Heath v. Department of the Army

640 F. App'x 989
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedApril 7, 2016
Docket2016-1273
StatusUnpublished

This text of 640 F. App'x 989 (Heath v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Heath v. Department of the Army, 640 F. App'x 989 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

George Heath petitions for review of a September 30, 2015, decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB” or “Board”) affirming the Department of the Army’s (“Army”) action removing him from federal service effective January 17, 2014. We affirm.

Background

George Heath served as an animal health technician at the William Beaumont Army Medical Center (“Medical Center”) in Fort Bliss, Texas, from September 2009 to January 2014. Mr. Heath was responsible for serving as a quality control officer, fulfilling the duties of a senior animal health technician, and leading and performing oversight work involving the operation of the animal facility and the care of laboratory animals.

On October 3, 2011, Mr. Heath disclosed alleged violations of procedures and falsification of data by his then supervisor, Major Todd Collins, to the Chairman of the Medical Center’s Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Mr. Heath alleged that, because he had made these disclosures, Major Collins informed him that he would no longer be allowed to perform supervisory duties. On September 18, 2012, Mr. Heath filed an individual right of action appeal seeking restoration of his supervisory duties, but the administrative judge held that Mr. Heath’s disclosures “were part of [his] normal duties and were made through normal channels” and therefore “do not qualify as protected disclosures under the [Whistleblower Protection Act].” Resp’t’s App’x (“App’x”) at 63.

On September 11, 2013, the Board granted Mr. Heath’s petition for review and remanded to the administrative judge, because the intervening Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act clarified that disclosures made in the normal course of one’s duties may qualify as protected disclosures. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2). On January 27, 2014, the administrative judge found that the Army “failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that, absent any protected disclosures, it would have eliminated [Mr. Heath’s] supervisory duties.” App’x at 86. The administrative judge granted Mr. Heath’s request for corrective action and ordered the Army to, within 20 days, “provide [Mr. Heath] with relief such that he is placed as nearly as possible in the same situation he would have been had the agency not retaliated *991 against him for whistleblowing.” App’x at 88.

Meanwhile, Major Collins was promoted and left the Medical Center in June 2012. In April 2012, shortly before Major Collins’s departure, Staff Sergeant Prycie Turner (“SSG Turner”) joined the Medical Center and became Mr. Heath’s new supervisor. On March 15, 2013, SSG Turner proposed Mr. Heath’s removal for failure to observe orders, rules, or procedures, and failure to carry out assigned duties. The Army removed Mr. Heath on April 18, 2013, and Mr. Heath appealed to the Board, arguing, inter alia, that his removal, like the elimination of his supervisory duties, was retaliation for the alleged whistleblowing that occurred in 2011. On September 12, 2013, an administrative judge rejected Mr. Heath’s affirmative defense of retaliation for whistleblowing, but set aside the removal because Mr. Heath was not made aware of or given an opportunity to respond to certain ex parte communications made to the deciding official, Colonel Eric Morgan. On October 28, 2013, the Army reinstated Mr. Heath, and simultaneously placed him on paid administrative leave retroactive to April 18, 2013. On the same day, the Army instituted removal proceedings on the same grounds as the first removal.

The proposed removal letter was based on: (1) “Failure to observe orders, rules, or procedures where safety to persons or property is endangered”; (2) “[fjailure to observe orders, rules, or procedures where safety to persons or property is not endangered”; and (3) “[fjailure to carry out assigned duties.” App’x at 121. Specifically, Mr. Heath was charged with:

• leaving work early on February 5, 2013, and failing, inter alia, to properly clean and disinfect animal cages and related items;
• euthanizing animals on or around February 22, 2013, without observing the experimental protocol or standard operating procedure;
• arriving to work early on March 4, 2013, without notifying a supervisor of his entrance to the building outside of normal duty hours, in violation of standard operating procedure and prior counseling; and
• failing to prepare for a scheduled animal surgery on February 7, 2013.

App’x at 121-22. Because this was Mr. Heath’s third instance of formal discipline for misconduct, 1 SSG Turner proposed removal. Mr. Heath was removed for a second time on January 17, 2014, 2 and he once more appealed his removal to the Board, again arguing, among other things, that he had been removed in retaliation for the alleged 2011 whistleblowing. An administrative judge sustained Mr. Heath’s second removal on May 14, 2014. On appeal, however, the Board vacated and remanded, holding that the administrative judge erred in “finding that [Mr. Heath] was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from litigating the facts underlying the agency’s charges” that were determined in the first removal action, and held that the administrative judge “must afford *992 the parties the opportunity to further develop the record.” App’x at 29-30.

Following additional briefing and a one-day hearing, the administrative judge affirmed Mr.. Heath’s second removal on September 30, 2015. The administrative judge determined that the Army had proven by preponderant evidence that Mr. Heath had engaged in the charged misconduct and that the penalty of removal was reasonable and promoted the efficiency of service. The administrative judge also held that Mr. Heath had established a prima facie case of reprisal for whistle-blowing based on Mr. Heath’s prior protected disclosures, and evidence that his supervisor, SSG Turner, and the deciding official for the second removal, Colonel Lisa Lehning, were aware of his whistle-blowing. However, the administrative judge found that the Army had established by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of Mr. Heath’s disclosures.

Mr. Heath did not file a petition with the Board for review of the initial decision, which became the final decision of the Board on November 4, 2015. Mr. Heath now petitions for review of the final decision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

Discussion

. We must affirm the decision of the MSPB unless it was (1) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); Salmon v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

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Related

Salmon v. Social Security Administration
663 F.3d 1378 (Federal Circuit, 2011)
Whitmore v. Department of Labor
680 F.3d 1353 (Federal Circuit, 2012)

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Bluebook (online)
640 F. App'x 989, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heath-v-department-of-the-army-cafc-2016.