 2017,

the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services (hereinafter, “DHFS”), on behalf of

Heather, filed a “Petition to Determine the Existence of the Father and Child Relationship”

between M.T. and Respondent Nicholas Bennett. A judgment of parentage was entered on October

4, 2017, finding Nicholas to be the biological father of M.T. A temporary child support order was

entered in January 2018. On May 2, 2018, the trial court issued a final judgment ordering Nicholas

to pay child support to Heather.

¶5 Then, on July 11, 2019, M.T. was placed into Nicholas’s custody by the Department of

Children and Family Services (hereinafter, “DCFS”) due to an ongoing investigation involving

Heather and another one of her minor children. On July 29, 2019. Nicholas filed a “Motion to

Terminate or Suspend Child Support.” The trial court granted Nicholas’ motion on August 7, 2019.

¶6 That same day, Nicholas filed a “Petition to Establish The Allocation of Parental Rights

and Responsibilities”, requesting that the trial court: (1) allocate a majority of parental rights and

responsibilities to himself; (2) reserve child support issues to himself; (3) allocate primary

decision-making authority for M.T.’s education and healthcare to himself; and (4) designate

Nicholas as the “residential parent” for M.T.’s schooling purposes.

¶7 Between the time Nicholas filed his petition and when the hearing was conducted, several

guardians ad litem (GAL) were appointed. The first GAL, appointed in September of 2021, was

discharged in February of 2022. The second GAL, attorney Nina Cosentino, was appointed by the

trial court on March 11, 2022.

¶8 The trial court conducted the hearing on Nicholas’ petition over the spans of three dates:

August 27, 2024; January 9, 2025; and February 10, 2025. The GAL testified on January 9, 2025.

-2- Written closing arguments were filed for Nicholas on March 10, 2025, and Heather on March 11,

2025.

¶9 On April 21, 2025, the trial court issued its ruling on Nicholas’s “Petition to Allocate

Parental Rights and Responsibilities” holding: (1) that it was in the best interest of M.T. to leave

significant decision-making responsibilities to Nicholas regarding M.T.’s education, health,

religion, and extracurricular activities; and, (2) that the current parenting time schedule was to be

maintained, with an increase of parenting time for Heather during summer breaks, as well as

additional parenting time for Heather during extended weekend breaks not associated with the

Holidays and seasonal school breaks. A separate parenting plan was filed and incorporated with

the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 10 On May 21, 2025, Heather’s attorney filed a “Motion to Clarify and Reconsider” on her

behalf. Her attorney then withdrew representation on June 25, 2025. In her “Motion to Clarify and

Reconsider,” Heather argued, inter alia, that the trial court failed to address testimony from both

the GAL and Nicholas that he was not always forthcoming or responsive in communicating, when

it was critical in its judgment of Heather’s alleged failure to communicate with the GAL.

¶ 11 Nicholas filed a “Motion to Dismiss Or In The Alternative, Response To Motion To Clarify

and Reconsider” on September 4, 2025. The hearing on Heather’s motion was held on October 9,

2025. During the hearing on her motion, Heather presented several emails to the court, explaining

they constituted new evidence that contradicted the GAL’s January 9, 2025, testimony. The

following conversation then occurred between Heather and the trial court:

“THE COURT : So the new evidence… are emails that were between yourself and

Ms. Cosentino [the GAL]?

HEATHER: Yes.

-3- THE COURT: Did those emails occur prior to the hearings?

HEATHER: They did.”

¶ 12 The trial court noted that the standard for a motion to reconsider is that there must be

evidence that was not available at the time the trial was held, that would have caused the trial court

to enter a different judgment. It further held that because the emails were sent and discoverable

prior to the GAL’s testimony on January 9, 2025, they had been in Heather’s possession and were

accessible. Therefore, the emails did not constitute new evidence. The trial court concluded its

decision was made in the best interest of M.T. and denied Heather’s “Motion to Clarify and

Reconsider.”

¶ 13 Heather subsequently filed her timely notice of appeal on November 6, 2025. 1

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 This court has an independent duty to consider whether jurisdiction is proper. Johnson v.

Armstrong, 2022 IL 127942, ¶ 18; Barnai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2023 IL App (1st) 220900, ¶ 13.

