Head Drilling Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission

170 P. 157, 177 Cal. 194, 1918 Cal. LEXIS 575
California Supreme Court·Decided January 9, 1918·No. S. F. No. 8257.·Published·Cited by 34 cases

Opinions

ANGELLOTTI, C. J.

This is a proceeding to review an award in favor of one W. H. Scott, for injuries due to accident on February 24, 1916, in the course of and arising out of his employment, against the Head Drilling Company, his employer, and the Georgia Casualty Company, insurer of the employer. It was concluded by the commission that.the disability of Scott continued up to and still existed at the time *195 of judgment by the commission, and the award was for $243.12 as the balance due as disability indemnity to September 15, 1916, and for the further sum of $15.56 per week from that date until the termination of the disability or the further order of the commission, not to exceed in all 240 weeks. The award is attacked solely on the ground that any disability beyond the period of fourteen weeks from March 10, 1916, was in fact due to a second accident and injury which did not occur in the course of Scott’s employment, and on account of which the employer is in no way responsible, and that the commission had no jurisdiction to award compensation for the disability in so far as it was caused by the second injury.

On February 24, 1916, Scott, while removing a sprocket from an engine, was struck by a fly-wheel, sustaining a fracture of several ribs and a Pott’s fracture of the left leg. The fracture of the leg was further described in the findings as a spiral fracture, and the evidence disclosed that the fibula was badly comminuted. He was taken to a hospital, where he remained till April 12th, being attended by a doctor who was paid by the insurance company. There appears to be no question as to the very serious nature of the fracture, the difficulty of setting the bones in place and in thereafter holding them in place until a permanent union was effected, and the slowness "of complete recovery. According to some of the evidence, a recovery within four months “would be very good.” After reducing the swelling and removing “several little fragments” of bone, the doctor “tried to get the bone lined up in proper apposition,” and “used kangaroo tendon to support the broken fragments in place,” and put the leg from the toes to just below the knee in a plaster cast. At the end of four or five weeks the cast was split and opened for “massage and manipulation, ’ ’ but still used as a protection, being held by bandages over it. An X-ray taken by the doctor indicated, according to his testimony, that the bones were “in good position. ’ ’ There is some uncertainty in the evidence of the doctor as to the exact date when this X-ray was taken. We assume it was after the cast' was opened, but there is testimony that this was some little time before Scott’s discharge from the hospital. About the twelfth day of April he was discharged from the hospital, the doctor deeming it best that he should begin to use the leg, but still supervising the case. *196 He went to his home, the east still on the leg, using crutches. On the evening of April 15th what is called the “second accident” occurred. Scott testified that he was sitting at the dining-room table, and arose to get some kodak pictures that were on a wardrobe shelf just back of him. He said:' “I raised up and turned around like this and got the pictures, and when I turned back there was a wrinkle in the rug that straightened out under the good foot. I didn’t have to take a step, but when the wrinkle straightened out I caught my hand on the table and chair and this heel struck the pedestal of the table or a chair, I don’t know which it was. I never fell. I never fell to the floor. It hurt me quite a bit for about an hour, and after that I didn’t realize any more pain and I slept all right that night.” An X-ray taken within two or three days thereafter showed that the fragments of bone were not entirely in place.

The accident commission made the following finding: “That during the course of the employee’s convalescence from Ms injuries, and while his fractured leg was still in a cast, it was found, on or about April 15, 1916, that the broken portions of the fibula, previously placed in apposition for healing, had separated, necessitating further surgical treatment and prolonged disability; that the danger of such separation from natural causes in a fracture of this type, a spiral fracture, is very great and of frequent occurrence, with or without any immediate exciting cause; that the danger of such subsequent separation is to be anticipated in fractures of this type and is a natural consequence of the original injury; that the evidence is insufficient to show that the separation was due to any substantial independent intervening cause or to any'inde^pendent intervening cause, but that said separation was instead a proximate and natural result of the original injury.”

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Head Drilling Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 170 P. 157, 177 Cal. 194, 1918 Cal. LEXIS 575 (Cal. 1918).

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