Hearne v. Smith

208 S.E.2d 268, 23 N.C. App. 111, 1974 N.C. App. LEXIS 2025
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedSeptember 18, 1974
Docket7419SC625
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 208 S.E.2d 268 (Hearne v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hearne v. Smith, 208 S.E.2d 268, 23 N.C. App. 111, 1974 N.C. App. LEXIS 2025 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974).

Opinion

VAUGHN, Judge.

Defendant-movant relies on plaintiff’s allegation that plaintiff was the owner of and passenger in an automobile which was negligently driven by Walter Ivey Smith so as to proximately cause a collision and resulting injury and damage to plaintiff. Defendant then moves for summary judgment on the grounds that as a result of plaintiff’s capacity as owner and status as passenger, Walter Ivey Smith’s negligence is imputed to him, thereby making plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law.

“In North Carolina, negligence is imputed to the owner-occupant of an automobile according to the following test: ‘Did the owner, under the circumstances disclosed, have the legal right to control the manner in which the automobile was being operated — was his relation to the operation such that he would have been responsible to a third party for the negligence of the driver ?’ ”

Etheridge v. R. R. Co., 7 N.C. App. 140, 144, 171 S.E. 2d 459, 462. Also see Shoe v. Hood, 251 N.C. 719, 724, 112 S.E. 2d 543, 548.

*113 Here, although plaintiff may not have had physical control, he did have the legal right to control, and that is the test.

The application of “imputed negligence” to contributory negligence has been upheld in cases to bar recovery by an owner-occupant. Etheridge v. R. R. Co., supra, at 145, 171 S.E. 2d, at 462. Such an application to the present case establishes the contributory negligence of plaintiff, owner-occupant, and thus bars any recovery by plaintiff against defendant.

The foregoing necessitates our conclusion that the movant did satisfy his burden of showing that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56 (e), “an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading” and his response “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” If the adverse party fails to do so, summary judgment shall be entered against him.

Following defendant’s motion for summary judment in the case at bar, plaintiff, as the adverse party, did not meet his burden of coming forward with specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial.

The judgment granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Judges Campbell and Parker concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Oxendine v. Bowers
398 S.E.2d 57 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1990)
Rhoads v. Bryant
289 S.E.2d 637 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1982)
Bohin v. State
274 S.E.2d 592 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1980)
Siders v. Gibbs
249 S.E.2d 858 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1978)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
208 S.E.2d 268, 23 N.C. App. 111, 1974 N.C. App. LEXIS 2025, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hearne-v-smith-ncctapp-1974.