HEATHER MINTON & Another v. INDUSTRIAL DEMOLITION LLC.

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedApril 24, 2025
Docket24-P-0191
StatusUnpublished

This text of HEATHER MINTON & Another v. INDUSTRIAL DEMOLITION LLC. (HEATHER MINTON & Another v. INDUSTRIAL DEMOLITION LLC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
HEATHER MINTON & Another v. INDUSTRIAL DEMOLITION LLC., (Mass. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-191

HEATHER MINTON & another1

vs.

INDUSTRIAL DEMOLITION LLC.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After the termination of their employment by the defendant,

Industrial Demolition LLC (Industrial), the plaintiffs, Heather

and William Minton,2 filed a complaint in Superior Court

alleging, among other things, that they were wrongfully

terminated in violation of public policy.3 Industrial filed a

motion for summary judgment. The judge concluded that the

Mintons' claims of wrongful termination failed as a matter of

1 William Minton.

2As the plaintiffs share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names for ease of reference.

3A prior complaint also alleged claims of quantum meruit and the manager of Industrial, Michael Roberts, was named as a defendant. These claims were dismissed by agreement as were all claims against Roberts. law and allowed the motion on all remaining counts.4 This appeal

ensued.

Background. We summarize the relevant material facts from

the summary judgment record viewed in the light most favorable

to the plaintiffs as the nonmoving parties. See Juliano v.

Simpson, 461 Mass. 527, 529 (2012). Industrial is a demolition

company with its principal place of business in St. Louis,

Missouri. It demolishes and redevelops properties throughout

the United States, hiring employees to move across the country

to work on its various projects. In September 2019, Industrial

hired William, a heavy equipment operator, to work on a

demolition project at Brayton Point in Somerset, Massachusetts

(project). Industrial also hired William's wife, Heather, to

serve as the safety director on the project and to help develop

a company safety program. There is no dispute that the

plaintiffs were hourly, at-will employees and that neither of

them had an employment contract with Industrial.

In November 2019, Industrial became the subject of an

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) complaint.

Industrial placed Heather in charge of facilitating OSHA's

investigation, which was resolved successfully during the summer

4 The Mintons did not oppose summary judgment with respect to their breach of contract claims. Thus, only their claims alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy are before us.

2 of 2020. Heather did not file any internal or external

complaint regarding an OSHA violation during her employment with

Industrial. However, shortly after her employment was

terminated in August 2020, she filed a whistleblower complaint

with OSHA and then withdrew it thirteen months later.

Additionally, in June and July 2020, while the OSHA

investigation was pending, she reported two unrelated incidents

to her superiors: (1) a haul truck driver, who was not an

Industrial employee, was speeding at the worksite and almost

struck her; and (2) another independent contractor took a

photograph of her license plate and followed her in an attempt

to intimidate her. Neither incident was reported to law

enforcement or any other external entity; however, Heather filed

an internal safety report regarding the first matter.

As noted, William worked as a heavy equipment operator. On

April 21, 2020, William's supervisor, Roger Oberkramer, was

asked to leave the worksite based on a complaint lodged by

another employee. William was promoted to fill Oberkramer's

position. When Oberkramer refused to leave, he and William

argued and Oberkramer threatened him and Heather. William

notified his superiors of the argument and threat. Oberkramer

was allegedly the subject of additional complaints by his

subordinates. Industrial transferred Oberkramer to a different

job site but did not fire him.

3 Soon after William was promoted, between June and August

2020, the project began to wind down and Industrial started to

transfer equipment to another smaller project in Fox Lake,

Minnesota. The Mintons expected to be selected for that

project, and they explored various living accommodations in

Minnesota. As it turned out, they were not asked to work on the

new project. In August 2020, Industrial informed the Mintons

and other employees that the project was nearly complete, and

soon, their services would no longer be needed. Industrial put

Oberkramer in charge of the Minnesota project, and did not hire

a safety coordinator for it.

As previously noted, the Mintons contend that the

termination of their employment was in violation of public

policy and, consequently, the judge erred in granting summary

judgment in favor of Industrial. We conclude otherwise.

Discussion. "We review the disposition of a motion for

summary judgment de novo, to determine whether all material

facts have been established such that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (citation omitted).

American Int'l Ins. Co. v. Robert Seuffer GMBH & Co., 468 Mass.

109, 113 (2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1061 (2014). Although

our review is de novo, we reach the same conclusion as the judge

for the reasons articulated in her well-reasoned memorandum of

decision and order.

4 As the judge explained, Heather claims that she was fired

in retaliation for raising safety concerns and for her

involvement in the OSHA investigation. William argues he was

fired because Industrial preferred that Oberkramer, who was less

safety conscious, supervise the project in Minnesota. Neither

claim can survive summary judgment.

As an initial matter, "[s]ubject to rare public policy

exceptions, employment at will can be terminated for any reason

or for no reason." Harrison v. NetCentric Corp., 433 Mass. 465,

478 (2001). The public policy exception applies in

circumstances where an employee is terminated for "asserting a

legally guaranteed right (e.g., filing workers' compensation

claim), for doing what the law requires (e.g., serving on a

jury), or for refusing to do that which the law forbids (e.g.,

committing perjury)." Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled

Children, 412 Mass. 469, 472 (1992), quoting Smith-Pfeffer v.

Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State Sch., 404 Mass.

145, 149-150 (1989). The exception generally does not apply

where an employee is fired after lodging a complaint based on

"the internal administration, policy, functioning, and other

matters of an organization." King v. Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576,

583 (1994), S.C., 424 Mass. 1 (1996).

Here, to the extent that Heather bases her claim of

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Mello v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc.
524 N.E.2d 105 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1988)
Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp.
575 N.E.2d 1107 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1991)
King v. Driscoll
638 N.E.2d 488 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1994)
Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State School
533 N.E.2d 1368 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1989)
Wright v. Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children
589 N.E.2d 1241 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1992)
King v. Driscoll
673 N.E.2d 859 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1996)
Harrison v. NetCentric Corp.
744 N.E.2d 622 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2001)
Juliano v. Simpson
461 Mass. 527 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2012)
American International Insurance v. Robert Seuffer GmbH & Co. KG
468 Mass. 109 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2014)
Chace v. Curran
881 N.E.2d 792 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2008)
Mercado v. Manny's T.V. & Appliance, Inc.
928 N.E.2d 979 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
HEATHER MINTON & Another v. INDUSTRIAL DEMOLITION LLC., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heather-minton-another-v-industrial-demolition-llc-massappct-2025.