Hearn v. Warden

District Court, S.D. California·Decided January 23, 2024·No. 3:22-cv-00255·Unknown

Opinion

WILLIAM HEARN, CDCR #AS-7111, Case No.: 22-cv-255-AGS-DDL

Plaintiff, ORDER: v. (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S RJD WARDEN, et al., MOTION TO APPOINT Defendants. COUNSEL WITHOUT PREJUDICE; (2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EFFECT SERVICE OF SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS VIA UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE; and (3) DEFERRING RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO [Dkt. Nos. 54, 55] Plaintiff William Hearn (“Plaintiff”), an inmate previously incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, California, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court are (1) Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Appoint Counsel (“Motion for Counsel”) [Dkt. No. 54]; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Effectuate Service of the Second Amended Complaint and Summons via the United States Marshals Service (“Motion for Service”) [Dkt. No. 55]; and (3) Defendants M. Pollard and E. Frijas’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”) [Dkt. No. 59]. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the Motion for Counsel; GRANTS the Motion for Service; and defers ruling on the Motion to Dismiss pending filing of a responsive pleading by the newly served Defendants. I. Plaintiff filed his original complaint on February 24, 2022, alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the First and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See generally Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff concurrently moved to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2. By order dated June 13, 2022, the District Judge granted the in forma pauperis motion, dismissed some—but not all—of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and directed service of the complaint by the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”). See Dkt. No. 5. On September 29, 2022, Defendants M. Pollard and E. Frijas filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s original complaint. Dkt. No. 15. On October 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 25. On November 17, 2022, before briefing was complete on the first motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint and his first motion for appointment of counsel. Dkt. Nos. 26, 27. On December 2, 2022, the undersigned denied Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel without prejudice. Dkt. No. 29 at 3-5. On December 14, 2022, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation to the District Judge to deny the first motion to dismiss as moot in light of Plaintiff’s filing of the First Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 30. The parties filed briefing on Defendants’ objection to the Report and Recommendation. Dkt. Nos. 31, 32. Before the District Judge issued an order on the Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, a proposed second amended complaint, and a motion for an order directing service of the complaint by the USMS. Dkt. Nos. 34, 35, 36. On September 6, 2023, the District Judge issued an order adopting the Report and Recommendation; overruling Defendants’ objection thereto and ruling that the First Amended Complaint superseded the original complaint; and denying the first motion to dismiss as moot. See Dkt. No. 40. On September 11, 2023, the undersigned issued an order granting Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint; rejecting the proposed second amended complaint and directing Plaintiff to re-file a second amended complaint subject to specific requirements; and denying Plaintiff’s motion for an order directing service by the USMS. See generally Dkt. No. 41. On October 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed a second version of the second amended complaint; a renewed motion for an order directing service of the complaint by the USMS; and a renewed motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Dkt. Nos. 46, 47, 48. On November 8, 2023, the Court held a Status Conference to address Plaintiff’s motions. On November 13, 2023, the Court issued an order striking the second version of Plaintiff’s second amended complaint due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirements set forth in the Court’s September 11 order; denying as moot Plaintiff’s renewed motion for leave to file a second amended complaint; and directing Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint that complied with the requirements of the September 11 order. Dkt. No. 52. On November 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint, the instant Motion for Counsel, and the instant Motion for Service. Dkt. Nos. 53, 54, 55. On January 10, 2024, Defendants M. Pollard and E. Frijas filed an opposition to the Motion for Counsel and the instant Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 58, 59. / / / / / / / / / II. A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel “There is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.” Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp., 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994). However, District Courts have discretion to “request” that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of “exceptional circumstances.” See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 823 (9th Cir. 1989). “That a pro se litigant may be better served with the assistance of counsel is not the test.” Okler v. MCC IMU Prison, No. 3:18-cv-05458-RJB-TLF, 2019 WL 461143, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 5, 2019). Instead, the Court “must determine whether . . . there is a likelihood of success on the merits” and whether “the prisoner is unable to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 2014). Neither factor is “dispositive” but “must be considered cumulatively.” Id. In the Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s first motion for appointment of counsel, the Court determined that “[a]t this early stage of the proceedings, there is no basis upon which the Court can predict Plaintiff’s success at trial.” Dkt. No. 29 at 3 (citation omitted). The current procedural posture of the case does not differ significantly from where it was at the time of Plaintiff’s first motion for appointment of counsel, and it remains too soon for the Court to predict Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits of his case. Additionally, the Court addressed Plaintiff’s ability to pursue his claims in the context of each of the six factors Plaintiff asserted in support of his motion for appointment of counsel, and which factors Plaintiff re-asserts in support of the instant Motion for Counsel. See id. at 3-5; see also Dkt. No. 54 at 2. In its prior order, the Court concluded that “none of the factors identified by Plaintiff, alone or in combination, demonstrate that he is unable to articulate his claims or advocate for himself in this action.” Dkt. No. 29 at 5. For the reasons stated as to each factor in the Court’s prior order, the same remains true of the instant Motion for Counsel. Accordingly, the Motion for Counsel is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Service In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff identifies three Doe Defendants by name as J. Cepeda, S. Mancilla Bravo, and I. Alfaro, all of whom Plaintiff alleges are correctional staff at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility. Dkt. No. 53 at ¶ 2. Plaintiff has requested tha

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Related

Erineo Cano v. Nicole Taylor
739 F.3d 1214 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp.
32 F.3d 1360 (Ninth Circuit, 1994)
Burns v. County of King
883 F.2d 819 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)