Heath v. Turner, Special Deputy Banking, Etc.

77 S.W.2d 9, 256 Ky. 715, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 485
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedDecember 11, 1934
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 77 S.W.2d 9 (Heath v. Turner, Special Deputy Banking, Etc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Heath v. Turner, Special Deputy Banking, Etc., 77 S.W.2d 9, 256 Ky. 715, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 485 (Ky. 1934).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Crear, Commissioner

Affirming.

On April 25, 1933, the. Peoples Bank of Sulphur, Ky., a state banking in'stitution, was, by order of' its board of directors, closed, and its affairs placed in the hands of the banking and securities commissioner of the state of Kentucky. Thereafter, J. Wirt Turner was duly appointed and qualified as special deputy banking commissioner and liquidating agent to liquidate the bank, and as such instituted an action against G-. P. Heath, seeking to recover on a promissory note for $1,000 dated May 26, 1932, which the latter executed and delivered to the bank, the note bearing interest after maturity.

By answer, defendant admitted the execution of the note and that no part thereof had been paid. In a second paragraph he alleged that on or about May 26, 1930, the banking and securities commissioner notified the bank of a depreciation in its funds and the impairment of its capital stock; that, in order to maintain the capital stock unimpaired, defendant, without receiving any value and for the purpose of lending his name’to the bank, executed a note for the principal sum of $1,000 and delivered same to the bank during August or September, 1930; that the note was subsequently renewed on May 26, 1931, and again on May 26, 1932; that he executed the original and subsequent renewals to the bank solely as an accommodation to it without receiving ■any value or benefit from the bank. In a third para *717 graph he further alleged that on or about June 17, 1930, and before delivery of the original note to the bank, it was agreed and understood by defendant and the bank that, in case of voluntary or involuntary liquidation of the bank or of its closing, there would be no requirement of defendant to pay the note until the bank’s surplus, undivided profits, capital stock, and double liability had' been first exhausted, and that upon the renewal of the note that agreement and understanding was renewed and reaffirmed between the parties; and that the agreement was reduced to writing and spread upon the minute book of the bank at a special meeting of its board of directors held June 7, 1932. He further alleged that at no time prior to the institution of this action, or at any time mentioned in the pleading, had the bank’s surplus, undivided profits, capital stock, or double liability assessment been exhausted, and that no suit had been instituted by the banking' commissioner or his deputy in charge of the bank against the stockholders of the bank to collect or assess any double liability against the stockholders.

By reply, plaintiff alleged that on May 26, 1930, and prior to and thereafter until it was closed, defendant was a director and stockholder in the bank; that, at the time of the execution of the original note, the banking commissioner had demanded that the capital structure of the bank be made whole because it had become impaired by reason of depreciation in and loss of assets, and threatened to close the bank unless the officers and stockholders would put sufficient funds in the institution to bring its capital stock to par; that defendant, being-an owner of stock and believing that he would have to pay double liability and would lose the stock he owned if the bank should be closed, together with other officers, stockholders, and directors of the bank, executed and delivered the notes to the bank to be used as assets of the institution, thereby preventing it from closing; that the' original notes and the renewals thereof were placed in the bank as assets and reported to the banking department as such in each annual report made by the bank and at each and every examination of the bank made by the banking commissioner; that, but for the execution of the notes, the banking commissioner would have closed the bank at the time they were executed. Plaintiff denied that the note was executed solely as an accommodation to the bank or without benefit or value to defendant, and alleged that defendant received the *718 benefit of keeping the bank open and giving’ the opportunity to make good its losses; that the depositors and other creditors of the bank dealt and deposited funds with it on the faith and belief that defendant’s note and other notes executed by the stockholders and directors were good and valid obligations of the bank. Plaintiff ■further alleged that, after the execution of the original note and before the execution of the renewals, the bank was closed upon demand of the banking commissioner because the capital stock had become impaired with the notes sued on as a part of its assets, and that defendant with other directors and stockholders put up cash and other securities to be used as assets of the bank in an amount sufficient to make up the impairment of the capital stock, and thereupon the banking commissioner permitted the bank to reopen for business. It is further alleged in the reply that the liabilities of the bank amount to $71,000, and that not more than $60,000 could be realized from its assets, including defendant’s note and the notes of other officers and directors of the bank, and including the undivided profits, capital stock, surplus, and double liability of stockholders.

By rejoinder, defendant traversed the affirmative allegations of the reply.

The cause having been submitted on a demurrer to the reply, it was adjudged by the court that the demurrer relate back and be sustained as to the answer, and defendant was given time to further plead.

Thereafter, an amended answer was filed reiterating the allegations of the original answer as to the way and manner and the purpose for which the note and renewals were executed and the agreement and understanding relative thereto. It was further alleged that on or about May 26,' 1930, O. S. Denny, as banking commissioner, notified the Peoples Bank of Sulphur of an alleged threatened depreciation in the bond account of the bank, and, in order to maintain unimpaired the bond account and without receiving any value and for the purpose of lending his name to the bank, he executed the note and the renewals thereof and delivered same to the bank; that, at the time the original note was executed and delivered, the capital stock of the bank was unimpaired, and that it had a surplus account of $10,-000; that the banking commissioner at no time notified 'defendant of any impairment of the capital stock, and that, at all times mentioned in the pleading, the bank *719 was, to the best knowledge and belief of defendant, in a solvent condition; that, prior to the delivery of the note sued on, the .cashier of the bank notified O. S. Denny, banking commissioner, of the agreement between the bank and the defendant concerning the note, and that the banking commissioner agreed, permitted, and allowed the note to be executed and delivered to the bank with the stipulation and condition evidenced by the minute book of the directors’ meeting held June 7, 1930. That on November 22, 1930, E. H. Short, bank examiner, by letter notified the banking commissioner of the note and of the meeting of the directors concerning it, and on December 23, 1930, "W. A. Dicken, the banking commissioner of the state of Kentucky, was present at a call meeting of the board of directors of the bank and examined the notes as previously described and approved, and ratified same with their attending conditions.

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Bluebook (online)
77 S.W.2d 9, 256 Ky. 715, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 485, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heath-v-turner-special-deputy-banking-etc-kyctapphigh-1934.