In her opening brief, Heather has indicated that jurisdiction is proper under Illinois Supreme Court

Rules 303 and 304(b)(3). Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. July 1, 2017); Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(3) (eff. Mar. 8,

2016). We note that Rule 304(b)(3) pertains to judgments and orders granting or denying relief

pursuant to a section 2-1401 petition. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(3) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). This case does not

involve such a matter, and therefore we disregard Heather’s mention of this rule. We will, however,

1 We note that pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a)(5), “[e]xcept for good cause shown,

the appellate court shall issue its decision within 150 days after the filing of the notice of appeal.” Ill. S. Ct.

R. 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018). This decision is filed after that 150-day deadline. However, appellant was

granted two extensions of time to file her opening brief. Accordingly, we have good cause for issuing our

decision after the 150-day deadline. See In re B’Yata I., 2013 IL App (2d) 130558, ¶ 26.

-4- consider if we have jurisdiction through another rule. See In re Estate of O’Gara, 2022 IL App

(1st) 210709, ¶ 28. Here, jurisdiction is proper under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(6) (eff.

Mar. 8, 2016), which provides that orders involving custody or allocation of parental

responsibilities are immediately appealable without special findings. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(6) (eff.

Mar. 8, 2016). The notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days

after entry of the judgment appealed from. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017). As Heather

filed this appeal 27 days after the trial court gave its final ruling on the matter, we have jurisdiction

to consider this appeal.

¶ 16 Having determined jurisdiction, we now turn to the merits of Heather’s appeal. Nicholas

argues that Heather’s brief fails to comply with Illinois Supreme Rule 341. We agree. Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) provides the filing requirements for an appellant’s

brief. The Illinois Supreme Court Rules are not mere suggestions, but requirements for parties to

consider when filing an appeal. People v. Denzel W., 237 Ill. 2d 285, 294 (2010). A discussion of

Heather’s brief and the several Rule 341 issues within follows.

¶ 17 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) requires an appellant’s statement

of facts to be “stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment, and with appropriate

reference to the pages of the record on appeal.” Heather’s “facts” are not only argumentative but

largely contain citations to what appear to be quotes from a transcript from the hearing on

Nicholas’s “Petition to Allocate Parental Rights and Responsibilities,” and citations to the seven

emails she has filed with this appeal. Neither of these were included in the record on appeal.

Accordingly, we cannot consider them. See Doria v. Village of Downers Grove, 397 Ill. App. 3d

752, 755 (“[W]e may not consider as evidence any items that are not included in the record on

appeal.”). This leaves Heather’s statement of the facts essentially non-existent.

-5- ¶ 18 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct 1, 2020) states an appellant’s brief shall

contain an argument section, which requires citation of the authorities and pages of the record

relied on. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Heather’s argument section begins with seven

numbered paragraphs: (1) “[t]he trial court erred by relying on religious considerations and the

GAL’s mischaracterization of Plaintiff-Appellant’s First Amendment Religious and Political

beliefs in violation of 750 ILCS 5/600(I) as a clear restriction on Appellant’s parenting time and

decision-making authority, 750 ILCS 5/602.5, 750 ILCS 5/602.7 and U.S. Const. Amend I.”; (2)

“[t]he trial court improperly allowed political speech and online political content to influence the

restriction of parental responsibilities in violation of U.S. Const. Amend I as a Penalty towards

Appellant for Exercising Her Right to Criticize the Government on Social Media”; (3) “[t]he

GAL’s investigation failed to comply with 750 ILCS 5/600(i) 750 ILCS 5/506 and 750 ILCS

5/604.10 750 ILCS 5/602.5, and 750 ILCS 5/602.7 due to incomplete, selective, and biased

inquiry”; (4) “[t]he GAL’s inaccurate statements on the witness stand regarding ‘big ticket’ issues

rendered her recommendation unreliable”; (5) “(Start by citing the statutes I listed, what they say,

and cite the cases listed previously how the court ruled, and how that applies to the facts in this

case); (6) [w]hether newly discovered email evidence directly impeaching the GAL required

reconsideration under the standards of People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128 and In re Marriage of

Wolff, 355 Ill. App. 3d 403”; and (7) “[w]hether, under In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489

and the statutory framework, the trial court’s reliance on unverified and biased GAL testimony

violated Plaintiff-Appellant’s due process rights.”

¶ 19 Each of these paragraphs is poorly punctuated, difficult to understand, and has no citations

to the common law record. Further, the citations to authority are provided generally with no

specific argument, quotations, or even pinpoint citations. Under each paragraph, Heather has

-6- included a parenthetical which states: “[s]tart by citing the statutes I listed, what they say, and cite

the cases listed previously how the court ruled, and how that applies to the facts in this case.”

