Heather A. Greenlee v. Jesse D. Bobbitt

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 28, 2025
• Docket: 09-23-00404-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-23-00404-CV __________________

HEATHER A. GREENLEE, Appellant

V.

JESSE D. BOBBITT, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law Liberty County, Texas Trial Cause No. 23C C-CV-00 140 __________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jesse D. Bobbitt obtained a judgment for possession against Heather A.

Greenlee in a suit for eviction tried in the County Court at Law of Liberty County,

Texas. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.002. In her appeal, Greenlee contends that

she was entitled to but did not receive a thirty-day notice of non-renewal required

by section 91.001 of the Texas Property Code. See id. § 91.001(a). We understand

her issue as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the

judgment for possession. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

1 Standard of Review

In a civil nonjury case, a complaint regarding the legal insufficiency of the

evidence may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d). The

record contains neither written findings of fact and conclusions of law nor shows

any party requested them. Following a bench trial, when the trial court does not issue

separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, all facts necessary to support its

judgment are implied. See BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789,

795 (Tex. 2002); Ramin’ Corp. v. Wills, No. 09-14-00168-CV, 2015 WL 6121602,

at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 15, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). We must affirm the

judgment if it can be upheld on any legal theory the evidence supports. See In re

W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984); Ramin’ Corp., 2015 WL 6121602, at *4.

When the appellate record includes the reporter’s and clerk’s records, implied

findings are not conclusive and may be challenged based on legal sufficiency. BMC

Software Belg., 83 S.W.3d at 795; Ramin’ Corp., 2015 WL 6121602, at *4. We

review the trial court’s decision for legal sufficiency of the evidence by the same

standards applied in reviewing the evidence supporting a jury’s finding. Catalina v.

Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). We review the evidence in the light most

favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every reasonable inference that

would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). We

2 credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary

evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 827.

When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on which she

did not have the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal that no evidence

supports the adverse finding. Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Peña, 442 S.W.3d 261,

263 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam). In a bench trial, the trial court, as factfinder, is the sole

judge of the witnesses’ credibility and weight of the evidence and is tasked with

resolving conflicts in the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences from basic

facts to ultimate facts. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819–21; Sw. Bell Tel. Co.

v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 625 (Tex. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Morrell v.

Morrell, No. 09-20-00086-CV, 2022 WL 959943, at *12 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

Mar. 31, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The factfinder may choose to believe one

witness over another, and we do not substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s. See

Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003) (discussing

in context of a jury trial); see also Morrell, 2022 WL 959943, at *12.

Trial Testimony

In the December 2023 bench trial before the County Court at Law, Bobbitt

testified that he let Greenlee move in with him into his fifth wheel travel trailer in

February. At the time, the travel trailer was located on real property owned by

3 Bobbitt’s brother. Bobbitt stated, “[Greenlee] doesn’t pay rent. We don’t have any

kind of agreements.” She did not have her own bedroom.

Greenlee stated they were dating and Bobbitt invited her to move in with him.

Greenlee agreed they did not have a written lease, but she testified “the agreement

was I would help cook and clean, definitely take care of my dogs and then I pay

$200 in cash a month for rent once I get a job.” She stated that she started paying

rent after she obtained employment in May and received her first paycheck. Greenlee

stated, “I just want a 30-day notice[.]” Greenlee testified that everything was fine

until she came home on October 20 and Bobbitt had moved all her things out and

locked her out without any notice.

Bobbitt denied that Greenlee paid him $200 in May, June, July, August, or

September. Bobbitt stated, “I’ve never asked her for rent or anything, except to

leave.” His three-day notice to vacate is dated October 20, 2023. Bobbitt stated that

he moved out in October because Greenlee started calling in police reports daily. As

a result, Bobbitt’s brother instructed him to remove the trailer from the property.

Analysis

The parties agreed that Bobbitt allowed Greenlee to move in with him, but the

terms under which she remained there were disputed by the parties. Bobbitt denied

they had an agreement that gave Greenlee a right to live in the fifth-wheel trailer in

exchange for payment of rent. He disputed that Greenlee ever paid him any money.

4 Greenlee disputed that she was merely a guest in his home. She claimed they had an

oral agreement and in accordance with that agreement she paid Bobbitt $200 each

month beginning in May or June.

As the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court could accept

or reject all or any part of their testimony. The trial court could accept Bobbitt’s

claim that he did not have a month-to-month tenancy agreement with Greenlee, or it

could believe Greenlee’s testimony that she had an agreement to pay monthly rent

to Bobbitt and also believe Bobbitt’s testimony that Greenlee never paid any rent to

him. The subsection of section 91.004 that requires a notice of termination of a

monthly tenancy or a tenancy from month-to-month does not apply if there is a

breach of contract recognized by law. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 91.001(e)(2). The

evidence supports a finding that Bobbitt had a superior right to immediate possession

of the property and Greenlee did not. Accordingly, legally sufficient evidence

supports the judgment awarding possession of the property to Bobbitt.

We overrule Greenlee’s issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice

Submitted on August 25, 2025 Opinion Delivered August 28, 2025

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.