Whether this was a note Heather left for herself or instructions for her reader, we disregard these,

as this court is not a depository where parties may dump the burden of researching and crafting

their arguments. In re Marriage of Petrik, 2012 IL App (2d) 110495, ¶ 39.

¶ 20 Heather’s first, second, third, fourth, and seventh arguments involve the GAL’s testimony

from the hearing on Nicholas’s “Petition to Allocate Parental Rights and Responsibilities,” which

occurred on August 27, 2024, January 9, 2025, and February 10, 2025. No transcript from that

hearing has been included in the record on appeal. “[A]n appellant has the burden to present a

sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the

absence of such a record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was

in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis.” Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-

392 (1984). Without a transcript or bystander’s report from the hearing, we must assume that the

order was in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis. Id.

¶ 21 Heather’s fifth argument merely contains the following phrase: “(Start by citing the statutes

I listed, what they say, and cite the cases listed previously how the court ruled, and how that applies

to the facts in this case).” As this is not a substantive argument, we need not address it.

¶ 22 Heather’s sixth argument is that newly discovered email evidence which directly

impeached the GAL required the trial court to reconsider its judgment under the standards of

People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, and In re Marriage of Wolff, 355 Ill. App. 3d 403. She does not

expound on either of these cases. She then provides three paragraphs of further support. No

citations to the record or authorities are provided in these paragraphs. Rather, Heather has included

citations to the seven emails she presented as “new evidence” to the trial court in the hearing on

-7- her “Motion to Reconsider and Clarify.” Supra ¶ 11. All matters to be considered on appeal must

be made part of the official court record, and documents to be included in the record of appeal may

only consist of those which were filed in the case. Dopp v. Village of Northbrook, 196 Ill. Dec.

387, 257 (1993). This court cannot consider documents which were not previously admitted by the

trial court. Jill Knowles Enterprises, Inc. v. Dunkin, 2017 IL App (2d) 160811, ¶ 24 (citing People

v. Blankenship 406 Ill. App. 3d 578, 590 (2010)); Rosenbaum-Golden v. Golden, 381 Ill. App. 3d

65, 71 (2008). As these emails were not admitted by the trial court and are not part of the official

record on appeal, we may not consider them. See Doria, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 755 (“[W]e may not

consider as evidence any items that are not included in the record on appeal.”).

¶ 23 A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with “pertinent authority cited

and cohesive arguments presented.” Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682 (1993). It is not the

responsibility of this court to serve as an advocate. Id. Therefore, mere contentions without

argument or citation to authority, do not merit consideration on appeal. Hall v. Naper Gold Hosp.

LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 12. Heather cited only two cases in support of her sixth argument,

but she did not explain how the cases supported her argument. As Heather has failed to

meaningfully support her sixth argument with citations to pertinent authority or cohesive

argument, she has forfeited her sixth argument on appeal. Id.

¶ 24 Notwithstanding forfeiture, we find Heather’s sixth argument to be without merit. To

justify setting aside an order based on newly discovered evidence:

“(1) the party seeking to overturn the order must show due diligence in discovering

the evidence; (2) the party must also show that he could not have produced the evidence at

the first trial by exercising due diligence; (3) the party must demonstrate that the evidence

is so conclusive that it would probably change the trial result; (4) the evidence must be

-8- material and relate to the issues; and (5) the evidence cannot be merely cumulative or serve

the sole purpose of impeachment.” In re Marriage of Wolff, 355 Ill. App. 3d 403, 409-410.

Here, the emails which Heather claims are newly discovered evidence were in her possession prior

to the hearing. Supra ¶¶ 11-12. Had she exercised due diligence, she would have been able to

produce the emails at the hearing. They were within her possession, and they existed prior to the

date of the trial. Further, by Heather’s own admission, the emails solely served the purpose of

impeaching the GAL’s testimony at the hearing. Accordingly, there is no justification to set aside

the trial court’s order based on the “newly-discovered” emails.

¶ 25 Although Heather is a self-represented litigant, we note that she is nonetheless required to

follow our rules. In re Marriage of Petrik, 2012 IL App (2d) 110495, ¶ 38. Given that Heather has

only recently started representing herself, we are electing to treat her violations as misfeasance

rather than malfeasance. Nevertheless, we caution Heather that the failure to comply with appeal

rules is not an inconsequential matter (see Hall, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7), and that future

leniency from this court should not be expected.

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the De Kalb County trial court.

¶ 28 Affirmed.

-9-